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ABSTRACT
STABILITY IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS: THE ROLE OF RUSSIA AND TURKEY
Rovshan SADIGBEYLI
M.A., International Relations
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu
August 2002
Numerous ethnic and territorial conflicts that re-emerged after the demise of the Soviet
Union are the primary factors that beset the long-term stability in the post-Soviet space and
particularly in the South Caucasus. However, regional security problems have also an external
dimension as the regional powers, primarily Russia, instrumentalized regional conflicts in order
to reinstate its predominant position in the region and to prevent involvement of other regional
and non-regional powers. The South Caucasian states, primarily Azerbaijan and Georgia in
order to forestall Russian hegemony chose to foster geopolitical pluralism in the region by
diversifying their security ties with external regional and non-regional powers, primarily
Turkey and the USA. The conflicting security interests eventually increased the possibility of
emergence of informal alliances along North-South and East-West axis. This led to a
polarization in the region. Taking into considearation that the external dimension of the
instability in the South Caucasus increased the zero-sum character of the regional conflicts and
complicated the process of the conflict resolution, the following paradigm seems to emerge: the
lasting solution to these conflicts depends to a large extent on the interests and policies pursued
by powerful regional and extra-regional states. Although there are several stability pact projects
proposed by various governments
iv
and research institutes for the South Caucasus, it seems to be very difficult if not impossible to
achieve the long-term stability in the South Caucasus until a paradigm shift takes place from a
zero-sum rivalries between the major regional as well as extra-regional states to the framework
of a balance-of-interests, the essence of which is that each major state claiming to have “vital
interests” in the region should take into account interests and concerns of other states, paving
the ground for cooperative arrangements.
vÖZET
GÜNEY KAFKASYA’DA ISTIKRAR: RUSYA’NIN VE TÜRKİYE’NİN ROLÜ
Rovshan SADIGBEYLI
Master tezi, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü
Tez yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu
Ağustos 2002
Sovyetler Birliği yıkıldıktan sonra, etnik çatışmalar ve bölgesel ülkelerin toprak
bütünlüğüne tehditler en önemli istikrarsızlık faktörleri olarak ortaya çıkmıştı. Öte yandan,
bölgedeki eski hakimiyetini yeniden kurmak isteyen ve diğer bölge dışı güçlerin müdahalesini
engellemek amacı güden Rusya, bölgesel güvenlik sorunlarını etkileyen önemli bir aktör olarak
belirdi.
Özellikle Azerbaycan ve Gürcüstan, bölgedeki Rus etkisini azaltmak, bağımsızlıklarını
güçlendirmek ve jeopolitik çoğulunluğu perçinlemek amacıyla, ABD ve Türkiye ile işbirliğine
giriştiler. Çatışan güvenlik çıkarları doğu-batı ve kuzey-güney eksenlerinde resmi nitelik
taşımayan ittifakların doğma ihtimalini artırarak, kutuplaşmalara sebebiyet verdi. Sonuçta,
bölgesel ve bölge dışı faktörler bölgesel istikrarsızlıkları artırarak, uyuşmazlıklarının çözümünü
güçleştirmiştir.
Bu arada, bazı hükümetler, devlet başkanları ve araştırma merkezleri Güney Kafkasya’da
kalıcı barış ve istikrarı sağlayacağı ümidiyle istikrar paktı projeleri önermişlerdir. Ancak bu tür
önerilerin başarılı olmasını engelleyen faktörler hala mevcuttur. Bölgede etkili olan devletler
aralarındaki ilişkileri güç dengesi anlayışına göre değerlendirmekten vazgeçerek, menfaat
dengeleri esasına dayandırmadıkları sürece Güney Kafkasya’da uzun vadeli istikrarın
vi
sağlanması son derece güç olacaktır. Bölgede yaşamsal çıkarları bulunan başlıca güçlü devletler
diğer devletlerin çıkarlarını ve kaygılarını dıkkate alarlarsa, bölgede işbirliğin temeli
oluşturulabilir.
vii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like first to express my sincere gratitude to Prof. Dr. Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu, who
supervised me throughout my work over this study. Without his deep knowledge of the subject
and valuable information, that he shared with me, my understanding of the insights of
International Affairs in general and of the Turkish foreign policy in particular would be
incomplete.
I also deeply appreciate Asst. Prof. Gülgün Tuna and Dr. Aylin Güney for spending their
valuable time to read and review my thesis.
I would like to thank all academic and administrative staff of the Bilkent University, and
of International Relations Department in particular, who helped me greatly during my residence
in Bilkent Campus.
Finally, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my family and all my close
friends in Baku, Azerbaijan, who despite of the geographical distance, were near me with their
moral support and always encouraged my education in Turkey. Without their support it would be
difficult to complete the present study.
viii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT………………………………………………………………………………….iii
ÖZET…………………………………………………………………………………………v
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS…..………………………………………………………………vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS…………………………………………………………………...viii
LIST OF MAPS AND TABLES…………………………………………………………….xi
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS……………………………………………………………….xii
INTRODUCTION…….......………………………………………………………………..1
CHAPTER I: SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS
 AFTER THE DISSOLUTION OF THE SOVIET UNION………..…….5
1.1. Regional Approach to the Stability in the South Caucasus………………..5
1.2.   The “Russian Factor” in the South Caucasus……………………….……12
1.2.1. Transformation of Russian Foreign Policy……………….…………………..15
1.2.2. The Role of the Military Establishment ……………………………………...22
1.2.3. Continuity and Change in Russian Security Policy at the Doctrinal Level……24
1.3.   “The Last Surge South” - Neo-imperialistic Ambitions or Legitimate
          Concerns?……………………………………………………………….…..29
1.3.1.  Russia’s Military-Strategic Interests in the South Caucasus…………………32
1.3.2.  Russia’s Political Interests in the South Caucasus………...…………………45
1.3.3.  Russia’s Economic Interests in the South Caucasus…………….…………...49
ix
1.4.  Walking the Tightrope: Security Dilemmas of the South Caucasian
         States ………………………………………………………………………..53
1.4.1.  Common Security Perceptions of Azerbaijan and Georgia…………….……53
1.4.2.  Militarisation of Armenia: A Factor of Instability in the South Caucasus…..65
CHAPTER II: GEOPOLITICAL PLURALISM IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS:
THE ROLE OF TURKEY.….............................................…………......70
2.1. The New Mission in the South Caucasus: Can Ankara Do It Alone?…….71
2.1.1. The New Activism in Foreign Policy……………...…..………………..……72
2.1.2. The “Turkish Model”: A Framework for Turkey’s Foreign Policy?…………78
2.1.3. Relations with the Turkic World: Sentiments vs. Realities..…………………82
2.2.    Turkey’s Strategic Engagement in the South Caucasus…………………89
2.2.1.  Turkey’s Dilemma in the South Caucasus…………………………………..89
2.2.2.  Old Power Rivalries – New Concerns:  Turkey - Russia - Iran Triangle……97
2.2.3. Turkey’s Role in the Diversification of Security Ties of Azerbaijan and
            Georgia……………………………………………………………………..104
2.3.  Baku-Ceyhan Pipeline: Diversification of Energy Supply or Dubious
           Battle for the “Sphere of Influence”?……………………………………109
  2.3.1.  Caspian Basin Energy Availability…………………………………………..109
2.3.2.  Caspian Energy: A Contribution to the World Energy Security?…………...110
2.3.3.  Baku-Ceyhan Pipeline: Geo-Economics vs. Geo-Strategy………………….112
xCHAPTER III: PROSPECTS OF A STABILITY PACT FOR THE SOUTH
         CAUCASUS………………………………………………………….121
3.1.    The Obstacles to the Stability in the South Caucasus…………………..121
3.2.  The “Stability Pact” Model: A Long-Sought-After Regional Security
          Framework?………………………………………………………………..125
CONCLUSION……………………………………………………………………………144
BIBLIOGRAPHY………………………………………………………………………...148
xi
LIST OF MAPS AND TABLES
Map 1: The Wars and Major Conflicts of the 1990s………………………………………165
Map 2: The Countries and Disputed Areas of the Caucasus Region……………….……..166
Map 3: Ethnic Groups in the Caucasus Region.....................................................…….…167
Map 4: Location of Russian Forces in the South Caucasus in Early 1992………………...168
Map 5: Existent and Proposed Oil and Gas pipelines in the Caspian Sea Basin…………...169
Map 6: The “Eurasian Balkans”…………………………………………………………...170
TABLE 1: Declared Russian Military Presence in the Caucasus………..…………………171
TABLE 2: Estimated Russian Population in the Former Soviet Republics..………………172
TABLE 3: Participation in CIS Agreements………………………………………………173
xii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ACG Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli (Oil fields)
AIOC Azerbaijan International Operation Company
ANS TV Azerbaijan News Service (Azerbaijani independent TV)
APF Azerbaijani Popular Front
AzTV Azerbaijan State Television
BP British Petroleum
BSEC Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization
BTC Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline
CENTO Central Treaty Organization
CEPS Center for European Policy Studies
CFE Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIA Central Intelligence Agency (USA)
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States
CoE Council of Europe
CPC Caspian Pipeline Consortium
CSP Caucasus Stability Pact
CST Collective Security Treaty
DLP Democratic Left Party
EAPC Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ECO Economic Cooperation Organization
EU European Union
FSU Former Soviet Union
GRVZ Group of Russian Forces in Trans-Caucasus
GUUAM Georgia-Ukraine-Uzbekistan-Azerbaijan-Moldova Group
HC High Command
IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IEA International Energy Agency
ILSA Iran-Libya Sanctions Act
IMF International Monetary Fund
INOGATE Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe
JAF Joint Armed Forces
KGB Committee for National Security (in Soviet Union)
LDPR Liberal Democratic Party of Russian Federation (of V.Zhirinovsky)
MD Military District
MEP Main Export Pipeline
MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MHP Milli Hareket Partisi (National Action Party)
MoD Ministry of Defense
NACC North-Atlantic Cooperation Council
xiii
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NFU Non-First-Use pledge
NIS Newly Independent States
NMD National Missile Defense
NSC National Security Concept
OIC Organization of Islamic Conference
OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporters Countries
OPIC Organization of Private Investment Corporations
OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PfP Partnership for Peace Program
PKF Peacekeeping Force
PKK Kurdish Workers Party
PSA Production Sharing Agreement
RAND Research and Development Corporation (USA)
RF Russian Federation
RFE/RL Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
RIIA Royal Institute of International Affairs (London)
RLS Radio Location Station
SCC South Caucasus Community
START II Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
SVR External Intelligence Service (Russia)
TABDC Turkish-Armenian Business Development Council
TBMM Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi (Turkish Grand National
 Assembly)
TDA Trade and Development Agency
TDN Turkish Daily News (on-line newspaper)
TIKA Türk Işbirliği ve Kalkınma Ajansı (Turkish Cooperation and
 Development Agency)
TLE Treaty Limited Equipment
TNW Tactical Nuclear Weapons
TRACECA Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Central Asia
TRNC Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
TRT Turkish Radio and Television
TSMA Theatre for Strategic Military Action
TÜRKSOY Turkic Cultures and Arts Joint Administration
UN The United Nations Organization
URL Uniform Resource Locator
US The United States of America
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VPK Military Industrial Complex (Russia)
WB World Bank
1INTRODUCTION
The demise of the Soviet Union led to the transformation of the geopolitical environment
in the vast area stretching from the Balkans to the borders of China. Sudden withdrawal of
Russia’s authority from the former Soviet republics resulted in the overall shift of the power
balance in the post-Soviet space and collapse of regional order. A “power vacuum” that
emerged in the post-Soviet space in general and in the South Caucasus in particular gave way
to the re-emergence of centuries-old ethnic conflicts and territorial disputes that were “frozen”
by the Soviet authorities. Coupled with the dramatic decline in economic production and overall
crisis of identities, that the former Soviet republics have been living through, these conflicts beset
the stability in the South Caucasus. Since then the South Caucasian states have been searching
for the mechanisms that would maintain their security and stability. Numerous regional security
problems that increased the risk of the spill over of the conflicts into other neighboring regions
and considerable hydrocarbon resources that this region possess, draw attention of the
international community to this part of the world. Several governments, heads of state, including
Turkish ex-president Süleyman Demirel, and research institutes put forward various stability
pact projects for the South Caucasus. However, formidable obstacles make the realization of
these projects extremely difficult. The purpose of this study is to explore the main obstacles to
and the prospects for the regional stability in the South Caucasus.
The present conflicts in the region do affect the overall regional security environment,
however, this thesis is far from being an attempt to provide an overview of the roots and causes
of all the conflicts in the South Caucasus. An extensive literature exists on these issues. Rather, I
will touch upon some key aspects of these conflicts from the prism of intersection of “inner”
2triangle of regional states (Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia) and regional powers (Russia, Turkey,
Iran) that form the “outer” triangle. With the US and the EU (which increasingly views itself as
an independent international actor in its own right) that have become important factors in
regional politics, the geopolitics of the region has changed. This intersection contributed to
regional rivalries and formed an external dimension of instability and insecurity in the South
Caucasus. It is thus important to take into account policies and strategies pursued by regional
and extra-regional powers, while analyzing factors of regional instability. In the external “outer”
triangle of states I put special emphasis on the role Russia and Turkey play in the regional
politics. This is not to say, however, that the “factor of Iran” is downgraded. Rather, self-
isolationist policy of Iran on the international arena and its deconstructive regional ad hoc
policies, negatively affected Iran’s image of a country with stabilizing potential in the region.
The new security environment that formed in the aftermath of the dissolution of the
Soviet Union requires re-conceptualization of stability. Therefore, I start the first chapter by
giving the definition of an inclusive concept of stability that takes into account new non-
traditional sources of instability, such as, but not limited to non-state actors. The Newly
Independent States (NIS) had been living through a transition period from the Communist
centralized economy to the market-based one. The majority of the republics of the former
Soviet Union is positioned around of Russian borders and have their vital communications lines
still largely oriented towards Russia. This fact presupposed a continuation of their economic
dependence from their former dominion for at least a limited period of time to come. However,
they considered their economic dependence on Russia as the main threat to their political
independence and that is why were reluctant in preserving economic and political ties with
3Russia. However, the South Caucasian states were soon to discover that despite its weakened
position, Russia still retained its capabilities to influence the regional developments and remained
very important actor. The on-going armed conflicts in the South Caucasus allowed Russia to
reinstate its dominant position in the region by playing one conflicting side against the other.
Proximity of Russia and its assertive policy effected foreign and security policies of the South
Caucasian states. The Regional stability depended thus on the overall security environment in
the South Caucasus. Given, that the security environment in the South Caucasus was influenced
to a large extent by Russian foreign and security policy, it is therefore, important to examine first
the evolution of Russia’s regional policies.
In the second chapter I analyze the role “Turkish factor” played in fostering geopolitical
pluralism in the South Caucasus - a concept that emerged as a response to Russia’s attempts to
dominate the region. After the end of the Cold War Turkey felt the need to modify its cautious
foreign policy and develop a new post-Cold War strategy. Economic prosperity, increased
military capabilities of Turkey and its new geopolitical environment allowed Turkey to play a
stabilizing role in the neighboring regions. One of the directions where Turkey pursued an active
foreign policy was the post-Soviet South. Five of the fifteen ex-Soviet republics were of Turkic
origins. Turkey engaged in close economic, political and military relations with the republics, to
which it felt affinity and proposed its “model” of development. Azerbaijan and Georgia were
especially interested in developing close ties with Turkey. They saw Turkey, a NATO member,
as a reliable counterweight against Russia’s hegemonic aspirations. In this respect, Turkey’s
role in the diversification of external security ties of these states was indispensable. Though the
Caspian oil is an important contribution to the world energy security, for Turkey participation in
4the regional energy projects has more political and strategic value as the oil development and
multiple pipeline system is believed to consolidate political and economic independence of the
South Caucasian states and thus plays a positive role in the stabilization of the region. Besides,
Turkey sought to secure for itself a role of energy “terminal” that is believed would boost
Turkey’s strategic importance. The role Turkey plays in the regional energy projects is also
given special consideration.
In the third chapter I explore the obstacles to the stability in the South Caucasus and the
prospects of a “Stability Pact” model proposed by Turkey’s 9th president Süleyman Demirel for
the South Caucasus. Since the demise of the Soviet Union the primary preoccupation of
Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia has been to develop mechanisms that would maintain their
security and stability. However, numerous security problems that emanate from both internal
and external dimensions of instability in the South Caucasus prevented formation of cooperative
regional security frameworks. This study concludes that any stabilization process in the region is
conditional on the cooperative efforts of major regional and extra-regional powers, involved in
the region.
The purpose of this study is to critically examine the evolution of the politics of major
states in the South Caucasus, particularly focusing on two major actors, Russia and Turkey.
This critical examination of foreign and security policies of major actors will pave the ground for
the evaluation of the possibility of restoring long-term regional stability in the South Caucasus.
The review of the literature on this subject included books, articles, research reports, studies,
background papers, and evaluative documents. While collecting data necessary for my analysis
5I have also used such primary sources as statements and declarations of the regional political
figures.
6CHAPTER I
SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS1
 AFTER THE DISSOLUTION OF THE SOVIET UNION
1.1. Regional Approach to the Stability in the South Caucasus
 Before entering into a discussion of (in)stability in the South Caucasus, we must define
first what we exactly mean by stability. The primary focus of International Relations theory has
been on the behavior of states, and consequently the levels of analysis at which International
Relations theory operate are dealing with either a state (unit-level) and/or international system in
which states interact with each other (system-level). From this perspective, any
conceptualization of stability has to incorporate features of either the international system and/or
of its components (states). Departing from these “traditional” levels of analysis, Karl Deutsch
and J. David Singer define the stability either as “the probability that the system retains all of its
essential characteristics; that no single nation becomes dominant; that most of its members
continue to survive; and that large-scale war does not occur” (systemic approach), or from the
narrow unit-level perspective, they explain stability as the “probability of continued political
independence and territorial integrity of states without any significant probability of engaging in a
war for survival.”2 In other words, stability is considered to be an end result of the interactions
                                                
1 There are two names commonly used to describe the region comprising of Azerbaijan, Armenia and
Georgia. The term “Transcaucasus” is a translation from Russian “Zakavkazye”, which literally means
“Behind the Caucasus” (perhaps when looked from Moscow). Because the term South Caucasus is
geographically accurate and more precisely describes the region it will be adopted here.
2 See Karl W. Deutsch and J. David Singer, “Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability”, World
Politics, Vol. 16, No. 3, (April 1964), pp. 390-406 at 390-391, cited by Enver Begir Hasani, “Self-
Determination, Territorial Integrity and International Stability: the Case of Yugoslavia”, Ph. D. Dissertation,
Dept. of International Relations, Bilkent University, Ankara, (July 2001), pp.19.
7of states-as-unitary actors in an anarchical international system. Most of the IR scholars agree
that balance of power among actors is formed systematically and is the main instrument of
maintaining international stability.3 From this perspective, the relative international stability that
was established since 1945 according to the system-level approach was a consequence of the
bipolar character of the international system.4
  The disappearance of one of the poles, namely the Soviet Union in 1991 paved the
way to the transformation of the world system from a bipolar to an embryonic multipolar one.
This transformation renewed the debate among the IR scholars on the nature of the international
relations. One of the issues that were subjected to debate concerned the international stability
after the end of the Cold War. Unlike some scholars who argued that the post-Cold War era
would be more stable because the ideological and military inter-bloc confrontation was over,
several IR scholars headed by John Mearsheimer argued that the new multipolar world was less
stable compared to the bipolar one.5 He argued that the bipolar distribution of the military
power and the rough military equality between the two “poles” that contributed to the
international stability would change with the emergence of other “poles” and the system would
eventually become more imbalanced and consequently more prone to instability. Although the
developments of the last decade of the 20th century showed that the world became more
destabilized, it would be too simplistic to put the blame entirely on the emergence of new
“poles” per se. Admitting that in the multipolar world the balancing of interests among the states
                                                
3 See Andreas Osiander, The States System of Europe, 1640-1990. Peacemaking and the Conditions of
International Stability, (Oxford: Clarendon Press; New-York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1994), pp.3-4.
4 See John Lews Gaddis, “The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar System”, International
Security, Vol. 10, (Spring 1986), pp. 99-192 and Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle
for Power and Peace, 4th ed. (N-Y: Alfred A. Knopt, 1966).
5 See John J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the end of the Cold War”,
International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1, (Summer 1990).
8is much more difficult, our attention, however, should not be diverted from other non-traditional
sources of instability. The new international system is characterized not only by the emergence
of several “poles” instead of two. Along with new centers of power, the post-Cold War period
witnessed emergence of non-state entities that increasingly try to act on the international arena
as independent actors in their own right.
 Two questions may arise in this regard: what is the role of these non-state actors in the
international affairs and whether aforementioned conceptualization of stability is accurate enough
to cover all forms of stability in a changed environment? If we measure stability simply as
absence of wars and major crises between states, then the world we live in should be
characterized as relatively stable, because the current and potential threats of direct aggression
by other states are diminished considerably today, although they have not disappeared
altogether. However, even the brief outlook of the map of the conflicts of the last decade of
20th century will show that the conflicts and wars can hardly be considered a relic of the past.
What has changed is the nature of the conflicts. Most of these conflicts include non-state
entities, be it ethnic, religious or political groups, challenging state power (See Map 1). The
definition of stability given by Karl Deutsch and David Singer excludes, however, non-state
entities and therefore their actions are not taken into account as a potential source of instability.
One may well ask why these scholars developed such an exclusive concept of stability? An
assumption that the period, in which they conceptualized the stability, was free from conflicts
centered on ethnicity is not supported by facts. On the contrary, evidence suggests that the
greatest absolute and proportional increase in numbers of groups involved in serious
ethnopolitical conflicts occurred between the 1960s and the 1970s, from thirty-six groups to
9fifty-five.6 However, these ethnic groups were not acting as international actors on the world
arena, and thus were not considered to be major challenges to states. Independence and
territorial integrity of states were guaranteed by the international anarchical society through the
norms of sovereign equality of states and principle of inviolability of territorial borders.
Whenever local conflicts erupted, they were tackled either by the USA or the Soviet Union
depending in whose “sphere of influence” the crisis emerged. In other words, the world order
rested with the two superpowers that took on the role of the “disciplinarian” within their own
blocs.7
 Another question is why the end of the Cold War provoked a renewed debate among
IR scholars about the nature and significance of ethnicity in contemporary world politics? Some
observers put emphasis on the link between the deconstruction of the bloc system and the
resurgence of ethnopolitical conflicts throughout the world. They explain re-eruption of
numerous ethnicity-based conflicts by the ethnic fragmentation, which followed the further
decentralization of systemic power. According to this approach sudden disappearance of the
central authority from the former republics of the Soviet Union created greater political
opportunities for internal challenges by ethnopolitical contenders to seek independence and/or
re-distribution of and greater access to state power. These challenges were reinforced by the
expansionist objectives of adjoining states that were now freer than they were during the Cold
War to encourage ethnic kindred and coreligionists to rebellion.8 Armenia’s renewed territorial
                                                
6 See Ted Robert Gurr, “Peoples Against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System”,
International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 3, (1994), p. 350.  
7 See Enver Begir Hasani, “Self-Determination, Territorial Integrity…”(July 2001), p.19.
8 See Ted Robert Gurr, “Peoples Against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System”,
International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 3, (1994), p. 353.  
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claims to Azerbaijan and support for separatist movement in Karabakh9 is only one recent
example. As a result these non-state entities proved to be a huge source of instability within the
sovereign states where they emerged. In other words, states (especially heterogeneous ones)
are threatened nowadays not so much from the outside as from inside. As aptly argues Kalevi
Holsti, the assumption that the problem of conflict is primary a problem of relations between
states has to be seriously questioned.10 Aggressive Armenian separatism in Karabakh, Abkhaz
and South Ossetian secessionist movements in Georgia, coupled with a dramatic decline in
economic production and overall crisis of identities in these states – all are sources of the
instability that are threatening the very survival of the newly emerged nation-states (See Map 2).
Moreover, in the new security environment that was characterized by “power vacuum”, these
non-state actors became threatening not only to regional stability but also the wider international
stability.11 Taking into account the above-mentioned facts, clearly while conceptualizing stability
we have to look beyond the narrow definition of stability and develop a concept of stability that
would include non-state actors, such as ethnicity and religious-based separatist movements,
terrorist groups, just to name a few.
 It should be noted that sources of instability are intermingled with each other. Non-state
actors (primarily separatist movements) while challenging central authorities seek external
support and legitimization. As a result, these conflicts became open to external influences. The
                                                
9 The proper name of the region is Daðlýq Qarabað (Mountainous Garabag). However probably due to the
fact that the international community first learned about this region from Russian media the term “Nagorno-
Karabakh” (in Russian) became broadly accepted. Given, that this term is widely used in the literature on
this subject I will refer to the region as Karabakh to avoid confusion.
10 See Kalevi J. Holsti, The State, War and the State of War, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996),
p. 15, cited by Enver Begir Hasani, “Self-Determination, Territorial Integrity…”(July 2001), p. 22.
11 See Stephen Van Evera, “Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War”, International Security, Vol. 15,
No. 3, (Winter 1991), pp. 7-57.
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South Caucasus, which has been historically a place of rivalry between extra-regional actors, is
a case in point. Extra-regional powerful states used disputes of Caucasian peoples to advance
their own interests. They tried to oppose unwanted domination by any other major state by
creating virtual alliances with separatist regimes and regional states supporting them. However,
these balance-of-power techniques that were considered a cornerstone of international stability
throughout centuries proved to be counterproductive at the regional level. They promoted and
contributed to internal divisions and fragmentation in the region and prevented stabilization of
the region. Consequently, these crises became more dangerous as their “internationalization”
increased their spill over potential. Thus, present-day regional challenges to the international
stability have become no less acute problem for the international community. Few would doubt
nowadays that until there would exist regional sources of instability it would be very difficult if
not impossible to maintain wider international stability. Realizing the consequences of the “Great
Power” rivalry, the international community developed a concept of balance-of-interests, the
essence of which is that each major state claiming to have “vital interests” in the region should
take into account interests and concerns of other states, paving the ground for cooperative
arrangements (See Chapter III).
 Internal social, economic and political problems within the states also have destabilizing
effect. Although, in the era of globalization economic interdependence among the states
increased incentives for cooperation and was believed to foster economic interdependence
among states, thus dampening conflicts and transforming zero-sum competition for security into
positive-sum (win-win) cooperation, existence of the regional sources of instability was and is
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still a major obstacle that prevents creation and maintenance of the liberal economic order in the
region.12 As aptly argues Jayatha Dhanapala:
 Eras in history do not separate themselves in clearly demarcated segments.
There is a phasing out of one era as the new one emerges. Elements of both eras
co-exist in the transitional period. We are still in this period of transition as old
concepts of raw military power, national interests and balance-of-power assert
themselves amidst a new period of international cooperation.13
 In this regard, regional instabilities are kind of indicators of this transitional period. From
the ability of the international community to meet the challenges of these sources of instability in
numerous regions, depends how quickly and how successfully the mankind would pass this
transitional period. This is why in the post-Cold War era the focus of attention has increasingly
been on the regional sources of instability and insecurity.
 Aforementioned “traditional” levels of analysis, when applied to certain geographical
areas such as the South Caucasus or Central Asia, proved to be insufficient, however, in
providing us with a complete picture of regional dynamics. This does not suggest that studying
regional countries or exploring the impact of the international system on the regional
developments is of no use. Rather in such land-locked area as the South Caucasus, where
geography, historical and cultural legacies that shaped national identities of states are
intermingled, studying security problems of one given state separately from the trends in the
whole region would be incomplete.
 Some scholars proposed a regional level of analysis arguing that it would provide with
an important analytical tool. It should be noted that the regional approaches are not substitute
                                                
12 See Dale C. Copeland, “Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations,”
International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4, (Spring 1996).
13 See Jayatha Dhanapala (ed.) Regional Approaches to Disarmament: Security and Stability, (UNIDIR,
Dartmouth-Alderschot: England, 1999), p. 6.
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for global approaches. Rather, regional level of analysis is a kind of a “middle ground” between
the unit-level and the system-level of analysis. According to this approach a region should be
considered as a distinct system of states closely interrelated to each other.14 From this
perspective, stability in the South Caucasus is linked with the stability of each of the South
Caucasian states. Existence of non-traditional sources of instability in the region that brought
these states to the brink of dismemberment resulted in securitisation of the political, economic
issues. Svante Cornell proposes to study the South Caucasus within the framework of security
interdependence of the so-called “inner triangle” of states namely Azerbaijan, Armenia and
Georgia and “outer triangle” comprising of external regional powers (Russia, Turkey, Iran) that
are part of this security system.15 Although the USA is not a regional power, its role in the
regional geopolitics should also be given careful consideration. From this perspective, stability
and security of the whole South Caucasian region is linked to the policies pursued by regional
and extra-regional states.
1.2. The “Russian Factor” in the South Caucasus
Each of the extra-regional states declared that their security interests were at stake in
the South Caucasus. Even a brief outlook of the historical, geographical, ethno-linguistic and
cultural setting of the regional states as well as internal configurations of external powers can
shed some light on what is really at stake for each of the state concerned. Political elites of
external regional powers established linkage between their respective internal and external
                                                
14 See Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-
Cold War Era , (New York – London: Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1991), pp. 186-229.
15 See Ch. 1 “The Caucasus: A Region in Conflict”, pp. 17-26 in Svante E. Cornell (ed.) Small Nations and
Great Powers: A Study of Ethno-political Conflict in the Caucasus, (Richmond: Curzon Press, 2000).
14
national security. Indeed, the capabilities to influence the events in the Caucasus bore
consequences for both domestic security interests and foreign and security policies in their
immediate proximity. Turkey and Iran, due to their historical, cultural and linguistic ties with the
region could not stay aside from the regional developments. Iran feared that the rise of
nationalism and successful economic development of Azerbaijan could potentially influence self-
consciousness of its estimated 16 million Azerbaijani population (See Map 3).16 This induced
Iran to adopt an ambivalent approach to Azerbaijan’s independence. Iran was also uneasy
about the possibility of growing Turkish influence in the region and thought that its interests
would be better served if the status quo ante were preserved. This consideration induced Iran
to foster a “strategic partnership” with Russia. Turkey, unlike Iran, pursued the objective of
contributing to the preservation of Azerbaijan’s independence and territorial integrity.
Russia, while suffering geopolitical loss en touts azimuts, perceived external
penetration into the region as potentially dangerous to its own interests. Russia believed that it
would not be able to suppress separatist movement in Chechnya unless it keeps a preponderant
position in the South Caucasus. Furthermore, the loss of Chechnya could potentially strengthen
centrifugal tendencies in other autonomous regions (oblast) of Russia. Moreover Russian
military conflict in Chechnya would not have been so brutal, had it not been related one way or
another to the energy resources of the Caspian basin.
Each of these states, while trying to influence the dynamics of regional developments,
developed policies based on various historical, political, economic, ethno-linguistic and cultural
factors. However, as was previously mentioned, the main factors, that allowed external powers
                                                
16 According to the CIA World Fact Book (2001) Azerbaijani ethnic group forms 24% of the total Iranian
population,  <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ir.html>, Accessed: June 1, 2002.
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to get a foothold in the region and assert their influence were, the continuing regional conflicts on
the one hand and considerable energy resources on the other.
Among the various external influences on the developments in the South Caucasus after
the retreat of the Soviet (read Russian) authority, the role of Russia should be given special
consideration. Though each of the regional powers seeks some sort of sphere of influence in the
South Caucasus, only Russia despite its shrinking capabilities, had decisive influence on the
overall security environment of the South Caucasus. In fact both extra-regional and regional
states while shaping their security policies could not neglect the “Russian factor.” Historic
legacies, continuing economic dependence of the NIS combined with political and military
pressure were used by Moscow as a means to pursue Russian regional interests. As argues
Mesbahi Mohiaddin:
On all three levels, military, economic and political, while Russian ‘centre’
has been severely weakened, it still outweighs the Central Asian and Caucasian
periphery…between which there exists a level of structural
dependency/interdependence (emphasis original) that will not be overcome
overnight.17
Russia’s policy toward the South Caucasus during the last decade of the 20th century,
though inconsistent as it is, has passed through many stages ranging from benign neglect,
assertiveness and acceptance of the changed status quo. Immediate proximity of the region to
Russia’s volatile North Caucasus region, instability of which risked triggering “domino effect”
and blowing up vertical federal structure of the Russian Federation, is now named among the
major reasons that made it imperative for Russia to preserve in a decisive manner its both
                                                
17 See Mesbahi Mohiaddin, “Russian Foreign Policy and Security in Central Asia and the Caucasus”,
Central Asian Survey, Vol. 12, No. 2, (1993), p. 209.
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military-political and economic presence in the South Caucasus. However, close analysis of
Russia’s domestic and foreign policy transformation allows to assume that Russia’s goals went
far beyond pure security concerns. Perhaps out of overestimation of its capabilities and low-
profile threat assessment coupled with bitter domestic power struggle, Russia’s political elite
chose to instrumentalise instability in the South to serve its ends. All these factors together with
Russia’s desire to reinstate itself as a major global power forced Russia to seek ways to retain
its preponderant position in the post-Soviet space and in the South Caucasus in particular. It is
thus important while analyzing the security environment in the South Caucasus after the break-
up of the Soviet Union to start with an outlook of the evolution of Russia’s policies and
mechanisms toward the post-Soviet space that, to a large extent, predetermined the course of
events there.
1.2.1. Transformation of Russian Foreign Policy
After the dissolution of Soviet Union in 1991 Russia found itself in a drastically changed
external and internal environment. There was a need for re-identification and redefinition of
possible external threats and Russia’s national interests. This process was complicated by
polarization of political arena in Russia that brought into existence various political groups and
political parties that differ from each other in political, ideological, institutional motivations and
the channels through which they conducted their influence. The particular development of
Russian political arena was that those groups transcended the boundaries between the civil and
military executive departments, parliament, mass media and public organizations.
17
In the period from August 1991 to the middle of 1992, the objective of the new
Russian leadership headed by president Yeltsin and his close associates including foreign
minister Andrey Kozyrev was broad political and economic cooperation with the Western
countries. One of the motivation for such a policy of rapprochement with the West, was
probably an expectation to receive financial aid form the western countries needed so much for
the success in domestic reforms.18 This group was collectively referred to as Zapadniki
(Westernizers). Another group that included centrists, neo-communists and nationalists saw
their primary goal to revive Russian superpower status lost as a result of the collapse of Soviet
Union. Advocates of a strong and powerful state were referred to as Derzhavni.19
Opposition political parties and movements challenging Yeltsin’s policy used the   new
leaderships’ lack of political experience, its shortcomings in economic reforms and the nostalgic
feelings of people for the “old good days.” However, they didn’t constrain themselves to the
domestic issues. They were searching for foreign policy issues that could serve to undermine
pro-western -Atlantist- policy of Yeltsin’s government and thereby also weaken the
government’s domestic power.20 Foreign policy became more and more open to public
discussions, which in turn further made Yeltsin vulnerable to the pressure of opposition.
Hardliners accused the president and his close associates in conspiracy with foreign states
against his own people. They accused Yeltsin of betraying Russia’s national interests and
argued that the financial aid of the West didn’t worth the “unilateral concessions” Yeltsin made
                                                
18 Roger E. Kanet & A. V. Kozhemiakin (eds.) The Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, (London:
Macmillan Press Ltd., 1997).
19 For a detailed account of the different school of thoughts see Alexey G. Arbatov, “Russia’s Foreign
Policy Alternatives”, International Security, Vol. 18, No. 2, (Fall 1993).
20 Allen Lynch and Reneo Hikic, “Russian Foreign Policy and the Wars in the Former Yugoslavia”, RFE/RL
Research Report, Vol. 2, No. 41, (15 October 1993), p. 26.
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on such important issues such as START II, Yugoslavia crisis, missile technology exports to
India and arms sales to Iran. Inability of Yeltsin to protect Russia’s interests in the so-called
“Near Abroad” was also criticized.
Bad performance of pro-reform liberal-democratic parties and blocs in Duma elections
of 1995 marked a watershed in Yeltsin’s domestic and foreign policy.21 Yeltsin could no more
neglect the general rise of ultranationalist feelings among Russians. He gradually distanced
himself from the pro-Western group and chose to accommodate the left-dominated Duma
rhetoric, despite the considerable political power he had gained with the adoption of the new
constitution in 1993.22 He undertook steps that discredited his reformist image. He dismissed
Kozyrev and Anatoly Chubays (the then Deputy Prime minister) – two figures associated with
liberal-democratic reforms both in economic and political sphere, and in January 1996
appointed Yevgenniy Primakov, former head of External Intelligence Service (SVR) as Minister
of Foreign Affairs.
Appointment of Primakov had two immediate consequences. First, despite some
speculations about gradual increase of the role of power ministries (siloviki)23, Primakov
ensured change in balance of civil-military relations in favor of more civil control over the foreign
and security policy-making. Second, there was a visible shift in Russia’s overall foreign policy.
In an interview to the newspaper Izvestia Primakov warned the West that Russia intended to
                                                
21 Communist party gained 23% of votes and together with Agrarians and Popular Power they had 52% of
votes (221 seats in the Parliament with total 450 seats). Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) of V. Zhirinovsky
gained 11% of votes. Pro-government parties and groups gained in sum 26.5% of votes. Figures are taken
from Truscott, Peter, Russia First: Breaking with the West, p. 175.
22 See Peter Truscott, Ch.4 “The Duma Elections and Triumph of ‘Russia First’ ”, (1997), pp. 148-197.
23 This term is a collective name of the Russia’s Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Interior and FSB.
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play a more active role in international diplomacy. He expressed broad consensus among
political elite as well public on the fact that Russia was still world’s Great Power.24
 However, it proved difficult to pursue a foreign policy that would reflect country’s
status as a “Great Power.” Realizing the threat of isolation as a consequence of inability of
Russia to influence international affairs as showed developments in the Balkans25 Primakov
adopted the concept of “inclusive multi-polarity.” This concept was twofold. First, it envisaged
a role for Russia as an independent centre of power (pole) along with the United States, the
European Union, China and Japan. Primakov emphasized the role of OSCE as a counterweight
to increasing NATO’s domination in maintaining international security in Europe. At the same
time Primakov stressed the need to defend Russia’s interests without getting into a new “Cold
War” with the West.26 The “Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security
between NATO and Russian Federation” signed by Russia on May 29, 1997 reflected a
turning point when the need to reach some accommodation with NATO became widely
recognized among the Russian political elite.27
Second, the “Primakov doctrine” also envisaged increasing Russia's influence and
position in the Middle East and Eurasia, while diluting America's strength and influence there.28
Some analysts speculated that following his “Eurasianist” strand Primakov intended to forge a
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new “anti-hegemonic” coalition with China, Iran and Iraq.29 He reiterated that relations with
other CIS countries were a priority for Russia. The “Near Abroad” was asserted a de facto
Russian sphere of influence and any foreign interference into this region was perceived in zero-
sum terms. In this context US strengthening in the Caspian basin by promoting “Silk Road
Strategy” as well as oil transportation networks bypassing Russia were viewed as renewed
“containment” of Moscow.30 It is worth mentioning that back in 1994, under Primakov
leadership SVR released a report entitled “Russia-CIS: Does the West’s Position Need
Modification?” The report openly criticized Western leaders who allegedly wished to exploit
centrifugal tendencies among the CIS member states in an effort to prevent the re-emergence of
a strong Russia on the world stage.31
Such Russian “push southward” was most probably a reaction to Russia’s weakening
position in a number of important international issues. The US air strikes in Afghanistan and
Sudan in August 1998 – ostensibly to combat terrorism, the fact that Russia was not even
informed about US strikes in Iraq in December 1998 and NATO’s unilateral use of force
without UN authorisation in Bosnia and later in Kosovo were interpreted as serious military
threats to Russia’s vital military-political interests. NATO’s Kosovo operation was perceived
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as a precedent for future “out-of-area” operations in the regions where Russia has traditional
interests.32
Some analysts in Russia argued that NATO’s involvement in the Caucasus would result
in consolidation of its military presence in the region and argued that the only way to prevent
such an outcome was to implement a well-defined tough policy in the Caucasus.33 Western
employment of large-scale forces in the Balkans lifted a Russian taboo against the use of military
force as an instrument for resolving ethnic problems and conflicts that followed the first war in
Chechnya of 1994-1996.34 Russian leaders revised military and security doctrines, stressing the
continuous relevance of military force in international relations.
The provisions of new National Security Concept of Russia adopted by Russia’s new
President V. Putin showed that he generally supported the foreign policy prescriptions of
“Primakov doctrine” (See below, p. 23). According to this document the conscious and active
construction of multipolarity is to be one of the prerogatives for Russian foreign policy for the
years to come. Although Russia’s long-term goal to revive Russia’s Global Power status is still
there, Russian new political elite seems to have given up illusions that it can be achieved
overnight.35 The new government of Putin is faced with the challenge to combine military
potential, geopolitical opportunities and economic weakness. In his “State of the Nation”
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address President Putin stated that although “the era of confrontation is over, the bitter
competition – for markets, investments and political and economic influence – is a permanent
fixture of the present-day world. In this struggle Russia must be strong and competitive.”36 V.
Putin seems to realise that any successful foreign policy should be based on domestic reforms
and improvement in the economic situation, otherwise, he argues, “we [Russia] will always be
on the losing side while our political and economic opportunities in the world will be
shrinking.”37 President Putin stressed that “Russia’s foreign policy would in the future continue
to be built on purely pragmatic basis, in line with [Russia’s] capabilities and national interests –
military-strategic, economic and political.”38 In other words, V. Putin is trying to formulate such
a foreign policy that the country can cope with.39
In the short-term Russia’s strategy seems to be prevention at all cost of further
marginalisation of its status of multi-regional power. In this regard, the CIS, where Russia is still
influential, is given special consideration. President Putin considers the CIS to be “a major
factor of stability in a large part of the world.”40  Robert Legvold, explaining this prioritisation of
the CIS in Russia’s foreign policy, argues that:
 Russians realize that they still have potent influence within their immediate
neighbourhood and that if that neighbourhood is important to the larger world,
Russia must be important as well. Russian elites, including the president, quite
consciously see their capacity to shape events in Central Asia, the Caucasus,
Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova as a key to strengthening their international
standing.41
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37 Ibid.
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1.2.2. The Role of the Military Establishment
Since the establishment of the Ministry of Defense (hereafter MoD) in May 1992 the
role of the military in Russian domestic and foreign politics gradually increased. On 1 July 1992,
Defense Minister Grachev stated that “in conditions of civil chaos, clashes and reprisals, only
the army can save thousands of lives, preserve morsels of good and defend what is sacred.”42
Russian political establishment attached great importance to the stance of the military in
domestic political arena.43 Various political parties and groups instrumentally used the problems
of the army to gain its sympathy. Grachev’s support for the president during the political crisis
between the president and the parliament in October 1993 that culminated in shelling of the
Parliament drastically changed civil-military relations.44 Though the military didn’t get as much
power as was predicted by some analysts45, nevertheless, Grachev gained direct access to the
president. In the domestic political setting of Russia direct access to the president was crucially
important in the power struggle with other power ministries.
After this tacit support of the president, the MoD became more and more influential in
foreign and security policy formulation. Grachev took an active stance on various conflicts in the
“Near Abroad.” He sought to assume full control over the direction of military policy in the
FSU. He persuaded Yeltsin to abandon the CIS Joint Armed Forces concept (CIS JAF)
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known as “Shaposhnikov Doctrine.” On June 15, 1993 the High Command of the CIS forces
(CIS HC) was replaced by Joint Staff for Coordination of Military Cooperation (SCMC).
Since 1994, SCMC together with Council of Defense Ministers (CDM) have de facto become
the relevant bodies of the Collective Security Treaty (CST) created in May 15, 1992 – all
defense and security cooperation within the CIS having been concentrated among members of
the CST.46 Grachev also strived to activate the CST, key provisions of which remained
“frozen” for a long time. Under the pressure of the Russian military, Azerbaijan and Georgia
were forced to sign the Tashkent agreement (a cornerstone of the CST) in September 1993.
After they entered the CST the composition of the CST became identical to the CIS security
bodies. This enabled the formerly purely CIS bodies to be used for the purposes of the
collective security framework.47 With these developments the only remaining purpose of the
CIS military structures was taking over collective security mission of the CST. Though the
Tashkent treaty is referred to as “collective security” it is dealing more with the “collective
defense.” The agreement was deliberately kept separate from the peacekeeping instruments of
the CIS, because the MoD was not willing the CST to be used to resolve numerous conflicts
between CIS states. The MoD intended to transform FSU into an “integrated military-political
space” and underlined that the main purpose of the military policy of the CIS was to guarantee
protection of the CIS from external threats.
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1.2.3. Continuity and Change in Russian Security Policy at the Doctrinal Level
Russian policy toward the FSU under the influence of military establishment gradually
transformed from benign neglect to assertive pro-active policy. This shift to more assertive
policy toward the “Near Abroad” was reflected at the doctrinal level. National Security
Concept, Military Doctrine as well as Foreign Policy Concept are key security documents
providing the guidelines for state policy of Russian Federation (RF).48
The Russian military doctrine was drafted by the MoD and adopted by the decree of
the president on November 2, 1993. National Security Concept of RF was signed by Yeltsin
few months before in April 3, 1993. It is noteworthy that as a “payoff” to Grachev for his
support during the notorious “October events” of 1993, Yeltsin dismissed the previous military
doctrine, prepared by the Center for Operational Strategic Research of the General Staff in
May 1992, and favored the new version, prepared by the MoD. It implicitly assumed that the
borders of the Russian security zone corresponded with those of the CIS. Russia took over the
mission of protecting “external” borders of the CIS. Analysts interpreted this self-imposed
mission as a kind of “Monroe doctrine”49 in the former Soviet space. The main threats to the
peace and stability of Russia were believed to emanate from the local armed conflicts on
Russia’s south periphery. This doctrine legitimized the use of force in response to the threats to
the RF, its military installations in the foreign states. For the first time “suppression of the rights
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of Russian speaking population abroad” was indicated to be a threat to Russia. The build-up of
groupings of troops near Russia’s borders, which could disrupt the “correlation of forces”, was
also perceived as a threat. Such traditional Soviet-style determination of military threats based
on purely military capabilities indicates that Russia regarded relations with NIS in zero-sum
terms.50
Another important feature is that the doctrine envisaged deployments of Russian troops
outside of the territory of the RF and use of force in the FSU to maintain its security.
“Peacekeeping” operations were referred to as an important tool in conflict resolution on the
territory of the CIS.51 CST was emphasized as a main mechanism of maintaining security and
stability in the territory of the FSU.
In the strategic context, the doctrine abandoned the “no-first-use” (NFU) pledge given
by the Soviet Union. The abandonment of the NFU pledge was justified by the declining
conventional capability in the post-Soviet period. Russia reserved the right to use nuclear
weapons in response to a conventional attack, if other means are proved insufficient or
exhausted.52
The Military Doctrine of 1993 as well as National Security Concept was subject to
debate among the wide political spectrum ranging from General Staff, MoD and other key
officials responsible for security decision-making. In fact this debate turned into a political
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struggle between these bodies, because the winner in this struggle would get decisive leverage
over determination of Russia’s appropriate national security policies and strategies. This
probably was one of the reasons why revision of the doctrines that started in 1996 continued up
until 2000, and came into agenda with the election of V. Putin as a president.
Adoption of NATO’s new strategic doctrine at the 50th Anniversary summit of NATO
in April 1999 that authorised NATO to intervene beyond its traditional “area of responsibility”,
NATO de facto enlargement in 1999, as well as NATO bombings in the former Yugoslavia
without the UN authorisation even further pressed for revision of previous doctrines. Russian
leadership was uneasy with the growing role of NATO in European security. The then Russian
defence minister General Igor Sergeyev and Deputy Chief of the General Staff Colonel-General
Valery L. Manilov admitted that Kosovo crisis led to revisions of the draft doctrine.53
Though NATO operations in Kosovo as well eastward enlargement indeed could be
interpreted as political threats to Russia that potentially could marginalize Russia’s role in the
European and perhaps Eurasian security process,54 they were far from a military threat to
Russia.55 However, the Russian military staunchly viewed these developments as  an indication
of growing military threats. The reason behind this exaggerated threat assessment was probably
the fact that Russian military was uneasy with the December 1997 security concept, because it
considerably reduced the role of the military in maintaining Russia’s security. It clearly stated
that foreign countries did not pose a threat to Russia's security. Crime, corruption, poorly
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managed economy, poverty, and social malaise within the country were considered to pose the
real dangers.  NATO’s unilateral use of force thus was an opportunity in hands to reverse this
trend. The military doctrine and security concepts were revised and provided general security
strategy framework that reflected new trends in international arena. The new National Security
Concept (NSC) of 200056 perceives NATO’s use of military force beyond the zone of its
responsibility and without the sanction of the UN Security Council as the threat to national
security of RF and warns that this can destabilize the strategic situation in the world. The new
NSC is more specific in pointing out that the trend towards the emergence of a multipolar world
is opposed by:
The attempt to create a structure of international relations based on the
domination of developed Western countries, led by the USA, in the international
community and providing for unilateral solution of the key problems of global
politics, above all with the use of military force, in violation of the fundamental
norms of international law.57
 At the same time, it underlines that “some states (presumably the US) have stepped up
their efforts to weaken Russia's positions in the political, economic, military and other spheres”.
NSC warns “the attempts to ignore the interests of Russia when tackling major problems of
international relations, including conflict situations, can undermine international security and
stability and slow down the ongoing positive changes in international relations”. Concern is also
expressed at “the weakening of the integration processes in the Commonwealth of Independent
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States” and “the appearance and escalation of conflicts close to the state borders of the Russian
Federation and the external borders of countries members of the CIS.”
Amidst the threats to the national security of RF are included “…the attempts of other
states to hinder the strengthening of Russia as a center of influence in the multi-polar world,
prevent the implementation of its national interests and weaken its positions in Europe, the
Middle East, the Transcaucasus, Central Asia and Asia Pacific”.
The revised Russian Federation military doctrine (hereinafter “military doctrine”)58
elaborates on the 1993 "Basic Provisions of the Russian Federation Military Doctrine" and in
general follows the overall pattern of the new NSC. Though it emphasizes the “diminished threat
of initiation of world war (including nuclear war)”59, according to the doctrine military-political
situation in the world is still characterized by such destabilizing factors as  “escalation of local
wars and armed conflicts, …activation of separatism and …strengthening of national-ethnic and
religious extremism”, that generate “… a number of potential external and internal threats to the
military security of Russian Federation…in a number of directions.” The documents states that
in order to ensure its national security:
The Russian Federation may station limited military contingents (military
bases) on a treaty basis in strategically important regions of the world to ensure
readiness to perform its obligations, assist in forming and maintaining a stable
military-strategic balance of forces, and react adequately to the appearance of
crisis situations in their initial stage.60
Clearly many of the provisions of the new military doctrine and national security
concept were designed for external consumption. Emphasis is made that Russia is a regional
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center of power in an emerging multi-polar world. Any military activities (including build-up of
forces, creation of military blocs and alliances) in its immediate proximity (presumably CIS) to
the detriment of Russia’s military security (and its allies i.e. mainly CIS states) will be
considered a threat to Russia’s national interests and Russia reserves the right to defend its
interests with all means available including use of force.
The provision that envisages use of tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) in conventional
threat scenarios (small-scale conflict) indicates that nuclear weapons besides its traditional role
of deterrence were also assigned political function to prevent states from actions that violate
Russia’s national interests.61
1.3.“The Last Surge South”62 - Neo-imperialistic Ambitions or Russia’s Legitimate
Concerns?
Russian policy toward the FSU and the South Caucasus in particular was thus a
reflection of domestic political situation and a broad geopolitical environment in the world. The
Russian liberal government from 1991 until the mid-1992 focused predominantly on the
domestic economic and political reforms and had not the clear-cut strategy in regard of the
Caucasus. It chose simply to “get rid” of the “Caucasian problem” by withdrawing both
militarily and politically from the region. 63 However, since mid-1992, when “Eurasianist” views
gained popularity in Russia’s political discourse, the Caucasus became once again one of the
key regions towards which Russian political and security elite re-defined its policy. The primary
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reason for the Russian engagement in the South Caucasus was sited to be the regional conflicts
that had spill over potential.
The US and several European countries originally regarded the conflicts on the post-
Soviet space as “inter-ethnic” internal conflicts and chose not to meddle into them due to the
lack of resolution mechanisms and partially because of unwillingness to jeopardize relations with
Russia. The US until 1994 had a “Russo-centric” approach toward the FSU and was ready to
accept Russia’s security concerns in the war-torn South Caucasus and Central Asia.64 Few
doubted that “instability in the Southern tier” was a grave challenge that somehow needed to be
met. During the Russo-American summit US President Clinton is quoted to say that:
You [Russians] will be more likely to be involved in some of these areas near
you, just like the United States has been involved in the last several years in Panama
and Grenada near our area. 65
However, with time, Russia’s assertiveness in the South Caucasus illustrated that Russia
developed an expansive concept of security that envisaged restoration of its predominant
position in the region. Russia’s inconsistent security policy in fact meant insecurity for its
neighbors and on many occasions threatened Russia’s own security. Interestingly, escalation of
the conflicts in the South Caucasus coincided with Russia’s policy shift toward the Caucasus.
The fact that the conflicts in the South Caucasus were instigated by Moscow in late 1980s in
order to prevent the region from slipping away is well documented.66 The military that played
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the most prominent role in the Russian security policy in Russia’s southern strategy from the
outset argued for the active engagement into the South Caucasus and justified the need for
Russia’s military presence there by the on-going conflicts. At the same time, using geopolitical
concepts the military establishment argued that unless Russia retains its military power in the
NIS, it would suffer geopolitical loss that could potentially bring to the disintegration of RF
itself. The military warned that unless Russia retained control over the key strategic areas such
as South Caucasus and Central Asia, the neighboring states Turkey, Iran and probably China
would fill the “power vacuum” to the detriment of Russia’s long-term geopolitical interests.67
Back in the mid-1992, when Russia’s objectives in the FSU were still ambiguous Colonel-
General Igor Rodionov unequivocally affirmed, “that all Commonwealth states are in the sphere
of Russia’s vital interests.”68
Russia’s over reliance on the military means and desire to emplace military bases on the
soils of NIS was considered by the regional and Western governments to be the first step in
enforced absorption of these states back into the Russian “sphere of influence.” It was this trend
that prompted many to conclude that Russia had neo-imperialist designs to restore in this form
or another, if not a sort of union of NIS then a kind of integrated defensive bloc comprising of
the FSU states (except Baltic States) at the expense of their sovereignty.
It should be noted however, that though Russia tried to establish mechanisms of
economic integration from the outset, Russia attempted to pursue CIS integration with special
                                                                                                                                                
1, (1995), pp. 75-96; Robert Bruce Ware, “Conflict in the Caucasus: an Historical Context and a Prospect for
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67 Tatiana Shakleina, “Russian Policy Toward Military Conflicts in the Former Soviet Union”, in Bruce
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emphasis on the military-security and political integration.69 Though Russia’s policy toward the
South Caucasus hardly resembled to sustainable and well-coordinated strategy still we can
identify military-strategic, political and economic directions closely intermingled with each other
along which Russian ruling elite shaped its policy in the region.
1.3.1. Russia’s Military-Strategic Interests in the South Caucasus
Russian military-strategic interests in the South Caucasus are manifold.
During the USSR period the Caucasus was divided into Trans-Caucasus Military District (MD)
and the Transcaucasus Border Guard District and North Caucasus MD. This region
represented one of the most militarized areas, not only in the former Soviet Union but also in the
world.70 During the Cold War the Caucasus was a part of Soviet Union’s Southern Theatre for
Strategic Military Action (TSMA)71, which was an important element of Soviet’s power
projection capabilities into the Near and Middle East.72
The split of tremendous Soviet military machine and the “nationalization” of many of its
elements by the NIS in the aftermath of the dissolution of the USSR was indeed a disastrous
development that caused a real shock to the military establishment.73 Unable to hold together
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Soviet military infrastructure under single military command, which was essential to sustain
Russia’s previous military might, Russian military establishment chose to develop toward the
FSU a strategy of “forward basing” that would enable Russian MoD to have access to the
military assets on the territories of NIS. The concept of forward basing or extended Russian
security zone required progress in a number of interrelated aspects of CIS multilateral military
coordination, especially joint border protection, air defence and peacekeeping operations in the
conflicts around the CIS. However it was not an easy task. Russian military leadership was
faced with numerous challenges. First, it was extremely difficult to maintain stable public support
for a large-scale military involvement in the “Near Abroad.” Though most Russians regret that
their country “is no longer one-sixth of the globe – a scale they were accustomed to,”74 more
and more Russians opposed to Russian involvement into the conflicts outside Russia’s borders.
Public reaction to the war in Chechnya confirmed this trend.75 The real challenge was, however,
how to match Russia’s ambitions with the requisite economic and military capabilities. Resource
shortages fundamentally restrained Russian military engagement in FSU. For example, the MoD
was unable to extract concessions for the Military Industrial Complex (VPK) in the 1994-1995
budgets.76
Geostrategic location of the South Caucasus was also of great importance to Russia.
Region’s unique geographical location between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea indeed
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served throughout the centuries the role of a bridge or barrier for Russia, depending on the
international situation. In the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union the South
Caucasus was supposed to be a cordon sanitaire against instability emanating from the
South.77
Georgia was perceived by Russian military strategists to be a key component in
Russia’s security policy in the South Caucasus. Given that in the first years of its independence
Azerbaijan took an open anti-Russian stand, Russia could become isolated from its traditional
ally in the region – Armenia.78 Thus, a pro-Russian Georgia was crucial for Russia to have land
access route to Armenia.79 In the context of rapprochement between Russia and Iran, Georgia
and Armenia could be a natural corridor for trade and communications networks with Iran.
Moreover, Georgia is situated in the strategically important area on the Black Sea coast. After
the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russian Black Sea coastline reduced to 300 km. Added to
the conflict with Ukraine over the division of Black Sea fleet and dispute over the access to the
naval bases in Crimea, Russia could not afford the loss of naval infrastructure along the
Georgian Black Sea coast. During his visit to the region early in 1993, Grachev unequivocally
stressed:
I will only say that this is a strategically important area for the Russian army.
We have certain strategic interests here and must take every measure to ensure that
our troops remain: otherwise we will lose the Black Sea.80
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Besides, the outbreak of hostilities in Chechnya altered the function of Russian group of
forces in Georgia: if before their primary role of these forces was to check Turkey’s influence,
after the break out of war in Chechnya Russia sought to use its troops in Georgia against
Chechen insurgents that allegedly infiltrated through uncontrolled Georgian-Chechnya border.
On many occasions Russian authorities accused Georgian government of providing safe heaven
for the Chechen guerrilla fighters.
One of the first signs of Russian policy shift in the South Caucasus could be detected in
January 1993 when an announcement was made concerning the formation of the GRVZ (Group
of Russian Troops in Transcaucasus) with the ultimate aim of preventing total withdrawal of the
Russian forces from the region (See Map 4). The GRVZ included almost all the former Soviet
forces that remained in Georgia. In 1993-1994 it consisted of 20,000 troops (See Table 1).81
This decision was logical conclusion of a process of change of attitude toward the residual
military presence in the South Caucasus. In January 1994, at a meeting with ambassadors from
the CIS and Baltic states Kozyrev emphasized the need to preserve the Russian military
presence in the FSU and called the proposals to withdraw Russian troops from the CIS
“extremist.”82 In April 1994, Yeltsin issued a decree for the Russian Foreign Ministry and MoD
to negotiate and sign agreements on setting up some 30 Russian military bases in the CIS states.
This decision marked the first practical step in Russian effort to establish the basic infrastructure
for a forward security zone in the CIS region.83
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One of the main obstacles for Russia’s “forward deployment” strategy was the CFE
treaty. In early 1993, a year before assault in Chechnya, Russian defence minister Pavel
Grachev, returning from an inspection tour of military units in the Caucasus, stated that the
“geopolitical situation has changed” since the CFE treaty had entered into force and that Russia
“now finds it necessary to reconsider the armed quotas envisioned by Article V of the CFE
treaty for the flank zones.”84 Russian leadership argued that whereas previously the North
Caucasus MD was considered a rear area, it was now a border district. Even before the war in
Chechnya North Caucasus had become more important to Russia, than it was to the Soviet
Union. According to Pavel Grachev, “instability in the Caucasus and neighboring regions and
the increasing of separatism and extremism necessitates a significant Russian military presence in
the North Caucasus in order to prevent and deter potential conflicts and insure against the
destabilization of the situation on the European continent as a whole.”
Justifying its excessive military presence in the North Caucasus by the conflict in
Chechnya, Russia failed to comply with the CFE treaty provisions by the deadline set in
November 1995. The unexpectedly prolonged and bitter struggle with the Chechen guerrillas
prompted Russian authorities to further strengthen their permanent presence in the North
Caucasus. On June 1, 1995, the chief of the Russian Ground Forces, Colonel-General Vladimir
Semenov, announced that in order to “maintain stability and tranquility” in the region the 58th
Army had been formed, with its headquarters in Vladikavkaz (North Ossetia).85
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Azerbaijan and Georgia fearing that Russia could abuse the flank agreement of the CFE
treaty to increase its own weapons entitlements or legitimize deployment of its equipment on
their territories (in case of Georgia) expressed concern about Russia’s “over concentration of
forces” in the North Caucasus.86 However, in order not to jeopardize overall CFE treaty and
not to worsen relations with Russia, that were already tense over the “Eastward enlargement”
issue, NATO countries declared Russian deployments exceeding its quotas as “technical non-
compliance…that is not militarily significant to NATO”87 and signed on May 15, 1997 the
“Flank Document” that allowed higher quotas of TLE for Russia in the North Caucasus and
allowed temporary over deployment of forces.88
As a part of its “forward basing” strategy, Russia also strived to deploy its border-
guards along the outer “non-CIS” borders. Though geopolitical calculations were important in
adopting such a policy, the fact that MoD did not have additional resources to build a new
border-protecting defense infrastructure along its new southern borders should not be
underestimated either. Besides, Russian authorities claimed that Chechen guerilla fighters
received logistical support from Muslim countries in the South, which was carried out through
poorly controlled Russian border with South Caucasian states. Threat of Islamic
fundamentalism was also cited among the reasons for Russian protection of borders in the
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South Caucasus. Though these immediate threats were a source of anxiety for Russia, in the
long-term Russia’s preoccupation was to seal off the South Caucasus from external security
policy influences and ties that potentially could marginalize Russian influence in this region.
At the CIS summit of May 1995 held in Minsk, Russia proposed an agreement on the
protection of external CIS borders. Five states, namely Ukraine, Moldova, Azerbaijan,
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan refused to sign the document. Motivation of these states was
clearly expressed by Ukrainian president Kuchma who was quoted to say that “there is no
external borders of the CIS but each state has its own external and internal borders.”89 As a
result, Russia managed to develop cooperation in the border protection only with states that
were willing to accept Russian border-guards. In the South Caucasus only Armenia, guided by
its traditional “Turkphobia”, allowed Russia to protect its border with Turkey and Iran.
Georgia, due to the Russian pressure, which used the domestic turmoil in the country to
advance its interests, also agreed on Russian deployment of troops along its borders with
Turkey. Azerbaijan until recently was also subjected to Russia’s pressure to allow Russian
troops on its soil.
Another important tool in maintaining Russia’s extended security zone was the so-called
“peacekeeping strategy” that was gradually developed to deal with the numerous conflicts
throughout the CIS. This strategy emerged as a result of a long quest by the civilian and military
agencies responsible for security and foreign policy making for the mechanisms to advance
Russia’s interests in the South Caucasus. Through “peacekeeping operations” Russia sought to
boost its role as a “key security guarantor” in the CIS. At the same time, it secured Russian
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military presence (albeit by “blue helmets”) in the strategically important regions, while rebuffing
the West’s accusations of Russian neo-imperialistic ambitions. Thus, from the outset, political
principles and philosophy of Russian peacekeeping developed within the framework of
Moscow’s evolving perspectives of the “Near Abroad.” The ability of Russia to become an
effective peacekeeper in the FSU and elsewhere was linked with Russia’s status and prestige in
international affairs that was believed to be imperative for Russian traditional desire to maintain
geopolitical influence and strategic positions in Eurasia. Senior military officials expressed
concern that Russia’s inaction and failure to take the lead in the conflict resolution in the FSU
could prompt the direct military involvement of Western powers and NATO in the CIS.90
Russian strategists also feared that Russia’s failure to settle local conflicts and its inability to lead
CIS peacekeeping operations would put the CIS at the risk of disintegration.91
 Russian “peacekeeping operations” however, failed to comply with the guidelines set
forth by the UN.92 Russians argued that ethnic conflicts on the territory of the FSU could not be
contained by traditional principles of peacekeeping, such as consent of all parties concerned,
impartiality and the use-of-force only in self-defence.93 Nevertheless, Russia was seeking
recognition of the CIS as an international organization under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter in
order to acquire mandate from the UN and/or the OSCE for peacekeeping operations in the
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FSU.94 Russian analysts based Russian/CIS armed operations on the international law principle
of “legitimate intervention” into a conflict in another nation’s territory at the request of that other
nation.95 However, this definition is subject to question as there is solid evidence suggesting that
Russia using domestic instability in Moldova and Georgia forced their central governments to
“request” Russian peacekeeping forces on their territories that in reality meant an open
involvement of Russian troops on the side of separatist communities.96
The pattern of Russian “peacekeeping operations” in various “hot spots” throughout the
FSU was constant. In all cases Russia brokered cease-fire, deployed predominantly Russian
troops wherever it was possible97 and initiated peace negotiations. However, it seems that the
peace talks were held mainly for the external consumption and, however hypocritical it may
seem, the situation of “no peace no war” best served Russian interests. However, in the long-
term this policy turned out to be counter-productive. It became clear that all actors in the region
would shape their policy towards Russia by taking into account its relations with their
belligerent. Thus while Russia allegedly supported Abkhazia both militarily and politically and
secured for itself Georgian CIS membership, peacekeepers and military bases in Georgia,
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inability or unwillingness of Russia to solve the Abkhaz problem even further alienated Georgian
leadership from Russia forcing it to seek support in Euro-Atlantic security structures like NATO
– an outcome that Russia was so desperately trying to prevent. Russia’s peacekeeping strategy
was thus bound to find itself in the dead-end.98
Russia was also concerned with the strategic early-warning facilities in the CIS and in
the South Caucasus in particular. Russian security community believes that as long as the mutual
deterrence remains the underlying nuclear posture of Russia and the USA, the maintenance of
early warning, communication, control and testing facilities remains a prerequisite component for
a credible nuclear capability. The military assets in the FSU99 were thus of paramount strategic
importance for the security of Russia.100 The fact that after the dissolution of the Soviet Union all
these strategic land-based facilities were declared national properties of the successor states
complicated Russia’s access to them. It was mainly for this reason that Russia proposed a joint
CIS Air-Defence System within the CST agreement hoping in this way to keep all these
installations under single command and control. It became a huge problem for Russia to
negotiate the terms of Russian access to these facilities. They became even more important in
the light of the recent decision of the USA to create its own National Missile Defence
(NMD).101 While Central Asian states were more receptive to Russian demands due to the
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regional geopolitical dynamics, in case of Azerbaijan, Gebele RLS turned for Russia into real
headache for many years to come.102
Russia’s strategy to develop a coherent policy toward the CIS was bound, however, to
failure because it lacked one important feature - political will of CIS countries to engage in the
“single military-political space.” Russian leaders came to understand that CIS states vary in
terms of size, population, internal political stability, energy dependence, economic conditions,
the presence of Russian military contingents and proportion of Russian population – the key
factors that shaped the security policies of the states and determined the character of their
relations with Russia. Another no less important factor was lack of the common threat for all
post-Soviet states.103 Russia had to face this reality and gradually it developed a “selective
engagement” strategy that meant diversification of the political, economic, military policies that
varied from region to region and even from state to state.104
By the late 1997, Russian military analysts themselves admitted that military relations
with the CIS states existed on two levels, according to the extent of military integration with
                                                                                                                                                
Missile Treaty) of 1972, which committed the two parties, the USA and Soviet Union, to substantial
limitations of their missile defences.
102 Gebele RLS (an early warning ABM radar station) was built in 1985 to control air space of 7200km in
radius (reportedly it can control territory from Atlantics to the Indian Ocean). After the dissolution of the
USSR, Azerbaijan within the framework of the decision to create its own national army nationalized all ex-
Soviet equipment and facilities on its soil (including Gebele RLS). For the last 10 years this RLS was
functioning despite its unclear status. Beginning from 1997 Russia paid Baku $45 millions for electricity. In
January 2002 during the official visit of the president of Azerbaijan H. Aliyev to Russia was finally signed
“A leasing agreement on the status of Gebele RLS”(ratified by Azerbaijani Parliament on March 19, 2002),
which was officially recognized “a property” of Azerbaijan.  According to this agreement Gebele RLS was
given a status of Analytic-Information Centre. According to the new agreement Russia will pay also for
consuming water and rent payments, approximately $7million per year plus $30 millions for renting the
installation since 1991. (Source: ANS TV Ch. Baku, January 2002).
103 Unlike Central Asian states that were interested in developing close security ties with Russia in view of
immediate threat coming from instable Afghanistan, the South Caucasian states had no common threat with
Russia except perhaps Armenia and on the contrary were willing to develop security ties with other states.
104 See Tatiana Shakleina, “Russian Policy Toward Military Conflicts in the Former Soviet Union”, in Bruce
Parrott (1995), p. 103.
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Russia. The MoD adopted a dual-track approach to the military cooperation with the NIS. At
a bilateral level Russia chose to create an extensive network of treaties of cooperation, which
envisaged pre-positioning of Russian forces in the form of military bases, joint border-
protection troops. MoD has focused on creating regional security sub-systems with those states
of CIS that were ready to limit their sovereignty to some degree in order to obtain “reliable
security guarantees from Russia.” Russia gradually developed the strategy of prioritizing Russian
security policy along western, southwestern and southern axes. The then-Russian defence
minister Igor Sergeyev was unambiguous when he told that Russia had only three allies, namely
Armenia, Belarus and Kazakhstan.105
Civilian experts that became more influential in foreign and security policy making since
1996 came to realize that over reliance on the military tools in pursuing Russian interests in the
Caucasus was counterproductive and while it did not prevent external penetration into the
region, on the contrary it even further pushed Georgia and Azerbaijan to seek security
guarantees in other security institutions and arrangements. One of the factors that contributed to
this re-evaluation of Russian policies in the Caucasus was the disastrous performance of
Russian army in Chechnya.106 Several aspects of the war in Chechnya are relevant for our
analysis.107 Russian military overextension and deficiencies that became evident in the Chechnya
campaign constrained Russian overall security policy in the wider Caucasus region.108
                                                
105 Rajan Menon, Yuri E. Fedorov and Ghia Nodia (eds.) Russia, The Caucasus and Central Asia, The 21st
Century Security Environment, (Armonk, N-Y: M.E. Sharpe, EWI 1999) p.41.
106 A good updated analysis is presented by Pavel Baev  “Russia in the Caucasus: Sovereignty,
Intervention and Retreat”, pp. 239-260 in Col. Michael Crutcher (ed.) The Russian Armed Forces at the
Dawn of the Millennium. (Carlisle Barracks: The U.S. Army War College, 2000).
107 For detailed account of war in Chechnya see Anatol Lieven, Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power,
(New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1998).
108 See Roy Allison, “The Chechnya Conflict Military and Security Policy Implications” in Roy Allison and
Christoph Bluth (eds.) Security Dilemmas in Russia and Eurasia (1998) pp. 242-262.
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After the failure in Chechnya Russian military presence in the region was taken less
seriously.109 The formal character of Russian military presence and Russian leadership’s
engagement in Chechnya provided greater space for political maneuvering for Azerbaijan and
Georgia. While illusion of the effectiveness of military option as a policy instrument disappeared
before the dust settled after the first Chechen war, the Russian political elite could not entirely
abandon the military component in its foreign policy overnight. One reason for this was the old
stereotypes deeply entrenched in Russian security thinking since Russia’s advance into the
Caucasus in the 18th century. Though the first years of Putin’s presidency showed that he
inclined to take more pragmatic approach towards the South Caucasus unlike his predecessor,
Russia’s policy can still be characterized as a “carrot and stick” strategy.110
Though Russia’s objectives in the South Caucasus after a decade still seem ambiguous,
regional trends allow assuming that the new Russian leadership will be forced to gradually
reduce its military contingent in the South Caucasus. Realizing counter-productiveness of the
“pointing gun” strategy, new Russian leadership seems to attempt to normalize its relations with
Azerbaijan and Georgia in an effort to enhance its political position and economic penetration
that were damaged by the military hardliners during their heyday in the security policy-
making.111
1.3.2. Russia’s Political Interests in the South Caucasus
                                                
109 See Pavel Baev, “Russia Refocuses its policies in the Southern Caucasus”, Cambridge: Caspian Studies
Program, BCSIA Publications (July 13, 2001).
110 See Andrei Zagorski, “The role of Russia in the South Caucasus”, and Pavel Baev, “What Putin’s Russia
Aims for in the Caucasus?”- Papers presented at 31st Vienna Seminar of International Peace Academy on
“Promoting Institutional Responses to the Challenges in the Caucasus”, (Vienna, 5-7 July 2001).
111 See Jean-Christophe Peuch,  “Azerbaijan: Putin Tries To Overcome Years Of Mistrust”, RFE/RL
Newsline, (10 January 2001).
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Russia’s primary political objective in the South Caucasus was to incorporate the new
states into a would-be supranational political entity. The CIS was regarded as an instrument for
such integration. Though Russia managed to draw Azerbaijan and Georgia into the CIS, it failed
to achieve its ultimate goals in the region, which proved incompatible with the process of state
building that had begun in these states. Moreover, the growing geopolitical and geo-economic
pluralism also helped the NIS to consolidate their independence.112 Azerbaijan and Georgia
rushed in engaging in multilateral security policy frameworks such as OSCE, NACC, PfP - a
policy that was not viewed by them as necessarily inconsistent with their CIS membership.
Azerbaijan and Georgia were very enthusiastic in participating in “Great Silk Road”,
TRACECA113 and INOGATE114 Western-initiated regional transport, communication and
energy projects that were aimed at enhancing capacity of the South Caucasus and Central
Asian states to access European and world markets through alternative transport routes. For
the newly independent states these projects had not only economic but also political meaning as
these projects were seen as practical step on their way to the integration into the world and
were believed to strengthen their independence and contribute to the state-building process.
Georgia with its access to the Black Sea was a key element in these projects. Controlling
Georgia thus would give Russia, which viewed these regional initiatives as harming its own
                                                
112 See Roy Allison, "The Eurasian Security Policy Arena in Transition" in Security Dilemmas in Russia and
Eurasia, (London: RIIA, 1998), p. 1.
113 The TRACECA Program was launched in May 1993 by eight countries (five Central Asian republics and
three Caucasian republics). It was agreed to implement a program of European Union (EU) funded technical
assistance to develop a transport corridor on a west - east axis from Europe, across the Black Sea, through
the Caucasus and the Caspian Sea to Central Asia. For more information see <www.traceca.org>.
114 The EU-funded INOGATE Program stands for Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe and has its
overall objective to improve the security of Europe’s energy supply by promoting the regional integration
of the oil and gas pipeline systems and facilitating their transport both within the region in question and
towards the export markets of Europe and the West in general. For more information see
<www.inogate.org>.
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regional interests, additional leverage to limit the West’s influence in the region. Control over
Georgia would in turn enable Moscow to put pressure on Azerbaijan, whose success in energy
projects was very much dependent on the energy transportation networks that were supposed
to pass through Georgian territory.
Yeltsin's decree No. 940 of September 14, 1995, on the “Strategic Policy of the
Russian Federation toward CIS Member States” frankly stated Moscow's intention to re-
establish its political supremacy over the territory of the FSU.  This document constituted a
comprehensive plan of action for the forced reconstruction of Russian dominance within the
CIS, systematizing the use of the wide array of diplomatic, military, economic, ethnic, and
international levers.115 Within this new political guideline Yeltsin in his speech at Council of CIS
Heads of state meeting on March 28, 1997 unequivocally declared that “…[Russia] has no
interest in seeing the Former Union’s territory dominated by anyone, particularly in the military-
political sphere, or seeing any country playing a role of buffer against Russia.”116
The nationalist leaders in Azerbaijan and Georgia, who came to power under the
banner of complete severance from Russia, presented a bigger challenge to Russia’s long-term
interests than the conflicts and instability in the South Caucasus. This partially explains why
Russian military units deployed in the region apart from maintaining Russian military security also
contributed to the pursuing of political objectives in the South Caucasus. Field commanders and
troops deployed in the region had the potential to influence local key politicians and overall
situation there. The role of the military was clearly stated by the then-Russian border troops
                                                
115 See Stephen Foye, “Russia and the ‘Near Abroad’ ”, Post Soviet Prospects, Vol.3, No.12, (December
1995).
116 Quoted in “Introduction”, Rajan Menon, (1999), p. 3.
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commander Andrey Nikolayev, who openly argued that “the task of Russian military in the CIS
was to induce conditions that would prevent political leaders not loyal to Russia from assuming
power.”117 The best scenario for Russia would be to have pro-Moscow presidents that will
follow Russian political line or at worst predictable political leaders who while pursuing their
national policies would take into account Russia’s security concerns.
Russia was also anxious about the growing role of sub-regional groups such as
GUUAM. The rising regional security policy profile of external states disturbed Moscow not
only because of the implications that their penetration might have for the integration process in
the CIS, but also because of their potential political and cultural implications for the South
Caucasus.118 Moscow’s strive to guarantee Russian TV and radio broadcasting, press
dissemination as well as restoring Russia’s role as an educational center on the territory of the
FSU was derived by its desire to prevent Russian cultural retreat from the region that would be
inevitably followed by the political and military withdrawal.119
Russian authorities were also concerned with the progressive exodus of Russian
population from the South Caucasus that could be used as an additional leverage in relations
with NIS (See Table 2). As argues M. Shashenkov:
Ideally, it would be in the Russian authorities’ long-term interest for local
Russians to adjust to life in the newly independent [South Caucasus] states and to
emerge as yet another factor in favour of closer cooperation with Russia.120
                                                
117 From the interview to the Argumenti i Facti, Moscow, No. 27, July 5, 1995, quoted in Rajan Menon, Yuri
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119 See Brzezinski, Zbigniew, “The Grand Chessboard…” (1997), p. 109.
120 Maxim Shashenkov, (1997), p. 439.
49
This partially explains why the national security concepts stressed that Russia sees threat to
Russian population in the “Near Abroad” as a threat to Russian Federation and reserves the
rights to defend their rights and freedoms by all means. Putin’s concern about the fate of
Russian-speaking population in the NIS indicates that he too takes into consideration
consequences of the external cultural penetration on the Russian foreign policy.121 Putin’s
endorsement of the meetings with South Caucasian states within the framework of the so-called
“Caucasus Four”122 clearly reveals that President Putin is willing to regain Russia’s role of
“honest broker” in regional conflict mediation, damaged greatly by Yeltsin’s Administration and
uncompromising military establishment. This is indeed a great challenge to Putin’s new
Administration, given that excessive emphasis on “strategic partnership” with Armenia and ever-
deepening military relations between Russia and Armenia on the one hand and overt pro-
Abkhaz stand on the other, contributed to the formation of negative image of Russia in the eyes
of Azerbaijanis and Georgians. President Putin chose to personify Russia’s foreign policy that
allowed him to detach from the Russian political and military elite, which is mistrusted by
Azerbaijani and Georgian political elites.123 He sent clear messages to the leaderships of
Azerbaijan and Georgia that he was responsible only for the Russian policy pursued after his
coming to power. Despite some voices of irritation coming from the Russian opposition, Putin’s
recognition of Georgia’s territorial integrity and a formula of political settlement of regional
                                                
121 For example during his meetings with the president of Azerbaijan H. Aliyev who returned official visit to
Moscow in January 2001, Putin expressed his gratitude for Azerbaijan government’s attitude toward
Russian-speaking population as well as to the Russian language and joked that if in Azerbaijan everybody
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disputes proposed by him during his visit to Azerbaijan in January 2001, according to which
regional conflicts should be solved “without victors or vanquished”124 shows that he pursues
more balanced, pragmatic policy in the South Caucasus, which “takes into account the interests
of Russia’s partners in the CIS”.125
1.3.3. Russia’s Economic Interests in the South Caucasus
Yegor Gaidar and his team of radical reformers in the early in 1990s abandoned the old
structure of the Russian trade with most of the CIS states that had led to relative trade
disadvantages for Russia.126While economic cooperation with Russia was especially important
for most of the CIS countries, the new Russian government pursued isolationist economic policy
toward the “near abroad.”127 As a result of this policy Russia’s trade with the South Caucasian
states declined considerably.128 The only interest of Russia was agricultural products and oil
drilling and oil-pumping machinery of Azerbaijan. Thus, in the immediate aftermath of the break
up of the Soviet Union Russia’s economic interests were marginal.
                                                                                                                                                
123 See Vitalii Tretiakov, “Putin’s Pragmatic Foreign Policy”, International Affairs, (Moscow), Vol. 48, No. 3,
(2002), p. 17.
124 Source AzTV1, Baku, January 2001.
125 See President Putin’s “State of the Nation” annual address, (April 18, 2002).
126 Under the Soviet trade system Russian exports were dominated by energy and raw materials, and
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127 The Russian government announced that any energy exports not covered in bilateral agreements would
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for Armenian and Georgia (for Georgia 1992 figures are available) are 37% and 33% and 55% and 33%.
Source: Statistical Handbook 1995: States of the Former Soviet Union, The World Bank, Washington D.C.
taken from Pavel Baev, (1997), p. 31.
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Since the mid-1992 when Russian leadership opted for more assertive policy towards
the South Caucasus, the ever-weakening economic relations with the NIS were perceived by
Moscow to have serious implications on the overall Russian regional interests. Azerbaijan and
Georgia’s participation in other regional economic cooperation structures such as ECO, OIC,
BSEC was believed to be detrimental to Russia’s plan of closer integration within the CIS.
Though Russia could not hinder this cooperation, it chose to activate its own economic
cooperative schemes. Russian economic policy in the South Caucasus was thus a reaction to
the trends in this region and should be viewed as a component of its changing foreign policy
attitude. The major event that gave impetus for Russian policy change toward the region was
Azerbaijan’s “oil strategy,” which aimed at attracting western companies to the exploration of
oil and gas deposits in its sector of the Caspian Sea.
Overall, inconsistency of Russian foreign policy prevented formulation of a coordinated
economic policy. While Russian oil company Lukoil participated in the “contract of the
century”129 with a share of 10%, Russia’s MFA, made a statement warning to “take
appropriate measures against those Caspian states that unilaterally decided to explore oil
reserves.” This incompatibility of the policies of various governmental bodies was probably a
reflection of domestic struggle of powerful industrial lobbies that had connections with certain
key politicians and used them to advance their corporate interests.130 Though national state oil
                                                
129 Signed in Baku on September 20, 1994.
130 Recent hearings in State Duma of the RF in November 2001 confirm existence of clear linkage between
Russia’s domestic and foreign politics. During the hearings on “The legal status and ecological problems of
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companies of the NIS can potentially compete with Russian oil exporters such as GASPROM
and TRANSNEFT, for Russia, at least up until 2000, the Caspian oil and gas deposits per se
were not of primary interest.131 Rather, oil explorations in the Caspian were considered to
damage Russia’s political interests in the region. Russia was against internationalization of the
Caspian hydrocarbon exploration because it was to increase Western involvement in the
Caspian basin and strengthen economic independence of the Caspian littoral NIS from Russia
thus depriving Russia from economic and political leverages in dealing with these states132 (for
more on geopolitics of oil see Chapter II).
Russian geo-economic interests in the South Caucasus were bolstered by Russia’s
“strategic partnership” with Iran in 1996.133 “Southern Transport Paths”134 agreement signed in
Autumn 2000 in St. Petersburg by Russia, Iran and India was considered to be the first step in
strengthening a would-be “geopolitical trigon.” This project, though having economic
advantages,135 first of all was of political value to these states and to Russia in particular. Russia
was uneasy with the East-West “New Silk Road Land Bridge Project” corridor that was to
bypass Russia depriving it of its “bridge” role connecting Asia and Europe and thus expelling
                                                                                                                                                
Alekperov who has business connections in Azerbaijan and can potentially emerge, as an influential
politician in Moscow and should be ragarded within the Putin’s “war with oligarchs”. See R. Mirkadirov,
“Russia is again against Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan MEP”, Zerkalo Daily on-line newspaper, <www.zerkalo.az>,
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Pavel Baev, “Russia Refocuses its Policies in the South Caucasus” (2001).
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133 See Robert O. Freedman, “Russian-Iranian Relations In The 1990s”, Middle East Review of International
Affairs, Vol. 4, No. 2, (June 2000).
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Russia from transport-communication sphere of Eurasia.136 Besides, this “New Silk Road”
project was to pass through the South Caucasus states, and was considered by Russia to be
aimed at marginalizing its role in the region.
 In this regard, Putin’s intention to develop economic relations with the South Caucasian
states is probably based on strategic rather than purely economic considerations.137 This policy
most probably is aimed at decreasing disparity in Russia’s economic capabilities in the region
vis-à-vis that of the West. Whatever are the reasons behind Russia’s visible attempts to
increase its economic profile in the South Caucasus its continuing economic ups and downs
considerably constrain this policy.
1.4. Walking the Tightrope: Security Dilemmas of the South Caucasian States
1.4.1. Common Security Perceptions of Azerbaijan and Georgia
After regaining their independence, the South Caucasian states found themselves in a
difficult domestic and international environment. They were faced with the challenge of creating
economic and political systems that were radically different from those of the former Soviet
Union. External security environment was no less challenging. Secessionist movements in
Azerbaijan and Georgia further complicated the situation in these states. Thus the primary task
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for each of these states thus was to restore their territorial integrity and retain their sovereignty
and independence. Internal security threats in these states were viewed (not without good
reason) as externally instigated, to a large degree by Russian security services. The conviction
was widespread among the populations of both states that Russia had not accommodated itself
to their independence.138 Vivid memories of tragic events in Tbilisi in April 1989 and in Baku in
January 1990 when Moscow ordered regular army troops to suppress violently national
movements also contributed to this perception.
The national leaders of Azerbaijan and Georgia while being aware of their continued
economic dependence on Russia rushed to attenuate it by independent state-building policies.
However, national leaders of Azerbaijan and Georgia seemed to underestimate the fact that the
questions of their internal national security and stability were closely linked with their external
security environment and state of their relationships with external powers and with Russia in
particular.
The new Georgian president Zviad Gamsakhurdia elected in October 1990, while
pursuing a nationalistic policy that was aimed at strengthening independence of Georgia refused
to accept the existence of a minority problem arguing that it was artificially created by Russia to
destabilize the situation in Georgia.139 This policy allowed extremists in Abkhazia and South
Ossetia to claim that their very existence as minority was endangered and prompted them to
demand full independence from Georgia or reunification with Russia. Russian political circles
                                                
138 See Philip Petersen, “Security in Post-Soviet Transcaucasia”, European Security, Vol. 3, No. 1, (Spring
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became more and more dissatisfied with Gamsakhurdia’s independent policies and used
Abkhazian and South Ossetian problems as a leverage to subdue him. Growing rivalries and
divisions within Georgian political forces that had paramilitary groups acting as private armies
for political personalities even further complicated the situation.140 Various political forces in
Georgia manipulated ethnic conflicts to pursue their interests while even further complicating
resolution of these ethnic conflicts.
In Azerbaijan too, domestic instability coupled with the undeclared war unleased by
Armenia brought to rapid succession of governments. Military reverses suffered in Karabakh
and Khojaly massacres in February 1992 committed by Armenian forces141 greatly undermined
allegedly pro-Moscow president Ayaz Mutalibov’s position. After his short presidency he was
forced to resign in May 1992 giving way to Abülfaz Elçibey – the nationalist leader of the
Azerbaijan Popular Front (APF).  However, like Gamsakhurdia, he miscalculated the stakes of
external powers and made serious geopolitical mistakes that costed him presidency. While
adopting a pro-Turkish policy he simultaneously antagonized Iran and took an open anti-
Russian stand refusing to join the CIS.142
As a result of domestic and external circumstances coupled with the lack of political
skills and balanced approach, Gamsakhurdia and Elçibey were forced to escape Tbilisi and
Baku respectively almost a year after assuming power. In this difficult circumstances that risked
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the dismemberment of Azerbaijan143 and Georgia Heydar Aliyev and Eduard Shevardnadze144
were brought to lead war-torn republics. The Communist past of these leaders as well as
involvement of the paramilitary units gave way to various conspiracy theories claiming that
Shevardnazde and Aliyev “orchestrated” events with the help of Moscow to take over power.
Though these speculations are too elaborate to be convincing, the “Russian factor” in the
politics of the South Caucasus should not be underestimated either. Moscow still preserved ties
with the Soviet era “nomenklatura” in these republics that had influence among local political
groups. Besides, as was mentioned in previous sections, Russian troops that still were present in
these republics, also reportedly took sides in the domestic power struggle.145 With its coercive
policy of creating “belt of good-neighbourliness” Russia indeed was interested in changing the
anti-Russian political regime in Tbilisi and Baku and if it was not directly engaged in plotting
conspiracy against ex-presidents146 then it did not try to prevent Aliyev and Shevardnadze from
assuming power.147 As argues Maxim Shashenkov:
Whether or not Russia was somehow involved in the toppling of the ‘ex-
dissident’ presidents of Georgia and Azerbaijan, the truth remains that this change
of guard clearly correspondent with Russia’s largest interest in having more
‘benign’ flexible and predictable political leaders in neighbouring Caucasian states.
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…More significant, however, is the fact that the departure of nationalist leaders
associated with a strongly anti-Russian political current was much more a
reflection of the geopolitical and economic realities of the first several years of
post-Soviet Eurasia than the successful result of ‘sophisticated’ Russian policy.148
Aliyev and Shevardnadze realized the need to cope with realities and were to pursue
more pragmatic policies. Striking similarities in foreign policies and security concerns of
Azerbaijan and Georgia seem to support the argument that the primary determinant of their
foreign policy options was the location of these states in the geopolitical zone of “Great Power”
competition.149 The leaderships of these states realized the need to take into account
international and regional politics. When Shevardnadze paid an official visit to Iran in October
1993 in search for a counterweight to Russia, he found that Iran had other strategic calculations
in regard of the South Caucasus.150 Aliyev also, while trying to normalize relations with Iran
during the first year of his presidency, came to realize that the USA’s containment of Iran set
limits for Azerbaijani-Iranian relations.
Using their political experience and skills Aliyev and Shevardnadze managed to achieve
their short-term goal – to restore relative stability in their respective countries. However, the
full-fledged stability in each country depended on the overall stabilisation in the South Caucasus.
Thus, the primary preoccupation of Aliyev and Shevardnadze was restoration of the territorial
integrity of their states. Though the military option was always on the agenda, it was considered
to be the option of last resort, partially because the true army building process was only to
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begin.151 Their diplomatic efforts were focused on “internationalising” of Abkhaz and Karabakh
conflicts by bringing the West’s attention to the conflict mediation process. At the same time,
Aliyev and Shevardnadze’s declarations that “the key to solve these conflicts was in Moscow”
indicate that they felt the need to accommodate with Russian interests. Interestingly, Georgia’s
admission into the CIS coincided with the Abkhaz assault on Sukhumi152 and uprising of
“Zviadists”(supporters of ex-president Zviad Gamsakhurdia) in Mingrella that aimed to oust
Shevardnadze.153 Shevardnadze accepted Russian mediation in South Ossetia and in
Abkhazia.154 Under the “Framework Treaty of Friendship and good neighbourliness”
signed on February 3, 1994 during the official visit of Yeltsin to Tbilisi, Georgia made major
concessions to Russia by allowing it to deploy the CIS peacekeeping forces,155 as well as
Russian border troops to guard Georgian border with Turkey. The treaty on Russian military
bases156 that was signed in October 1995 by Eduard Shevardnadze effectively closed the issue
of a “planned withdrawal” of the GRVZ from Georgia.157
                                                
151 For a good account of these problems in army building see Elizabeth Fuller, “Paramilitary Forces
Dominate Fighting in Transcaucasus”, RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 2, No. 25, (18 June 1993).
152 Catherine Dale, “The Case of Abkhazia (Georgia)”, in Dov Lynch (ed.) Peacekeeping and the role of
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Abkhaz guerrillas caused for Georgian suspicion of “hidden Russian hand” supporting Abkhazian forces.
Interestingly Russian troops agreed to support Georgian forces by blocking all roads and communications
and thus preventing Zviadist rebels from advancing on Tbilisi only after Shevardnadze’s consent to enter
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Nations and Great Powers: A Study of Ethno-political Conflict in the Caucasus, (2000), p. 168-170.
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Georgia: The Parties’ Attitudes And Prospects”, Caucasian Regional Studies, Vol. 2, Issue 1, (1997).
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 Aliyev also chose to accommodate with Russia. In September 1993 he paid visit to
Moscow where he signed the CIS Charter and CST agreement. He downplayed military
cooperation with Turkey by dismissing a number of Turkish military experts who had been
advising the Azerbaijani armed forces.158 This was however a tactical move aimed at appeasing
Russia as in 1994 Aliyev asked Turkey to continue training Azerbaijani officers.
  Though joining the CIS was perceived as a compromise with Russia, there were also
other strategic calculations. After joining the CST Azerbaijan insisted that the agreement should
be activated not only in the events of external threats but it should also be applied to the
conflicts among its members.159 The last decade of 20th century showed that Azerbaijan did not
at all weaken its independence by joining the CIS. On the contrary, Azerbaijan participated on
the all CIS summits, during which it had opportunity to expose Armenian irredentist policy. At
the same time Azerbaijan was among a few CIS countries that refused to sign a number of
military-political agreements that could potentially threaten Azerbaijan interests (See Table 3).
Though Azerbaijan accepted mediation efforts of Russia and signed a cease-fire agreement with
Armenia in May 12, 1994 it refused to introduce Russian peacekeepers into the zone of conflict
perhaps fearing that Russian-led peacekeeping forces (PKF) would just entrench the status
quo becoming in effect “buffer zone” for the self-proclaimed so-called “Nagorno-Karabakh
Republic” while exercising pressure on Azerbaijani government for further concessions.
Out of the same concerns, Shevardnadze made Russian military presence conditional to
the resolution of the Abkhaz conflict and restoration of Georgia’s territorial integrity. As a result
the agreements on bases and border guards were never ratified by Georgian parliament. This
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deprived Russian military presence of legal status while providing Georgia with some bargaining
chip. Shevardnadze also raised from time to time such issues as replacement of CIS mandated
PKF by a UN or OSCE-mandated force, Georgia’s withdrawal from the CIS and veto on the
extension of the peacekeeping mandate in order to induce Russia to take into account
Georgia’s position.160 Though Russia indeed agreed to impose CIS-mandated “blockade” on
Abkhazia161 Russia was not willing to apply full pressure on Abkhazia. The possible reason for
this was not so much pro-Abkhaz162 stand, as a lesson learned from bitter experience in
Bosnian conflict. Russia realised that it could preserve its “key mediator” status as long as it was
believed to have some leverage on at least one of the conflicting sides.163 Thus, unable or
unwilling to find lasting solution to the Abkhaz conflict Russia was faced with fundamental
dilemma of de-linking the issue of conflict resolution in Abkhazia from Russian-Georgian military
cooperation.164 Starting from 1995 Shevardnadze, probably being convinced that there was
little if any prospect for resolution of the Abkhaz problem, openly expressed his disappointment
with Russia’s failure to fulfil “certain obligations” it had towards Georgia. By that time Georgia
was becoming a crucial component of trans-regional energy transportation corridor. This
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provided Shevardnadze with additional political dividends that strengthened his hand in relations
with Russia.
On September 20, 1994, just a year after it became member of the CIS, Azerbaijan
initiated its “Oil Strategy” by signing the “contract of the century” with consortium of Western
oil companies that envisaged joint exploration of Caspian Sea hydrocarbons. Aliyev
unequivocally demonstrated foreign policy orientation of Azerbaijan, thus rendering accusations
about pro-Russian stand groundless. Instrumentally attracting Western oil companies and
generating economic interests of their respective governments Azerbaijan sought to attract
attention of international community to the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. In fact, the Caspian
energy projects became a kind of “symbols” of independent political course of Azerbaijan and
Georgia.
The first results of this tactics were not long to present themselves. In December 1994
during the Budapest summit of OSCE a decision was made to send peacekeeping mission
under the mandate of the OSCE to Karabakh. This initiative led to the broader question
whether the international community should play a role in the South Caucasus and what that role
should be.165 The decisions166 taken by the OSCE indicate that the South Caucasus was
considered to be a part of European security zone.167 Since 1994 Georgia and Azerbaijan
initiated a security dialogue with NATO via the PfP program. Both of them have been
developing close economic, political and security ties with Turkey. In 1995-1996 Georgia and
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Azerbaijan received substantial financial assistance from IMF and World Bank, which assisted
in their countries’ overall macro economic stabilization. In 1997 Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova,
and Azerbaijan initiated the GUAM formal cooperation framework within the CIS in 1997 to
balance Russia’s attempts to dominate the CIS.168
Allegedly Moscow-sanctioned unsuccessful assassination attempts on Shevardnadze on
August 25, 1995 and February 9, 1998 and coup attempts against Aliyev in October 1994 and
March 1995169 indicate that Russia was more and more uneasy with Aliyev and
Shevardnadze’s independent political courses. Those who want them dead or ousted were
aware of the role Aliyev and Shevardnadze “factors” played in the regional politics.170 Indeed
there is good reason to look at the “Six-Day war” in the Gali district in May 1998, and military
mutiny in Senaki in October of the same year as links of one chain in Russia’s conspiracy aimed
at preventing the Main Export Pipeline (MEP)171 to pass through Georgia.172 As argues Svante
Cornell, “unable to oust Aliyev, Russia might have thought that destabilizing Georgia would do
very much the same effect for oil transportation as destabilizing Azerbaijan itself.”173
Though these events even further deteriorated Georgian and Azerbaijani relations with
Russia and highly complicated the domestic situation, continuing economic dependence on
Russia174 and the need for balanced policy seem to set limits on how far these states could go in
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antagonizing Russia.175 Azerbaijan, despite its strained relations with Russia throughout the last
decade, was interested in normalizing relations with Russia in order to limit Armenia’s over
reliance on Russian military help in case of renewed war with Armenia and prevent formation of
an overt anti-Azerbaijan Russia-Armenia-Iran bloc. Azerbaijan’s economic relations with
Russia should not be underestimated either.176
Shevardnadze also showed some flexibility on the time frame for closing Russian bases
in Akhalkalaki and Batumi – perhaps the most sensitive issue for Moscow, saying that the date
for completing the Russian withdrawal from Batumi and Akhalkalaki would be set only after the
signing of a new framework Russian-Georgian treaty, which is currently still at the discussion
stage.177 One of the possible reasons for such “patience” is that the Russian base in Georgian
Armenian populated Javakheti region, where Armenians from time to time demand for more
self-rule, provides Russia with additional lever to exert pressure on the Georgian government.178
Perhaps fearing that Javakheti can become the “next Karabakh,” Shevardnadze seems to
pursue the “strategy of postponement” playing down “uncertain” situation in this region with
potential centrifugal aspirations. But, more importantly, the spill over of instability into this region
can jeopardize regional transportation projects such as the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, Baku-
                                                
175 See Shireen T. Hunter, Ch.1 “The Evolution of the Foreign Policy of the Transcaucasian States” in
“Crossroads and Conflict…” (2000), p. 46.
176 Most of Azerbaijani import-export cargo flow is made via Azerbaijan-Russian border. Besides, estimated
2 millions of Azerbaijanis are currently doing business in Russia and are source of monetary inflows into
Azerbaijani economy.
177 Russia withdrew the bases at Vaziani by 1 July 2001.The planned withdrawal of base from Gudauta
(Abkhazia) was delayed due to the protests of Abkhazians. The decision occurred under the framework of
the OSCE summit agreement on the adaptation of the CFE treaty signed in Istanbul on November 19, 1999.
However Russia has offered to vacate bases in Akhalkalaki and Batumi within 15 years referring to financial
problems (withdrawal would cost $140 million) while Georgia insists that Russia should pull out in three to
four years. See RFE/RL Newsline, (16 May and 25 June 2001).
178 For a detailed account of this problem see Voitsekh Guretski,  “The Question of Javakheti”, Caucasian
Regional Studies, Vol. 3, Issue 1, 1998, <http://poli.vub.ac.be/publi/crs/eng/0301-05.htm>, Accessed: March
17, 2002.
64
Erzurum gas pipeline and the Kars-Marabda railway connection that are supposed to pass
through Javakheti region.
Though after the violent incidents in Abkhazia179 in October 2001 Georgian Parliament
voted for withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from Abkhazia,180 Shevardnadze chose to hold
back fearing that a “Russian troop pullout from the breakaway region could spark another
military conflict there.”181 Shevardnadze seem to be aware that though Russia’s conflict
resolution capabilities are ambiguous, its destabilization capabilities are certainly not
exhausted.182 The November 2001 political crisis in Georgia183 proves these fears. As Paul
Goble argues, “political situation in Georgia is at least in part a product of forces beyond its
borders”.184
Being suspicious that Russia is willing to play the “anti-terrorist campaign card”185 for its
own interests just like it used “peacekeeping,”186 Shevardnadze refused to allow Russia to carry
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out anti-terrorist operations in Pankisi gorge.187 Instead, Georgia asked the US government to
train Georgian counter-terrorism units that would carry out special anti-terrorist operations on
the territory of Georgia.188 Though Russia’s State Duma seems uneasy about presence of
American military instructors in Georgia189 Putin’s unwillingness to accentuate further on this
issue190 should be looked through the broader context of geopolitical shift in the world order
after the September 11 fallout. Whatever are the real intentions of Putin in supporting the US-
led anti-terrorist coalition, there are at least two strategic goals that are directly linked with the
post-Soviet space in general and the South Caucasus in particular. First, an immediate goal may
be to eliminate international terrorist networks that potentially threaten Russia’s own security.191
Second no less pressing issue for Russia is its relations with the CIS. While Moscow gradually
reduces its military presence in the “near abroad”192 it is searching for new forms of military
cooperation with the CIS states. Common “enemy” such as international terrorism and
extremism is believed in Moscow to provide a new basis for further integration of the CIS
states into a single political-military security system – long-sought-after goal of Russia.193
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1.4.2. Militarisation of Armenia: A Factor of Instability in the South Caucasus
Armenia’s post-Soviet foreign policy was to a large extent guided by its identity that
was shaped by geographical location, ethnic and religious characteristics and historical
narratives. The first crucial factor is its landlocked geographical location as a result of which
Armenia perceived itself isolated and encircled by neighbouring Muslim states. Lack of outlets
to open seas, major trade roots and natural resources are believed to be serious impediments to
Armenia’s economic development.194 Armenian historical territorial claims on neighbouring
states (Batum (Georgia) on the Black Sea, Turkey’s eastern provinces, Azerbaijan’s Nahchivan
and Karabakh regions) are probably linked to Armenia’s disadvantageous location. Coupled
with traditional animosity towards the “Turks” and allegations of so-called genocide of 1915,
Armenians, in time, developed negative identity perceptions of neighboring states. All these
factors together with domestic struggle for power between various political groups that used
instrumentally ethnic sentiments and animosities to carry out self-serving political agendas and
pressure of Armenian Diaspora abroad forced Armenian leadership to continue pursuing a
centuries-old irredentist policy after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Back in 1988, Armenia
commenced practical implementation of its policy of miatsum – forceful incorporation of
Karabakh region of Azerbaijan into Armenia. The Karabakh problem to a great extent
determined Armenia’s foreign policy for the years to come.
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Though militarily and economically weak Armenia took advantage of the domestic
instability in Azerbaijan to advance militarily in Karabakh, Armenian authorities were aware that
their capabilities to wage long war and let alone retain occupied territories were limited unless
they establish military superiority over more populous, economically developed and oil-rich
Azerbaijan. The Armenian leadership chose to bandwagon with the third power - Russia.
Armenia – pioneer in declaring its independence among former soviet republics – was one of
the first NIS that signed the CIS Charter and all its military-security treaties perhaps hoping that
it would allow Armenia to activate CIS security structures in its war with Azerbaijan.195 Though
Armenia declared its intentions to create its own army right after the dissolution of the Soviet
Union, it welcomed Russian control over the 7th Army stationed in Armenia (about 23,000
troops in mid-1992).196 Armenia instrumentally playing on Russia’s anxiety about Turkey’s
rising regional profile deliberately exaggerated the “Turkish threat.”197Therefore, Armenia only
welcomed Russia’s plans to turn Armenia into a bulwark against “Turkish expansion.” Armenia
indeed became the main instrument of Russian assertive policy in the South Caucasus. Aiming at
increasing Armenia’s warfare capabilities since 1993 Russia began secret shipments of military
hardware to Armenia and Karabakh that became known as a result of investigations by the
Russian Duma defence committee in 1996-1997.198 With the support of Russian military
officers and equipment, Armenia by 1994, managed to occupy 20% of Azerbaijani territories.
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Armenian authorities realized that as long as they would adhere to peaceful settlement of the
conflict by continuing formal peace talks and using occupied lands as bargaining chip, they
could preserve status quo and gain time for further military build-up. The constitutional coup
against Armenian ex-president Levon Ter-Petrossian in February 1998 that happened after he
advocated concessions to Azerbaijan proves the argument that survival of any Armenian
leadership in power is linked to the Karabakh problem.199
A landmark treaty on “friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance” signed on 29
August 1997 between Russia and Armenia was first in row of several military treaties200 that, by
wording of Russia's President Boris Yeltsin, “could lead to a much deeper strategic
partnership.” It marked for the first time in the post-Soviet era that Russia committed itself by
treaty to defend an ally militarily if attacked by a foreign country. In practical terms, according
to the treaty, an attack on Armenia would be considered an attack on Russia, and vice versa.201
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If for Armenia cooperation with Russia was needed to maintain superiority over Azerbaijan and
deter Azerbaijan from resorting to the military means of liberation its occupied territories, for
Russia military presence in the region was aimed at preventing NATO and other external forces
to get foothold in the Caucasus.202 President Putin, who unlike his predecessor Yeltsin, pursued
a more pragmatic foreign policy also rebuffed on 13 January 2001 during his official visit to
Azerbaijan, upon criticism of Russian weapons redeployment from bases in Georgia to Baku’s
archrival Armenia arguing that “…since Georgia has demanded the removal of Russian
(military) technology, and we believe that Russian equipment in this region is necessary, we
didn't have any other choice…”203
Though Armenia justified its militarization by security concerns, in reality its security
policy in the last decade only increased its insecurity bringing Armenia to complete political and
economic disaster. Economic hardships caused mass exodus of population that coupled with
low birth rate brought to the decline of Armenian population almost by half.204 Being dependent
on import energy Armenia was forced to abandon its outcry about “Muslim encirclement” and
improve relations with Iran.205 Armenia fearing to find itself in complete isolation206 was forced
to find a “modus vivendi” with Georgia and downplay territorial claims on Georgia. Armenia
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also was interested in quelling Armenian separatist aspirations in Javakheti region.207 Thus,
Armenian irredentist policy that resulted in the shift of overall regional military balance even
further complicated the situation in the South Caucasus and contributed to the regional
instability.
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CHAPTER II
GEOPOLITICAL PLURALISM IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS:
THE ROLE OF TURKEY
2.1. The New Mission in the South Caucasus: Can Ankara Do It Alone?
As was mentioned in the first chapter the security environment in the South Caucasus
after the demise of the Soviet Union was characterized on the one hand by the on-going ethnic
and territorial conflicts that exacerbated domestic turmoil in the South Caucasian states and on
the other hand by Russia’s attempts to reinstate its lost position in the region using regional
conflicts. The deadlock in the conflict resolution and the continuing military, political and
economic pressure from Russia forced Azerbaijan and Georgia to seek external support and
diversification of their security ties by developing relations with powerful extra-regional states.
 After the end of the Cold War Turkey was frequently referred to as a rising multi-
regional power with potential influence in its periphery. Being a sole country bordering the
South Caucasus and having both institutionalized links with the West and cultural, historical ties
with the South Caucasian countries, Turkey was considered by Azerbaijan and Georgia to be a
natural counterweight against Russia’s regional hegemonic aspirations. Therefore it is important
for our study to explore the role Turkey played in the regional politics.
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2.1.1. The New Activism in Foreign Policy
It is difficult to understand Turkey’s objectives and policies in the South Caucasus
without taking into account Turkey’s general foreign policy patterns during and after the Cold
War. Therefore, a brief outlook of the evolution of Turkey’s foreign policy strategy is
necessary. Since its establishment in 1923, the Turkish Republic, guided by famous principle
“peace at home, peace in the world” attributed to Atatürk, abolished expansionist foreign
policy of the Ottoman Empire, refrained from involvement in turbulent neighboring regions and
concentrated mainly on domestic issues. Turkey’s primary foreign policy objectives throughout
the years were to strengthen its statehood, preserve territorial integrity and independence. As a
result, Turkey developed a cautions foreign policy that sometimes resembled isolationism.
Structural changes in the international system in 1950s, namely the bipolar character of
the international configuration made it impossible for Turkey to follow its policy of non-
alignment. Given the traditional Western orientation of Turkey coupled with the need for
political, economic and military support from the West, Turkey established close ties with the
Western states. Soviet territorial claims also pushed Turkey to anchor itself with the Western
security alliance - NATO. It participated in the regional alliances such as Baghdad Pact (1955)
and CENTO (1955-1979) and became a bulwark against the containment of the possible
Soviet expansion into the Middle East and eastern Mediterranean.1
After the notorious Johnson letter of 1964 Turkey’s leadership came to realize that
Turkey’s approaches towards regions, which are of importance to its interests, differ
                                                
1 See Ali L. Karaosmanoðlu, “Turkey’s Security and the Middle East”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 62, No. 1, (Fall
1983).
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substantially from that of its western counterparts and the US in particular. Though Turkey
began to revaluate its strict pro-Western orientation and vigorously defended its national
interests, still there were limits on how far Turkey could go in this revaluation of its foreign
policy. Turkey’s dependence on the Western economic and military aid and general East-West
confrontation largely determined Turkey’s external environment and restrained its foreign policy
options.2
The end of the Cold War drastically changed the security environment in the world.
Turkey, due to its location in the front line of inter-bloc confrontation was one of the first states
that found itself in a qualitatively new geopolitical environment. Though détente between the
USA and he USSR reduced the immediate threat coming from the Soviet Union, for Turkey
this shift in international environment meant “mixed blessing”. Turkey’s strategic location was a
cornerstone of its relations with the West. Though undoubtedly Turkey and the West benefited
from close security relationships during the Cold War, the end of the bloc confrontation created
doubts about the strategic utility of Turkey especially in Western Europe. At the same time
drastic change in the geopolitical configuration in the world relieved Turkish foreign policy of
certain constrains while simultaneously opened new horizons for Turkey’s economic and
political activities in the vast area stretching from the Balkans to Central Asia. However, though
there were certain indications of more independent policy, Turkey’s overall Western orientation
was bound to affect its foreign policy options elsewhere in the future.3
                                                
2 For an insightful analysis of Turkey’s Foreign Policy during the Cold War see Mustafa Aydin,
“Determinants of Turkey’s Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures During the Cold War”,
Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 36, No. 1, (January 2000), pp. 103-139.
3 See Shireen Hunter, “Bridge or Frontier? Turkey’s Post-Cold War Geopolitical Posture”, The International
Spectator, Vol. XXXIV, No. 1, (January-March 1999).
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 Since the late 1980s, Turkish society has vividly discussed the possible outcome of the
end of the Cold War and its implications on Turkey. The view that the end of the Cold War
would undermine Turkey’s geo-strategic importance to the West that would eventually translate
into reduction of economic and military aid was very popular in the Turkish public opinion.
Postponement of Turkey’s full membership application to the European Community (now
European Union) in 1989 only added fuel to these suspicions.4
Turkish political and security elite had been searching for a new foreign policy strategy
in the post-Cold War era. The 1990 crisis in the Persian Gulf was in this sense a geopolitical
breakthrough for Turkey. The decision of the then Turkish President Turgut Özal to back
American-led anti-Iraq international coalition and get actively involved into the Gulf crisis caught
many at home and abroad by surprise. The reason for this was not so much Özal’s decision to
support international coalition during the Gulf war per se, since under the international
circumstances every Turkish government perhaps would do the same move, as his single-
handed actions that brush aside the traditions and patterns of cautious Turkish foreign policy.5
He sent 100,000 strong army to the border with Iraq to engage Iraqi troops, allowed allied
forces to use air bases on Turkish soil for air strikes and closed down profitable Kerkük-
Yumurtalýk pipeline thus jeopardizing economic situation in Turkey.6 When faced with the wave
                                                
4 See Sabri Sayari, “Turkey: The Changing European Security Environment and the Gulf Crisis”, Middle
East Journal, Vol. 46, No. 1, (Winter 1992).
5 See Mahmut Bali Ayhan, “Turkey’s Policy in Northern Iraq, 1991-1995”, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 32,
No. 4, (October 1996), pp. 343-366.
6 According to the Turkish MFA this pipeline used to bring to the Turkish budget $400 millions annually.
Besides, Iraq was Turkey’s key trade partner in the Middle East.
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of criticism at home he simply rebuffed accusations saying that “I put in one and take out
three”.7
Özal indeed may have been interested in the Western, and mainly American economic,
military aid, however his statements during and after the crisis indicate that the primary
calculation behind his move was not so much economic but strategic in character.8 Now that the
prospects for Turkey’s EU membership were uncertain and Turkey’s role in the post-Cold
War world order was vague, Özal was seeking a new foreign policy strategy that would secure
Turkish national interests. This strategy, in his view, required modification of Turkish foreign
policy patterns that became obsolete. During one of his press conferences in the aftermath of
the Gulf crisis in 1991, he unequivocally declared that Turkey “should leave its former passive
and hesitant policies and engage in an active foreign policy”.9
Özal seemed to be convinced that Turkey was capable of pursuing a more assertive
foreign policy in the regional and even global scale. Greater economic prosperity,10 increased
military capabilities, the decline of neighboring states, greater regional opportunity and a greater
sense of policy independence after the end of the bloc confrontation indeed could be factors
that encouraged Özal to redefine Turkish policy in such a drastic way. His policy was a reaction
to the processes taking place in the changing world. As Alan Makovski argues, this “new
                                                
7 In protest to Özal’s single-handed actions Turkey’s the then Chief of Staff Necip Torumtay, Minister of
Foreign Affairs Ali Bozer and Defence Minister Sefa Giray resigned.
8 See James Brown, “Turkey and the Persian Gulf Crisis”, Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Spring
1991).
9 Quoted in Alan Makovski, “The New Activism in Turkish Foreign Policy”, SAIS Review, Vol. 19, No. 1
(Winter-Spring 1999).
10 For an overview of Turkey’s economy in the 1990s see “Turkish Economy after 1980” in Onur Oymen
(ed.) Turkish Challenge: Turkey, Europe and the World Towards the 21st Century, (Rustem, Cambridge
Univ. Press, 2000), pp. 120-170.
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activism” in Turkish foreign policy “…represents a trend resulting from structural factors in
Turkey's domestic, regional, and international environment.”11
Though Özal’s actions were initially interpreted as the beginning of the transformation of
Turkish traditional foreign policy, his ultimate goals seemed to be traditional. As Mahmut Ayhan
argues “…what has changed is means to pursue Turkish foreign policy.”12 Just like the Korean
War, the Gulf crisis was a “golden opportunity” for Turkey to show its commitment to the West
and highlight its continuing strategic importance.
To the disappointment of Turkey, some expectations did not come true. Turkey’s stand
during the Gulf War did not translate into an increase of Western economic and military
assistance, the EU did not change its attitude in regard of such questions as Kurdish insurgency
in South-East Anatolia, and Turkey’s bid for full EU membership was still ambiguous.
However, post-Cold War developments in Eurasia namely the Gulf War, the break up of the
USSR in 1991 and Yugoslavia in 1992 indeed prompted decision-makers in the West and in
the USA in particular to reconsider the future role of Turkey in a changed world. Some
observers believed that Turkey might be an effective barrier against the instability emanating
from the South, while others saw Turkey’s role as a bridge between East and the West.13
Due to its strategic location, overall economic potential and the size of population
Turkey was considered a pivotal state with potential influence in such regions as the Balkans,
Mediterranean, the Middle East, the South Caucasus, the Black Sea basin and Central Asia.14
                                                
11 Alan Makovski, “The New Activism in Turkish Foreign Policy”, (Winter-Spring 1999).
12 Mahmut Ayhan, “Turkey’s Policy in Northern Iraq, 1991-1995”, (1996), p. 347.
13 See Ian O. Lesser, “Bridge or Barrier? Turkey and the West after the Cold War”, Report R-4204-AF/A,
RAND: Santa Monica, Calif., (1992); See also Graham E. Fuller, Ian O. Lesser (eds.) Turkey's New
Geopolitics: From the Balkans to Western China,  (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993).
14 See Robert S. Chase, Emili B. Hill, and Paul Kennedy, “Pivotal States and the US Strategy”, Foreign
Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 1, (January/February 1996).
77
Brzezinski considers that Turkey’s importance as a geopolitical pivot derives not so much from
its power and motivation as from its “sensitive geographical location, which gives it a special
role either in defining access to important areas or in denying resources to a significant player.”15
The Turkish leadership also stressed that Turkey’s multiple identity presupposed multi-vectored
foreign policy in the new environment.16
Though Turkey’s multi-regional profile tended to grow its ability to play an active role in
adjoining regions was believed to be dependent on its domestic political situation.17 Turkey’s
domestic situation in its turn was influenced by its external environment. Though after the Cold
War Turkey no more confronted the Soviet, threat its security environment was no less
threatening. Turkey had unresolved disputes with Greece over Aegean Sea and Cyprus; its
relations with Syria and Iraq were strained over water problem, alleged support for PKK
terrorist groups by these states; relations with Iran were also tense because of the latter’s
alleged support for the PKK and Islamic groups in Turkey. Coupled with Turkey’s stalled EU
membership this environment could increase the feeling of isolation in Turkey that might result in
the rise of the extreme lefts and rights in the political spectrum of Turkey. This possibility was
desirable neither in Europe nor in the US. Whatever are the prospects of Turkey’s EU
membership, European countries were aware of the consequences of Turkey’s alienation from
                                                
15 See Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives,
(N.Y.: Basic Books, 1997), p. 41.
16 See ªule Kut, “The Contours of Turkish Fore ign Policy in the 1990s” in Barry Rubin & Kemal Kýrýþci (eds.)
Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power, (Boulder-London, Rienner Publishers, Inc.,
2001), pp.5-11.
17 See Ian O. Lesser, Ch. 4, “Turkey and Security in the Eastern Mediterranean,” in Ian O. Lesser (ed.) NATO
Looks South: New Challenges and New Strategies in the Mediterranean, RAND Report MR-1126-AF,
(Santa Monica, CA, 2000), p. 27. See also Meltem Müftüler, “Turkey’s New Vocation”, Journal of South
Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. XXII, No. 3, (Spring 1999), p. 5.
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Europe that did not correspond to their long-term interests to have stable, democratic, secular
Turkey in their immediate neighborhood.
 Though the Gulf War revealed continuing strategic importance of Turkey to the US, the
future of the U.S.-Turkey relations as well as Turkey’s overall regional role was also believed
to bear on the domestic political developments in Turkey.18 This was another reason why the
USA encouraged more active role for Turkey in regional affairs along with continuing support
for Turkey’s EU membership. Turkey’s role model as a secular, market-based Muslim country
was believed to further encourage democratic reforms in Turkey. As argues Aydin Yalcin:
A Turkish model acted as a stimulant in the difficulties and disappointments,
which attended [Turkey’s] efforts to create a democratic and pluralistic society
at a time when it was still well behind the advanced industrialized states of the
West.19
2.1.2. The “Turkish Model”: A Framework for Turkey’s Foreign Policy?
Though internal political processes in the Soviet Union in the late 1980s indicated that
the USSR underwent drastic structural changes with the consequences that were to go well
beyond its borders, nobody had expected such a quick break-up of the SU. Though Turkey
welcomed reforms in the USSR that allowed the Soviet republics (five of which were of Turkic
origin) to have direct cultural and economic contacts with foreign states, Turkey refrained from
excessive popularization of its relations with the Turkic republics. Turkish leadership was careful
to avoid giving any perception of interfering into internal affairs of the Soviet Union – a powerful
neighboring country that was becoming an important trade partner for Turkey. Turkey’s
                                                
18 See Marios L. Svriviades, “Turkey’s Role in the US Strategy During and After the Cold War”,
Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 2, (Spring 1998),
19  Cited by Andrew. Mango, “The Turkish Model”, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 29, No. 4, (October 1993),
p. 726.
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cautious approach to the processes in the Soviet Union was illustrated by Özal’s remarks on
the tragic events in Baku in January 1990. Anticipating the wave of criticism at home, he
nevertheless declared that the events in Azerbaijan should be of more concern to Iran than to
Turkey as Azerbaijanis are mostly Shiites.20
When the Soviet republics declared their independence in 1991 Turkey did not hurry to
recognize them. Though Turkey was the first country to recognize the independence of
Azerbaijan on November 9, 1991 this move was motivated by an attempt to pre-empt possible
Iranian diplomatic recognition of Azerbaijan.21
However, when the Soviet Union de facto and de jure demised in December 1991
Turkey’s political elite, intellectuals, the media and the public enthusiastically welcomed the
emergence of the newly independent states (NIS). Turkey’s political elite regarded dissolution
of the Soviet Union as a “historical opportunity” for Turkey. 22 There were several reasons for
such assumptions. First, an “emerging Turkic world” provided opportunity to breakthrough the
sense of isolation in international arena. The Turkic republics were regarded as natural allies that
would support Turkey in the international forums. The then Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel
on his way back from the tour to Central Asia in April 1992 spoke about the “Gigantic Turkic
world stretching from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China”. As Ziya Onis argues:
                                                
20  Cited by Kemal Karpat, “The Role of Turkey and Iran in Incorporating the Former Soviet Republics into
the World System”, in Dawisha Karen (ed.) The International Dimension of the Post-Communist
Transitions in Russia and New States of Eurasia, (Armonk New-York-London: M.E. Sharpe,1997) p. 176.
21 During the ceremony held in Baku on January 15, 2002 and dedicated to the 10th anniversary of
establishment of the diplomatic relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey Bilal ªimºir, ex-Director-General of
the MFA’s department responsible for the CIS told that information about the possible recognition of
Azerbaijan by one neighboring country prompted Turkey to recognize Azerbaijan first despite heavy
pressure of Russian ambassador to Ankara A. Chernishev and warnings of NATO members (Source: Baku-
based daily on-line newspaper <www.zerkalo.az>, January 15, 2002).
22 In his opening speech in Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM) on September 1, 1991, Özal
described the situation created by the end of the Cold War and the breaking up of the Soviet Union as an
“historic opportunity” for the Turks to become a “regional power”.
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The dramatic significance of the emergence of the Turkic Republics is that
they have helped Turkey to overcome its cultural isolation – an isolation that stems
from being neither Arab nor fully European. Turkey, at least, has been able to find a
new group of countries to which it can relate both culturally and economically.23
Secondly, as was previously mentioned in the post-Cold War era Turkey had been
searching for a new role for itself. Relations with the Turkic states were believed to boost
Turkey’s importance for the West and provide a new basis for the strategic cooperation with
the West.24 Though some politicians in Turkey voiced the possibility that the Turkic republics
could be an alternative to Turkey’s European vocation, Turkey’s relations with these states
were supposed to be ‘complimentary to Turkey’s western attachment.’25 Süleyman Demirel is
quoted to say that:
In Central Asia we [Turks] are the emissaries of Europe. We are the
Europeans who are taking European values to Central Asia…we want to remain
Europeans…it is in Europe’s interests to see that a modern, secular, and democratic
Turkey is seen as the role model for the ex-communist countries in the region.26
The discourse in the Turkish public on the Turkey’s foreign policy towards the Turkic
states gradually translated into the “Turkish Model” concept which provided an overall
framework for Turkey’s approach to the Turkic world. A Turkish political economist Aydýn
Yalçýn noted that the “Turkish Model” concept had arisen outside Turkey.27 Indeed, Turkey
became even more enthusiastic to play an important role in Central Asia when it became clear
                                                
23 See Ziya Onis, “Turkey in Post-Cold War Era: In Search of an Identity”, Middle Eastern Journal, Vol. 49,
No. 1, (Winter 1995), pp. 48-83.
24 See Idris Bal, Turkey’s Relations with the West and the Turkic Republics: The Rise and the Fall of
Turkish model, (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2000), p. 114.
25 See Oral Sander, “Turkey and the Turkic World”, Central Asian Survey, Vol. 13, No. 1, (1994), p. 37
26 Cited by Idris Bal, “Turkey’s Relations with the West and the Turkic Republics...” (2000), p. 52.
27 Cited by Andrew. Mango, “The Turkish Model”, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 29, No. 4, (October 1993),
p. 726.
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that the West supported and even encouraged Turkey to lead independent Turkic states. After
a meeting with the Turkish Prime Minister S. Demirel in Washington D.C. on February 13,
1992, the U.S. President Bush pointed to Turkey as “a model of a democratic, secular state,
which could be emulated by Central Asia.”28 The Secretary-General of the Council of Europe
Mme Catherine Lalumière during her visit to Central Asia in June 199229 also declared that
“Turkey provided a valid model of development for many newly-independent countries”.30
The West’s endorsement for the “Turkish Model” was not however a confirmation of
the maturity of this model. Turkey itself was a country that still was undergoing economic and
political reforms. The Turkish leaders themselves were aware that along with the opportunities,
Turkey’s “new mission” posed new challenges and problems. Continuing economic difficulties
and problems within Turkey indeed put serious constrains on Turkey’s capabilities to engage
actively in the post-Soviet space. Turgut Özal speaking about the prospects of Turkey’s
relations with the Turkic states told that:
It would take years for these countries to understand how to operate
democracy and a market economy…Turkey will do what it can to help, but we have
our own problems and we will need support and we will expect the EC and the US
to give us this backing.31
Western promotion of the “Turkish Model” was thus guided mainly by political and
strategic calculations. The Western countries desired that the Turkic republics adopt and adhere
to such principles as secularism, democracy, and market-oriented economy, which in fact were
the basic characteristics of the “Turkish Model.” It was believed that cultural, ethnic, linguistic
                                                
28 Cited by Idris Bal, “Turkey’s Relations with the West and the Turkic Republics...” (2000), p. 115.
29 The then Turkish Foreign Minister Hikmet Cetin accompanied her during this trip.
30 See A. Mango, “The Turkish Model”, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 29, No. 4, (October 1993), p. 726.
31 Cited by Idris Bal, Turkey’s Relations with the West and the Turkic Republics: The Rise and the Fall of
Turkish model, Aldershot, Ashgate, (2000), p. 51, originally appeared in Guardian, April 3, 1992.
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affinities Turkic republics feel towards Turkey would stimulate them to follow Turkey’s path of
development thus accepting overall Western strategic orientation.
The European countries and the USA in particular did not possess much information
about the real state of affairs in Central Asia, fact-finding missions had not been sent yet and in
general, the West was cautious in dealing with the new and highly unpredictable region. At the
same time, there was a fear that the emerged power vacuum in Central Asia after the demise of
the Soviet Union would be filled by the radical Islamic fundamentalism sponsored by Iran. This
could eventually increase Iranian influence in the region that would inevitably lead to the
emergence of the anti-western sentiments (Bal, 2000, p. 107). Given that the U.S. and the
European states carefully avoided any paradigms of the religion-based East-West standoff
formulated by Huntington as “Clash of Civilizations”32 Turkey’s role model could potentially be
used not only for the Turkic states of Central Asia but also for entire Muslim world.33
2.1.3.  Relations with the Turkic states: Sentiments vs. Realities
Turkey’s initial foreign policy towards the newly independent Turkic republics was
based on cultural, ethnic and linguistic affinities. The close kinship ties indeed played a principal
role in consolidating public support for Turkey’s active engagement in the Soviet South.
Speaking at TIKA on September 14, 1994 Demirel stressed that:
Turkish foreign policy is guided by both national interests and moral
responsibilities before brothers and sisters with whom we [Turks] share
history, customs, language.34
                                                
32 See S. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3, (Summer 1993).
33 Probably out of these considerations, the US and Britain asked Turkey to take over the International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops’ command in Afghanistan.
34 Idris Bal, (2000), p. 44, also note 6.
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Turkey’s active engagement in the NIS was encouraged also by the political parties
(mainly right-wing like MHP), for whom the “Turkish Model” framework provided also a
convenient political platform, through which they could now freely promote their nationalistic
political agendas.35
The first major delegation that included Turkish Foreign Minister Hikmet Cetin with a
fact-finding mission visited Central Asian states between 28 February – march 6 1992. Turkish
government prepared a complex of initiatives mainly in the economic and cultural fields. The
Turkic republics of the former Soviet Union (FSU) enthusiastically welcomed Turkey’s
proposals for cooperation hoping that Turkey with its long traditions of relations with the
Western institutions would facilitate access to the dynamic financial markets, advanced
technology needed for successful economic transformation.36 Turkey indeed along with bilateral
relations promoted membership of Turkic states in the leading international organizations such
as OSCE, NACC, IMF, World Bank hoping in this way to integrate them into the world and
consolidate their independence. In 1992, Turkey established Turkish Cooperation and
Development Agency (Türk Iþbirliði ve Kalkýnma Ajansý - TIKA) as part of MFA to
facilitate the multi-sided relations with the Turkic republics. The MFA also formed the Turkic
Cultures and Arts Joint Administration (TÜRKSOY), Research Foundation of the Turkish
World, and the Turkish Cultural Research Association. Turkey opened credits via Turkish
                                                
35 The popularity of Nationalist Action Party (MHP) headed by Alparslan Turkes (after his sudden death in
1997 the party leader became Devlet Bahceli) has been growing since 1990s and culminated in 1999 elections
when MHP won 21% of votes and got 16 seats in the Parliament.
36 See Kemal H. Karpat, “The Foreign Policy of the Central Asian States, Turkey, and Iran”, International
Journal of Turkish Studies, Vol. 6, Nos. 1&2, (Winter 1992-1994), p.102.
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Eximbank for the NIS.37 Alongside with the official agencies a number of small and mid-sized
private enterprises have found in Central Asia potential market for their manufactured goods
and acted on their own. In 1992 Turkey began broadcasts of its TRT INT – Avrasya TV
channel to the Central Asia and Azerbaijan. Activities of Turkish telecommunications companies
such as NETAS and TELETAS were regarded as an “industrial frontiersman” of Turkey’s
policy towards the Turkic republics.38 Thus, by mid-1992 Turkey has made a bold bid for
leadership and influence in the region in the political, financial, cultural, economic, military
fields.39
The results of first Turkic summit of Turkic-speaking countries held in Ankara on
October 30-31, 1992 were however somewhat disappointing for Turkey. Though Central
Asian states in general welcomed cooperation with Turkey they made clear their own vision and
scope of cooperation with Turkey.40 They refused to consider such sensitive issues as
recognition of TRNC41, Armenian aggression against Azerbaijan.42 The President of
Kazakhstan N. Nazarbayev declined Turkey’s proposal to sign agreements concerning
transportation of Kazakh oil via Turkey’s territory. As a result, the only document adopted
                                                
37 Total amount of credits is $1103,26 millions, $779, 73 of which were used for goods and various programs.
Source: Idris Bal, “Turkey’s Relations with the West and the Turkic Republics” (2000), TIKA 1999, from the
Table 2.7, p. 83
38 See Philip Robins, “Between Sentiment and Self-Interest: Turkey’s Policy Toward Azerbaijan and the
Central Asian States”, Middle East Journal, Vol. 47, No. 4, (Autumn 1993), p. 605.
39 See Graham E. Fuller, “Turkey Faces East”, Report R-4232 AF/A, (Santa Monica, CA, RAND, 1992), p 38.
40 For example in response to Turkey’s proposal to create Turkic Union Nazarbayev voiced his disapproval
of any kind of ‘Greater Turkestan’ formation.
41 This was perhaps the only time when Turkey asked Turkic republics to recognize Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus.
42 In subsequent summits however, Turkic states condemned separatism, which jeopardizes territorial
integrity, sovereignty and security of Turkic countries.
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during the summit was the Ankara declaration that outlined in general terms the need to develop
cooperation in the fields of education, culture, languages, economy, and legislature.43
Though the Turkic summits are held on an annual basis, they failed to match initial
expectations of Turkey. Turkey’s projects to create a common market, Turkic development
and investment bank and a kind of Turkic commonwealth were postponed for an uncertain
future.44 Moreover, Central Asian leaders stressed continuously that Turkic summits should not
jeopardize their commitments in the CIS.45 Apparently, by mid-1996 Turkish MFA was not
seeking further to institutionalize ties with Turkic states on a supranational basis.46
Though existence of the cultural factor as a base for relations indeed was advantageous
to Turkey in fostering ties with the Turkic states, in the long-term it had complicated the
maintenance of Turkey’s policy and interests in the post-Soviet space. Turkish political elite and
public regarded Turkic republics as if they were one geopolitical entity collectively referring to
them as Türk Cümhuriyetleri and without making any clear distinction between Turkic states
of Central Asia and Azerbaijan.47 As a result, it seems that the Turkish leadership initially
underestimated the peculiarities of these states and different geopolitical factors that affected
foreign policies of the NIS in Central Asia and the South Caucasus.48
                                                
43 See Gareth Winrow, “Turkey’s Policies in Post-Soviet Central Asia”, (London: RIIA, 1995), p. 18-19.
44 Though leaders of Turkic states returned to the question of “Turkic Common Market” during the second
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and economic integration of the Turkic states.
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47 See Philip Robins, “Between Sentiment and Self-Interest: Turkey’s Policy Toward Azerbaijan and the
Central Asian states”, Middle Eastern Journal, Vol. 47, No. 4, (Autumn 1993), p. 597.
48 See Elizabeth Fuller, “The Tussle for Influence in Central Asia and the Transcaucasus”, Transition, (June
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After the first Turkic summit the Turkish leadership realized that it had to re-evaluate its
interests and policy options in dealing with the Turkic states. There were several factors that
Turkey initially failed to take into consideration. It became clear that though Central Asian
leaders declared that “Turkey is a morning star that would lead the way” they were not willing
to bind themselves exclusively to Turkey as this could limit their political maneuverability in
pursuing their long-term regional interests. Moreover, the “Turkish Model” could not fully be
applied to the Central Asian states as sociopolitical and economic realities in these states
differed substantially from that of Turkey’s. Though Central Asian elites chose market-based
economic development, in the political sphere they were more inclined to adopt authoritarian
methods of governing banning or suppressing the major opposition groups that could challenge
the government.
‘Turkey’s excessive emphasis on the commonalities between the people of Turkey and
the Turkic-speaking people of the former Soviet Central Asia and Caucasus resulted in
resentment among these peoples since these views were in direct conflict with the individual and
separate self-identities and national awareness formulated by each of these people.’49 They
half-heartedly approached declarations of several Turkish politicians that Turkey would assume
leadership over the Turkic states probably making associations with the bitter experience of the
Russian “elder brother” (starshiy brat).
Though Central Asian republics aimed at diminishing their economic dependence on
Russia, it was to remain a leading trade partner for them for the years to come. Instead of
allying with any external power, they chose to initiate their own regional cooperation. This was
                                                
49 See Mustafa Aydin, “Turkey and Central Asia: Challenges of Change”, Central Asian Survey, Vol. 15,
No. 2, (1996), p. 165.
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clearly seen during the second Turkic summit in Bishkek in August 1995 when Kazakhstan,
Kirgistan and Uzbekistan initiated their own process of regional development that did not
include other Turkic states.50
It was also evident that foreign policy of Central Asian states would be guided by the
regional geopolitical dynamics. While land locked Central Asian states were willing to develop
close ties with Turkey they realized the need to keep open other options. If Turkey was for
them a gate to the Western Europe, given geographical proximity, Russia, China and Iran were
as told Nazarbayev “communication gates to the world”, meaning access to the regional
transportation networks and world waterways.51  As Graham Fuller argues:
Geopolitics at a minimum, dictate the crucial importance of Iran as the sole
land route to the Persian Gulf and to Turkey itself. Despite Washington’s clearly
articulated preferences for Turkey as the model for Central Asian development
over Iran, no republic can afford to dispense with ties with Iran.52
Perhaps the main factor that forced Central Asian states to adopt a balanced policy
was the growing threat of Islamic fundamentalism emanating from Afghanistan.53 They only
welcomed Russian-sponsored Collective Security Treaty (CST) of 1992 that extended
Russia’s security umbrella to Central Asia. Being aware that Russia and Iran became more and
more uneasy with the Turkish expansion in Central Asia54 the Central Asian leaders preferred to
downplay relations with Turkey in order not to unnecessarily complicate relations with Russia
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51 Kemal H. Karpat, “The Foreign Policy of the Central Asian States, Turkey, and Iran”, International
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52 See G. Fuller, “Turkey Faces East”, p. 42.
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and Iran.55 Interestingly, Iran too, was responsive to concerns of Central Asian states and
pursued a cautious policy in the region demonstrating no interest in promotion of the Islamic
radicalism.56
Turkey gradually discovered that though ethnic bonds indeed help to establish special
relationships in the cultural sphere, this cultural dimension did not translate automatically into the
Turkish “sphere of influence.”57  Some observers even suggested that ‘Turkey is too weak to
have more than a marginal impact on these republics.’58
However, before assessing whether Turkey’s policy in Central Asia was successful or
not, it is necessary to make clear the Turkish interests in the region. By the time Demirel
replaced Özal in office in April 1993 Turkey had already returned to its pragmatic policy
abandoning its bid for a separate sphere of influence in Central Asia and concentrating instead
on geopolitical pluralism that would secure Turkey’s access to the region. Of course as Gareth
Winrow argues ‘no Turkish government is able to adopt a dismissive line towards the notions of
Turkic brotherhood and solidarity given the background of the upsurge of nationalistic feelings
in Turkey.’59 However, Turkish policymakers realized that unlike the South Caucasus, where
Turkey had security interests, in Central Asia Turkish national interests were not “vital” as far as
Turkey’s security is concerned and confined to the preserving cultural ties and developing
                                                
55 Interestingly, Uzbekistan president Islam Kerimov and at times Turkmenistan president Saparmurad
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56 See Edmund Herzig, “Iran and The Former Soviet South”, (London: RIIA, 1995).
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59 See Gareth Winrow, (1995), p. 3.
89
economic relations. Moreover, Turkish leadership was aware that the exacerbation of rivalry
with Russia and Iran that already were uneasy with the Turkey’s cultural penetration would only
further reveal Turkey’s severe limitations to meet the needs of Central Asian states.60
2.2. Turkey’s Strategic Engagement in the South Caucasus
2.2.1. Turkey’s Dilemma in the South Caucasus
Since the demise of the Soviet Union Turkey, within the framework of the promotion of
the “Turkish Model” for the Turkic states, focused its South Caucasian policy on Azerbaijan –
the only Turkic state in the region. Though Turkey recognized Georgia in November 1991
along with other NIS it did not establish diplomatic relations with Georgia until May 1992. This
low-profile policy in regard of Georgia only partially derived from the lack of the strategic
importance of Georgia for Turkey until 1994. Turkey’s policy in regard of Georgia was to a
considerable extent influenced by the pro-Abkhaz émigré lobbies of North Caucasian origin.61
As a result, Turkey retained its neutrality in Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflicts refraining
from preventing Abkhaz groups from extending their support to their kins in Abkhazia and at
the same time recognizing Georgian territorial integrity.62
 Turkey’s attention was concentrated on the armed conflict between Azerbaijan and
Armenia over Karabakh, which was considered a major challenge to Turkey’s objectives in the
region. It was in a sense a litmus test for matching Turkey’s intentions to play an active role in
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61 According to Svante E. Cornell there are half a million of Turks with Abkhaz origins. The North Caucasian
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the region and its capabilities to do so. Turkish foreign policy toward the Karabakh conflict
illustrated how complicated was the process of the Turkish policy-making.63 The coalition
government of Demirel was under the double pressure from both domestic and external factors
that severely constrained government’s policy options.64 Though everybody in Turkey realized
that this conflict had broader implications on the overall Turkey’s role in the former Soviet
South, the views differed on the nature of these implications. The opposition parties, solidarity
groups, media accused the government in lack of action and pushed the government for the
military involvement into the conflict on the Azerbaijani side. The view of the government’s
opponents was clearly stated by Bülent Ecevit (leader of DLP), who told that the Turkish
government’s failure to demonstrate unambiguous support for Azerbaijan might ultimately
undermine Azerbaijan’s and Central Asian confidence in the Turkish political model.65 The then
Prime Minister Demirel however, advocated a policy of non-intervention into the conflict
arguing that “…intervention will not solve the problem…may be the problem will start when you
intervene.”66
Turkey’s policy in regard of the Karabakh conflict was not as assertive as many
predicted it would be. Though Turkey refrained from officially involving into the conflict on the
Azerbaijani side, its policy cannot be characterized as neutral either. Turkey undertook several
‘behind-the-scenes’ diplomatic efforts both in regard of Azerbaijan and Armenia that were
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64 On domestic factors influencing Turkish Foreign policy see Gareth Winrow, Ch. 4 “Turkish Policy-making
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aimed at prevention of the escalation of conflict. Though Turkey was one of the two countries67
that that openly supported Azerbaijani cause Demirel criticized Azerbaijani new government’s
annulment of Karabakh’s autonomy status in November 26, 1991 arguing that this did not
serve stabilization.68 The then Turkish foreign minister Hikmet Çetin announced in 1992 that
Turkey was ready to upgrade its diplomatic relations with Armenia to the ambassadorial level, if
Armenian forces would withdraw from Shusha and Lachin. However, Turkey’s diplomatic
efforts did not stop advance of the Armenian forces in Karabakh. In the wake of Khojaly
massacre of February 1992, Demirel under pressure from the Turkish public and politicians
took one-sided initiative on March 2, 1992 randomly obliging planes carrying cargo bound for
Armenia to land in Turkey, where their cargo was checked for arms.69 When Armenian troops
occupied Kelbajar district thus opening the second corridor between Armenia and Karabakh
Turkey in protest closed its airspace to flights to and from Armenia.70 However, these steps
also did not brought any results as Armenia began shelling Sadarak district of Nahcivan in the
immediate proximity from the Turkish border. Despite Özal’s remark that Armenians should be
“frightened a little” and appeals of Mesut Yýlmaz (leader of MP) to mass Turkish troops near
the Armenian border Demirel criticized these appeals stating that “it is the government that is
responsible for the country’s foreign policy…and if the opposition wants a military solution, they
should go to Nahcivan and fight.”71
                                                
67 The other being Israel, for more on Israel’s policy toward Azerbaijan see Bulent Aras, “Post-Cold War
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After the new President Abulfaz Elçibey assumed power in Azerbaijan on June 7, 1992
it became even more difficult for Turkey to preserve its impartial image as Elçibey did not hide
its foreign policy priorities openly stating that “Turkey will occupy the first place in Azerbaijan’s
foreign policy”.72 Though Turkey increased its diplomatic support of Azerbaijani position in the
dispute by drawing attention of the international organizations (such as the OSCE) to the
Karabakh conflict, nevertheless it staunchly preserved a “delicate balance”73 toward the
conflict. The Turkish government proposed a visiting high-ranked Armenian delegation in
November 1992 to sign a protocol that envisaged selling Armenia 300 millions kilowatts of
electricity per year on condition that Armenia renounces its territorial claims on Turkey’s
eastern vilayets; abandons its campaign for international recognition of the so-called 1915
genocide; refrains from providing logistical support for the PKK groups and cease the fighting in
Karabakh.74 Though this protocol was never implemented due to the reaction of the official
Baku that considered this would-be agreement as a “stab in the back of Azerbaijan” the
preconditions put forward by Turkey clearly revealed that Turkey’s policy toward the South
Caucasus and the Karabakh conflict in particular was guided by Turkey’s interests and
commitments in other regions.
 First, in the mid-February 1992 Demirel urged Bush to refrain from overtly supporting
Armenia as ‘there was…concern in Ankara that Western support for Armenia’s territorial
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claims to Karabakh might prove to be the thin end of the wedge and give rise to renewed
irredentist demands by Armenia on lands in Eastern Turkey’.75
Secondly, by the time clashes in Karabakh escalated into the full-fledged war Turkey
was already engaged in the resource-consuming fighting with the PKK terrorist groups in the
South-Eastern Anatolia, which as the former Turkish Chief of Staff General Doðan Güreþ
frankly stated, was the military’s first priority.76 This issue leads to the question of prioritization
in the Turkish foreign policy. As argues Stephen Blank:
Because Turkey also acts in the Balkans and the Middle East and faces a long-
standing Kurdish insurgency at home, it cannot refrain from strategic engagement
in those areas and concentrate exclusively in the Transcaucasus. Turkey’s position
at the junction of these regions prevents undue concentration on any one area lest
it lose influence in the others.77
In other words, Turkey’s multi-regional profile was also a factor that limited Turkey
engagement in the south Caucasus. As seen from the list of preconditions, in the South
Caucasus Turkey’s primary security interest was to prevent support for Kurds from Armenia
that reportedly had contacts with the Kurdish organizations and was eager to play the “Kurdish
card” against Azerbaijan and to avoid overt involvement into the conflict.78 Simply put,
Turkey’s could not afford a second “Caucasian front.”
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Another aspect that limited Turkey’s maneuverability is that the Karabakh conflict was
the fact that one part of a conflict was Armenia with which Turkey historically had strained
relations because of the alleged “genocide” of 1915. Turkey feared that its active support for
Azerbaijan ‘would be inflated by the powerful Armenian Diaspora in the West so that Turkey
would be pictured as planning new atrocities against Armenians.’79 Besides, Turkey hoped that
rapprochement with Armenia would prompt Armenians to abandon their campaign for the
international condemnation of the “genocide” that at present harms Turkey’s relations with the
Western states80 and may even become an obstacle for Turkey’s EU membership in the future.
Turkish leadership also thought that improved relations with Armenia would obviate
Yerevan’s need for a Russian military presence. However, the Karabakh conflict prevented
Turkey from doing this as Turkey made establishment of diplomatic and other relations with
Armenia conditional to the withdrawal of Armenian forces from the occupied Azerbaijani
lands.81
The war in Karabakh was also a stumbling bloc for Turkey’s strategic objectives in the
region. The conflict hampered Turkey’s access to Central Asia, as it was not geographically
contagious with the region. Though Turkey bordered Nahcivan province of Azerbaijan via small
11 km strip of land, this did not solve Turkey’s access problem, as Nahcivan was separated
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from the rest of Azerbaijan by Armenia.82 Interestingly, Turkish peace plan for settlement of the
Karabakh dispute supported by the US State Department that was proposed in March 1992
envisaged territorial swap between Azerbaijan and Armenia.83 If realized, this “double-corridor
formula”84 would make Nahcivan geographically contagious with Azerbaijan proper thus
providing unimpeded land access to Central Asia.
Stephen Blank argues that the real stake of Turkey in the Karabakh conflict was its
desire to secure for itself the “middleman” role in the future East-West energy corridor85 – the
goal that could only be attained if the war in Karabakh was over.86 Turkey also needed to
preserve its status of “impartial mediator” as this would secure Turkey’s participation in the
conflict resolution in the South Caucasus and thus boost Turkey’s stabilizing role in the post-
Soviet South. It is evident that most of the above mentioned factors that obstructed Turkey’s
political and economic influence in the south Caucasus are directly or indirectly connected with
Armenia. Perhaps, due to this “Armenian factor” some observers argue that ‘the keystone of
Turkish policy in the south Caucasus is Armenia.’87
 The main external factor that constrained Turkey’s maneuverability in the South
Caucasus was its “Western alliance”.88 The NATO members fearing spillover of the conflict,
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that might involve Russia and probably Iran pressured Turkey to refrain from providing openly
military aid to Azerbaijan.89 Besides, Turkey had already faced criticism from the European
allies in regard of its military operations against the PKK separatists. Given that the Germany
refused to supply arms to Turkey fearing that it would be used against Kurds and the US made
its military aid to Turkey conditional to the latter’s compliance with the human rights standards,
any additional “adventure” in the Caucasus would only further complicate Turkey’s position.90
Under these circumstances Turkey chose not to act unilaterally and could not in fact allow its
policies to drift too far out of line with those of the Western powers.91 Demirel’s remarks that
“we [Turks] will act with the world on the issue of Azerbaijan” illustrate this argument.92 Thus,
while evaluating Turkey’s objectives in the south Caucasus ‘trans-regional linkages should be
taken into account. Turkey’s regional policies cannot be adequately understood separately from
its Western vocation and its relations with the US and the European Union (EU).’93
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2.2.2. Old Power Rivalries – New Concerns:  Turkey - Russia - Iran Triangle
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union many analysts predicted that Turkey and Iran
–historical rivals in the region - would rush into a new rivalry for influence in the former Soviet
South. Such predictions were not groundless given the initial rhetoric from both sides. In
response to the “Turkish model” of development, Iranian president Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani
claimed in 1992 that Iran offered an “ideal model” for the post-Soviet Central Asian Republics
thus revealing ideological and political competition between the two. However, this “clash of
models” was not destined to last long as both Iran and Turkey realized that the excessive
rivalry in Central Asia would be detrimental to their own interests.94 Iran that still had been
suffering from the devastating war with Iraq and economic consequences of the 1979
revolution was reluctant to engage openly in what subsequently was compared with the 19th
century “Great Game”.95 Iran declared its neutrality in the Tajik civil war and refused to
support Islamic groups suppressed by central governments in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to
avoid any accusations of exporting “radical Islam” rather concentrating on economic relations.
Turkey also soon became aware of the limits of its capabilities to project influence in
Central Asia given its limited economic capabilities, distance from the region and continued
economic and political dependence of Central Asian states on Russia. Besides, the Western
support for “Turkish model” also vanished before long. Both Iran and Russia
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just like the West realized that though ‘Russia was too weak to re-impose its imperial
domination over the region it was too powerful to be excluded.’96
The picture in the South Caucasus was however quite different. Turkey, Iran and
Russia were geographically contiguous with the region. Numerous regional conflicts directly or
indirectly affected security of all the three regional powers. The war between Azerbaijan and
Armenia stands out among the other conflicts as it had implications not only for the regional
security and stability but also for the domestic situation of the regional powers.97 Iran’s primary
security concern in the region was raising Azerbaijani nationalism that could inspire the largest
Azerbaijani minority in Iran that according to some sources constituted 25% of total Iranian
population.98 The events of December 1988 when Azerbaijanis crossed the Iranian border
were still vivid in the minds of the Iranian authorities. The assumption to power in Azerbaijan of
pro-Turkish nationalist Abulfaz Elçibey who stated that the Iranian state doomed and that within
five-year period Azerbaijan would be united pushed Iran to support Armenia.99
Another Iranian concern was ever growing Western penetration into the region. The
creation of the Minsk Group of the CSCE (now OCSE) in June 1992 was perceived by Iran as
an attempt to monopolize the resolution of the Karabakh conflict while excluding Iran from the
regional security architecture. Once the OSCE mediation process stalemated in January 1994
Iranian president Rafsanjani was quick to advise the FSU republics to distance themselves from
the West, arguing that ‘the US and Europe were neither willing nor able to resolve conflicts in
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the region.’100 Insistence of the USA on exclusion of Iran from the consortium of oil companies
engaged in the oil exploration of offshore hydrocarbon fields in Caspian Sea further angered
Iran.
As Russia moved to reassert its lost position in the South Caucasus it also resisted to
any external attempts to mediate regional conflicts. Though, Kozyrev declared that the existence
of the two parallel mediation efforts (one pursued by Russia and the other by the Minsk group)
was not a competition but a mutual contribution to the “common cause”, Grachev’s unilateral
push for the deployment of all-Russian peacekeeping force in Karabakh in 1993-1994
illustrated the opposite.101 This became even more obvious when in response to Aliyev’s
proposal to Ankara in February 1994 to participate in the would-be OSCE-led peacekeeping
operation in Karabakh102, Russian representative in the Karabakh mediation process Kazimirov
together with Iranian diplomat Murtazo Bang reiterated their concern over the
“internationalization” of the conflict indirectly referring to Turkey’s possible involvement.103
Iran saw Turkey as a prolonged arm of the US in the South Caucasus and tried to
prevent Turkey from getting a foothold in the region by aligning itself with Russia, which also
was uneasy with what was perceived as “Turkish expansion”. In January 1994 Iran conceded
that Russia should play the “first violin” in the conflict mediation process in the Caucasus.104 The
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first signs of the formation of informal alliance between Russia and Iran were seen in April 1993
when Kozyrev held talks with Iranian leaders in Tehran to establish a “strategic partnership”
aimed at securing stability in Central Asia and the South Caucasus.105 Given that both states,
although for different reasons, supported Armenia in its war with Azerbaijan and were anxious
about the US and Turkish influence in the region they become increasingly aligned into what
was subsequently called a virtual Moscow-Yerevan-Tehran axis whose main function was to
counteract any Turkish attempts to increase its influence.106 The decision of the Russian arms
export company Rosvoorujeniye to sell S-300 anti-aircraft systems to Greek Cyprus in 1997
was perceived as an attempt to enlarge this anti-Turkish bloc by including Greeks and possibly
Syria.107 The then Greek defense minister Apostolos-Athanasios Tsokhatzopoulos frankly
stated that ‘a key purpose of this country’s efforts in the Caucasus is to counter Turkey’s
“destabilizing impact” in the region.’108
  Since the mid-1993 relations between Russia and Turkey became deteriorating quickly
as both became profoundly suspicious about each other’s intentions in the South Caucasus and
Central Asia. Turkey became frustrated as it realized that there existed two self-contradictory
Russian policies toward the South Caucasus, the official one pursued by the MFA and the
policy pursued by the MoD. While Russian ambassador to Ankara A. Chernishev
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acknowledged ‘Turkey’s legitimate interest in the South Caucasus’ Grachev on its visit to
Ankara in July 1993 condemned military support by unnamed third countries for Azerbaijan
and warned Turkey to ‘keep out of Azerbaijan’.109
The fact that Turkey had not common border with Russia was considered in Turkey a
major strategic gain after the dissolution of the USSR.110 That is why Turkey viewed Russia’s
desire to reconsider its TLE quotas in the North Caucasus envisioned by the CFE treaty and to
increase its military presence in Armenia and Georgia as a major security concern.111 The then
Turkish Chief of General Staff Doðan Güreþ in mid-1994 even stated that ‘Russia posed a
greater threat to Turkey than it did during the Cold War.’112 A leading Turkish newspaper
summarized Turkey’s perspective on the CFE treaty as follows:
The real issue is the struggle over spheres of influence in the Caucasus. With
the military power that it wants to retain Russia…[wants] to reduce Turkey’s
influence in the Caucasus. One cannot take up the Flank issue as separate
from regional oil pipelines, military coups, civil wars, and bomb attacks.113
When Azerbaijani President Elçibey was ousted in June 1993, it was widely believed in
Turkey that the mutiny was instigated by Russia. Insofar as pro-Turkish Elçibey was perceived
as a key to retain a foothold in the South Caucasus, the ouster of Elçibey had constituted
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another severe blow to Turkey’s aspirations to extend its influence in the region. The fall of
Elçibey was regarded by many in Turkey as a fiasco for Turkey’s policy in the FSU.114
The list of the “clash points” between Turkey and Russia enlarged as both states
accused each other in supporting their respective PKK and Chechen separatist groups.115
Russia was also uneasy with Turkey’s upgrading of its naval power in the Black Sea.116 The
challenge posed by Turkey’s activities in the FSU has been magnified in Russian eyes because
as Duygu Sezer argues ‘Turkey remains the only direct physical and political connecting link
between the Trans-Atlantic system – which Moscow still does not entirely trust – and the
Eurasian system where it has been on a strategic retreat.’117 From this perspective, as long as
Russia continues to views Turkey primarily as a prolonged arm of the US in the Caspian basin
and perceives NATO as a threat, political relations between the two will be determined largely
by the East-West paradigms. A Russian outright objection to Turkey’s proposal to introduce
new regulations for the passage of shipping through the Turkish straits in May 1994 is only one
example. It was perceived in Moscow as an attempt to diminish the feasibility of the “Northern
route” for Caspian oil transportation.
Conversely, any rapprochement between Russia and the US and NATO would most
likely alter the zero-sum character of regional power interactions in the South Caucasus.118 The
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117 See Duygu B. Sezer, “Turkish-Russian Relations: The Challenges of Reconciling Geopolitical
Competition with Economic Partnership”, Turkish Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1, (Spring 2000), p. 60.
118 See Nur Bilge Criss & Serdar Guner, “Geopolitical Configurations: The Russia-Iran-Turkey Triangle”,
Security Dialogue, Vol. 30, No. 3, (September 1999), p. 368.
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developments after the notorious September 11, 2001 events prove this argument. Putin’s
desire to take advantage of the opportunity and end costly and unnecessary rivalry with the US
by giving Russia’s support for the combat against international terrorism was bound to positively
impact Russia’s relations with Turkey on the regional scale. The first signs of such geopolitical
transformation in the South Caucasus and Central Asia were not long to present themselves. On
November 16, 2001 in New York, during the UN General Assembly session foreign ministers
of Russia and Turkey, Igor Ivanov and Ismail Cem respectively, signed a document entitled
“On Action Plan between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Turkey on Co-operation
in Eurasia.” The plan stresses that fundamental changes in the world have opened a new stage in
interaction between Turkey and Russia. The document underlines that dialogue and cooperation
in Eurasia will positively contribute to a peaceful, just and lasting settlement of disputes in this
region.119 Ambassador of the Russian Federation to Turkey Alexander Lebedev argued that
such “multidimensional cooperation in so many fields would have seemed pure fantasy some
10-15 years ago.”120 Like Turkey, the new Russian administration seems to have
acknowledged that the unnecessary rivalry in the areas that once were a buffer zone between
these two states exacerbate the risks emanating from the regional sources of instability.121
Mutually beneficial economic relations between Russia and Turkey that had been
dynamically developing since the 1990s were one of the reasons why geopolitical rivalry
between Turkey and Russia in Eurasia did not turn into head-on confrontation but became a
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“managed competition.” Russia is so far primary source of gas supply for Turkey. The spectrum
of economic relations is diverse including tourism, trade, and construction activities by Turkish
firms in Russia. Before crisis in Russia in August 1998 official trade accounted for $3.5
billion.122 Turkey was also interested in Russian arms sales given that Germany (once second
arms supplier after the US) refused to proceed with the arms deals until Turkey cease its
campaign against Kurds.123 The emergence of a strong class of entrepreneurs in Turkey brought
to the formation of business groups that are lobbying Turkish government to downplay political
difficulties while capitalize on economic relations with Russia.124
2.2.3. Turkey’s Role in the Diversification of Security Ties of Azerbaijan and Georgia
The fall of Elçibey could be considered a turning point in Turkey’s policy toward the
South Caucasus. The first lesson Turkey drew from the June 1993 events in Azerbaijan was
that Turkey’s long-term regional interests went beyond tying its relations to a given political
figure. As Süha Bölükbaþý argues it is in Turkey’s interest to have friendly - but not necessarily
pan-Turkic – Azerbaijani administration.125 After involvement of the Russian military into the
domestic affairs of Azerbaijan and Georgia in 1993 it became clear that it is the Russian military
establishment that determined to a large extent Russian policy toward the south Caucasus.
Hence, regardless of the high level of Russo-Turkish economic relations, for the military, Turkey
is first of all, a NATO member and a natural part of Russian defense perimeter.126 Evidence
                                                
122 Existence of unofficial “bavul ticareti” (suitcase trade) that is difficult to estimate is not counted but
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Journal, Vol. 51, No. 1 (Winter 1997), p. 80.
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suggests that it is the Turkish General Staff that perhaps first among the Turkish security elite
realized that maintaining strong military ties with Azerbaijan and Georgia is no less important
than developing harmonious economic relations with Russia for successfully pursuing Turkey’s
national interests in the South Caucasus.127
By early 1994 Turkey gave up its resentment about Aliyev’s attempts to find a modus
vivendi with Russia seeing it as an imperative for the stabilization in Azerbaijan and in the whole
region. Instead, Turkey concentrated on deepening cooperation with Azerbaijan and Georgia –
two states that were crucial for preventing Russia’s domination in the South Caucasus. Turkey
signed an agreement on Cooperation and Friendship with Azerbaijan in February 1994. Turkey
also moved to develop relations with Georgia in 1994 not least because by that time it was
clear the prospects of resolution of Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict were gloomy and Georgia
due to its strategic location naturally became the only option for the projected transport and
energy corridor from Europe over the South Caucasus to Central Asia (TRACECA). Ankara
just like the US realized that Georgia’s stability was crucial for Turkey’s regional policy and for
the successful implementation of the regional projects. The then Turkish Prime Minister Mesud
Yilmaz during his visit to Ajaria in 1998 emphasized that ‘Georgia’s stability is no less important
than Turkey’s own stability.’128
Turkey’s relations with Georgia and Azerbaijan moved quickly into the military sphere.
Turkey did not hide that it had been training officers for Azerbaijani army.129 Turkey provided
Baku with approximately $3.5 million and $3.1 million respectively in July 1999 and May 2000
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to support the modernization of Azerbaijan’s military forces.130 Security ties with Georgia had
been also expanding. In September 1997 Turkey granted Georgia two coastal guard cutters
and agreed to train Georgian coast guards. In 1998 Turkey granted $5.5 million to the
modernization of the Georgian Army. In the summer 1999 Turkey decided to grant additional
$1.7 million and $3.7 million.131 In 2001 Turkey has carried out a $1million reconstruction
project at Marneuli airfield in Georgia.
Given that the Turkish leadership preferred to act in the South Caucasus taking into
consideration NATO’s concerns, it can be assumed that Turkey’s initiative to develop close
military and security ties with Georgia and Azerbaijan was at least partially sanctioned by
NATO. The Russian-Armenian military cooperation and growing Russian pressure on Georgia
forced Azerbaijan and Georgia to seek U.S. or NATO military presence in the region.132
However, though during his trip to the South Caucasian deputy assistant Secretary of State
Robert Beecroft explicitly referring to Russian military build-up acknowledged that “…there is
no military balance in the region…and that…the USA would try to establish a balance…”133 the
possibility of establishment of NATO and/or US military bases in the south Caucasus is remote
as this can bring to head-on confrontation with Russia. Instead, the US concentrated on the
modernization of the national armies of these states. The US encouraged Azerbaijan and
Georgia to cooperate with NATO within the framework of the PfP program initiated in
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1994.134 The PfP program was a blueprint for NATO’s engagement in the South Caucasus and
soon became one of the primary channels for building close military and security ties with
Azerbaijan and Georgia. Given Turkey’s proximity to the region and historical ties with the
NIS, Turkey with the US backing took a leading role in promoting the PfP program in the
region.135 Turkey institutionalized defense links with these states by opening NATO-sponsored
PfP training center in Ankara. Azerbaijan and Georgia sent symbolic platoons to join Turkish
peacekeepers in Kosovo in 1999 to show willingness to cooperate with NATO.136 Both states
are enthusiastically participating in PfP military exercises that are carried out on the annual
basis.137
Azerbaijan and Georgia sought diversification of their security ties and had been
searching for the security mechanisms other than the CIS. Georgia, Ukraine and Azerbaijan had
been exploring potential for the BSEC peacekeeping operations to counterbalance growing
Russian unilateralist approaches in the regional conflict resolution.138 In 1997 they established
GUAM (later became GUUAM) group to coordinate their policies within the CIS.139 Turkey
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encouraged Georgia to join its new regional cooperation scheme the “Black Sea Naval
Cooperation Task Group” (BLACKSEAFOR) created in 2001.140
Though there is still no formal defense pact between Turkey and Azerbaijan, for Baku
Turkey is the sole effective regional counterweight against the Russia-Armenia-Iran triangle.
Georgia also increasingly views Turkey as a balancing force in the region.141 Azerbaijan and
Georgia supported Turkey’s regional initiatives such as the “Caucasus Stability Pact” proposed
by Demirel in 2000 and participated in the “Caucasus Summit” in Trabzon held in April 29-30,
2002 to discuss such regional issues as combat with terrorism, separatism and drug trafficking,
and also agreed meet on the annual basis to join efforts in seeking ways of regional stabilization.
142 This evolving “strategic partnership” between Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia has a
potential to become an important geopolitical factor in the South Caucasus.
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2.3. Baku-Ceyhan Pipeline: Diversification of Energy Supplies or Dubious Battle for
the Sphere of Influence?
2.3.1. Caspian Basin Energy Availability
Hydrocarbon reserves of the Caspian basin are perhaps the last underdeveloped
energy reserves in the world. It is not surprise, that after the demise of the SU the region quickly
attracted attention of leading world oil giants such as Chevron, Amoco, Exxon, BP just to name
a few. The full utilization of the region’s energy resources however is a function of several
difficult geo-political and geo-economic issues, including an adequate assessment of the
Caspian oil and gas potentials, the legal status of the Caspian Sea and the construction of the
pipelines.143
 Estimates of the overall reserves of the Caspian basin and the scale of the future oil and
gas production have varied widely over the past decade. According to International Energy
Agency (IEA) estimates of proven oil reserves in the region vary between 15-40 billion barrels,
with about 70-150 billion barrels of additional reserves considered possible.144 Though the
Caspian is unlikely to become “another Middle East”, as was predicted early in the 1990s, its
resources are expected to be of the same magnitude as those of the North Sea.145 Natural gas
reserves in the Caspian Sea region are even larger than the region's oil reserves. Overall,
proven natural gas reserves in the Caspian region are estimated at 177-182 Tcf. Possible
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natural gas reserves could yield another 293 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of natural gas if proven.146
Given that the region is still poorly explored the estimates may be much higher.
2.3.2. Caspian Energy: A Contribution to the World Energy Security?
 After the oil shocks of 1973 (in the aftermath of Arab-Israeli war in 1973); 1979
(Iranian Revolution); and latest in 1990 (Iraqi invasion of Kuwait), the maintenance of energy
security has become a major objective for all major powers.147 Some observers claim that
Caspian oil supplies constitute only 3-4 % of global oil requirements and coupled with the high
costs of oil extraction148 in the Caspian basin they are not significant for promoting energy
security.149 However, the question is not that the Caspian oil may sometime in the future totally
substitute for Persian Gulf supplies. The globalization of oil markets mean that an oil-price rise
somewhere in Asia for example will bring to a similar price hike everywhere.150 Accordingly, oil
security should be understood less as an attempt to achieve a state of self-sufficiency by any
particular country and more in terms of the integrated world oil market.151 Given growing
vulnerability of the US and Europe to imported oil the primary preoccupation of these states is
to keep world oil prices stable by maintaining an uninterrupted flow of oil to the world
markets.152 As Brenda Shaffer153 argues, the addition of Caspian oil could weaken OPEC
                                                
146 Figures are taken from the official website of the US Department of Energy,
<http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/caspian.html>, Accessed: May 14, 2002.
147 The term energy security is referred to the diversification of energy supplies by developing new and
existing energy sources as well as maintaining unimpeded flow of oil to the world markets.
148 Landlocked character of the Caspian basin requires construction of infrastructure to transport oil to
markets, which makes overall developing and transportation costs to fluctuate between $70-100 billion
(source: Cambridge Energy Research Associates, 1998).
149 See Amy Myers Jaffe and Robert A. Manning, “The Myth of the Caspian ‘Great Game’: The Real
Geopolitics of Energy”, Survival, Vol. 40, No. 4, (Winter 1998-99), p. 119.
150 Ibid., p. 123.
151 See Gawdat Bahgat, “Oil Security in the New Millennium: Geo-Economy vs. Geo-Strategy”, Strategic
Review, (Fall 1998), p. 24.
152 See Major Adrian W. Burke, USMC, “A US Regional Strategy for the Caspian Sea Basin”, Strategic
Review, (Fall 1999), p. 18.
111
monopoly, providing greater leverage over the pricing policies of Saudi Arabia and other
OPEC countries, ultimately contributing to lower world oil prices.154
 The Caspian oil is no doubt a contribution to the world energy security, but there are
several other factors that make Caspian oil attractive to the Western oil companies and their
governments. As long as the oil is being used as a weapon in international politics155 the US and
other industrialized countries will try to avoid over-dependence on one single regional source of
oil. Thus, they will be interested in the oil suppliers other than the Middle Eastern countries even
if they are not comparable to Middle Eastern volumes. In other words, diversification of energy
supplies is increasingly viewed not purely as a matter of energy security but also as a national
security issue.156 As Glen Howard argues:
Energy diversification away from the Middle East has extreme importance for
the energy security needs of NATO allies due to its ability to insulate Europe,
as well as the US from future oil shocks caused by instability in the Persian
Gulf region.157
Another factor that makes the Caspian oil indispensable for the energy security is
expected decline of North Sea oil output after it reaches its peak in 2006. Given that by that
time the Caspian oil will begin to make a significant difference, the Western countries (including
countries of Eastern Europe) will naturally want the Caspian oil to reach European markets. It
should be also noted that the attractiveness of the Caspian oil to international companies is not
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so much a function of its absolute size as of its availability. In other words, most of the Caspian
oil under the production-sharing agreements (PSA) will be available for export.158 Thus, the
development of the Caspian basin is more attractive for Western oil companies in comparison
with the Middle Eastern states, because the process of opening the upstream oil industry159 in
the Gulf is still hesitant and has a long way to go.160 Besides, continuing ILSA sanctions161
issued by the US government in 1996 prevent major US oil giants to develop new lucrative
projects in Iran.
2.3.3. Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline: Geo-Economics vs. Geo-Strategy
Since the demise of the Soviet Union the Caspian oil again like in 1800s and 1900s
became a source of contention between external powers. Caspian energy was regarded by
both its owners and external powers as a key strategic asset that was to determine to a large
extent the shape of the Caspian political and economic landscape for the years to come.
Azerbaijan was interested in giving the US companies a vital stake in the oil deals, believing that
by securing an active presence by American corporate interests, it could leverage a larger US
role in preventing renewed Russian attempts at domination over the region. In as much as the oil
and gas became a powerful geo-strategic key for the newly independent Caspian states offering
an opportunity to strengthen their independence and providing investments needed for
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economic prosperity, for the powerful regional and external states Caspian hydrocarbons
became an important instrument in maintaining their political influence over the region.162
Indeed, it is difficult to separate political developments in the region from the oil
development. The ouster of Azerbaijani president Elçibey in June 1993 was at least partially
connected to oil, as he was ‘coincidentally’ toppled down a few weeks before he was to sign
oil concessions agreements with international consortium in London.163 In April 1994, when
new Azerbaijani government of Heydar Aliyev resumed negotiations with Western oil
companies with the ultimate aim to sign an agreement Russian MFA sent a demarche to
London stating that:
The Caspian Sea…represents an object of joint use…[and] all issues or
activities including resource development have to be resolved with the
participation of all the Caspian countries…[it concludes that] any steps by
whichever Caspian state aimed at acquiring any kind of advantages with
regard to the areas and resources…cannot be recognized…[and] any
unilateral actions are devoid of a legal status.164
This demarche was in fact a prologue to the long-standing dispute between Caspian
littoral states over the legal status of the Caspian Sea that in fact encapsulates the nature of the
intra-regional competition. Azerbaijan in September 1994 signed a “Contract of the Century”
with international consortium of foreign companies to develop Azeri, Chirag, Guneshli (ACG)
offshore oilfields that were located in its sector of the Caspian Sea based upon Soviet-era
divisions. Iran and Russia from the outset took unwavering stance claiming that the sea
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resources should be used in common, referring to the treaties signed in 1921 and 1940 between
Iran and the former Soviet Union. Both states insisted that all geophysical works in the Caspian
should be suspended or at least all Caspian states should approve any offshore oil
developments until the legal status of the Caspian Sea is agreed upon by all of the littoral
countries. Iranian and Russian authorities viewed exploration of Caspian reserves by Western
oil companies as a pretext to get a foothold in the Caspian basin for purposes dictated by
geopolitical and military-strategic designs.165 Iranian and Russian reference to the Soviet-era
treaties of 1921 and 1941 indicated that they wished to preserve the status quo in the Caspian
Sea.
However, as other littoral states and especially Azerbaijan went on to develop
hydrocarbons in their respective sectors, new Putin’s administration in Moscow modified
Russia’s Caspian policy and tried to advance its interests by signing separate agreements with
Kazakhstan (2001) and Azerbaijan (2002) on the basis of “common water, divided sea
floor,”166 while at the same time playing on the disputes between littoral states over overlapping
oil fields. Iran while staunchly insisting on the principle of “condominium”167 proposed also that
the Caspian floor and water basin should be divided into equal shares (20% each). Though it is
not yet clear how many summits of Caspian littoral states168 will be held in order to settle the
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issue of the Caspian status, the Iran-Azerbaijan confrontation in the Caspian in July 2001169
highlighted the stakes in the ongoing disagreement between the littoral states. 170
Much of the competition for influence over the Caspian region has been conducted
through the pipeline projects (See Map 5).171 Zbigniev Brzezinski explains the centrality of the
pipeline issue in the future of the Caspian basin by looking into the issue through the broad
context of access to this landlocked region. He argues that ‘whoever either controls or
dominates access to the region is the one most likely to win the geopolitical and economic
prize.’172 Ariel Cohen in a similar way argues that the 19th century ‘Great Game’ is being
replayed in a new geopolitical context, with oil and pipelines replacing the railroads as the main
means of extending political influence.173
 The land-locked geographical location means that Azerbaijan must rely on neighboring
states to transport its oil to world markets. Though there are many options from which to
choose, the pipelines ultimately can go only in three directions: to the North via Russia, to the
South across Iran and to the West via Georgia on to the Turkish Mediterranean port of
Ceyhan.174 While Russia had been exerting strong pressure on Baku to support the “Northern
route” the Clinton Administration pursued public and private diplomacy to persuade the AIOC
and the Azerbaijani government to endorse the ‘multiple pipeline strategy’ that would prevent
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domination of the oil transportation by any single country.175 Subsequently in October 1995 a
decision was made to transport so-called “early oil” via two pipelines running from Baku to the
Russian Black Sea terminal Novorossiisk and to Georgian port Supsa.176 However, these
pipelines provide only mid-term solution to the oil transportation, because of their limited
capacity, consisting of a mere 500,000 bpd and cannot handle so-called “big oil”, that is
estimated to rise to 3,500,000 bpd by 2010 and 5,000,000 by 2020.177
The major question is which way will go the long-term Main Export Pipeline (MEP).
Though Russia urged a construction of MEP that would run alongside the existing Baku-
Novorossiisk pipeline, it did not draw much support from the AIOC despite its comparative
low cost. The AIOC shareholders due to the US ‘dual containment’ policy rejected also the
“Southern route” through Iran.178 But even if passed through Iran to Persian Gulf, the Caspian
oil would not represent as much of a diversification of global supplies, as it may become subject
to the same constrains as much Middle Eastern crude if flows were disrupted through the strait
of Hormuz for whatever reason.179
 Though pipeline economics requires that the decision on the transportation route be
made on purely commercial viability grounds, political side of the decision of the Caspian
pipeline routes had always been present. Jan Kalicki in 1998 clearly stated that though
economical feasibility is important the US would support MEP that promotes such political and
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strategic goals as strengthening independence, sovereignty of regional states as well as their
democratic and free-market development, promoting regional cooperation and conflict
resolution, and diversifying the sources of world energy.180
While Russia pushed the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) to start construction of
Aturau-Novorossiisk pipeline that would bring Central Asian oil to the Black Sea, the US
supported the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline (BTC) considering it to be corresponding to its
strategic goals. Azerbaijan also preferred to have direct access to the Mediterranean Sea that
would pass through friendly Georgia and Turkey thus circumventing Russia and Iran.181 Turkey,
in its turn, hoped for playing a major role in the South Caucasus and Central Asia on the
construction of this and other pipelines, which it sees as the linchpin of its Caspian strategy.182 In
Turkey the BTC pipeline is seen as a backbone of the East-West energy corridor that would
make Turkey “Energy Bridge” of Eurasia.183 Apart from supporting the BTC pipeline, Turkey
has signed numerous gas import deals with a variety of countries, including Azerbaijan, Egypt,
Iran, Iraq, Russia, and Turkmenistan. Multiple gas pipeline projects are currently in the stage of
detailed engineering. Although many analysts are highly skeptical of Turkey's rapid gas demand
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181 Starting from Baku and ending in Ceyhan, the pipeline would run for 468 kilometres through Azerbaijan,
225 kilometres through Georgia and 1,037 kilometres through Turkey.
182 F Stephen Larrabee, “Turkish Foreign and Security Policy: New Dimensions and New Challenges”, in
Zaman Khalilzad, Ian O. Lesser, F. Stephen Larrabee (eds.) The Future of Turkish-Western Relations:
Toward a Strategic Plan, RAND Report MR-1241-SRF, (Santa Monica, CA, 2000), p. 10. See also Temel
Iskit, “Turkey: A New Actor in the Field of Energy Politics?” Perceptions, Vol. III, No. 4, (March –May
1996).
183 It was the main reason why Turkey made major concessions by agreeing to finance the cost of the
construction that will exceed $1,4 billion, and significantly relaxed the tariff structure over its portion of the
pipeline.
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growth forecasts, in part over Turkey's financial ability to construct gas-fired power plants, as
well as new pipelines quickly enough, the Turkish government argues that Turkey is 90%
dependent on imported energy and the Caspian oil and gas is essential part of Turkey’s plans
for diversification of its energy supplies that are supposed to meet Turkey’s growing energy
demands.184Besides, strategists of Turkish BOTAS – a company, responsible for pipelines
construction in Turkey, openly argue that the long-term goal of the diversification of the oil and
especially gas supplies is to re-export it to the European markets, thus making Turkey a
cornerstone of the “Eurasian energy corridor.”185
The Baku-Ceyhan pipeline clearly has many geo-economic advantages vis-à-vis other
routes. It is economically feasible as it ends up in a modern deepwater tanker loading and
storage facility at Ceyhan and requires no additional construction. Ceyhan’s location on the
Mediterranean coast allows low international shipping rates. Besides, the BTC avoids Turkish
straits and future oil shipments are thus not subject to physical restrictions imposed on vessels
passing through the straits.186 However, despite clear strategic importance and geographic
advantages the commercial viability of the BTC pipeline is dependent on the ‘throughput
guarantees’ of available oil and financing of the project.187 The AIOC developed a strategy that
would keep transit tariffs in the range of $2.50 to $2.70 a barrel to attract the volumes of oil
                                                
184 For a discussion of Turkey’s interests see Laurent Ruseckas, “Turkey and Eurasia: Opportunities and
Risks in the Caspian Pipeline Derby”, Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 54, No. 1, (Fall 2000).
185 Based on the paper of Mr. H. Emre Engur, deputy-director of BOTAª Department of Foreign Affairs and
Strategy “Natural Gas Pipeline Projects: Towards an East-West Energy Corridor”, presented at the METU 1st
International Conference on International Relations, held 3-5 July, 2002, in Ankara-Turkey.
186 See Carolyn Miles, “The Caspian Pipeline Debate Continues: Why Not Iran?” Journal of International
Affairs, Vol. 53, No. 1, (Fall 1999), p. 336.
187 According to the US Department of Energy the cost of the construction is estimated to be $2,8-2,9 billion.
See Bülent Gökay, “Caspian Uncertainties:Regional Rivalries And Pipelines”, Perceptions, Vol. III, No. 1,
(March-May 1998).
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needed to make the project commercial188 until Azerbaijan will be able to produce expected
1,2 mb/d (60 millions tones per year) by 2010.189 The major challenge to the BTC pipeline was
however financing of the project. Though the US administration did not commit itself by direct
investments arguing that the pipeline is commercial and thus private-sector financing is needed, it
lobbied quite effectively private and international investment agencies to provide needed
financial resources. In May 1998 three trade-financing agencies – EximBank, Overseas Private
Investment Corporation (OPIC) and the Trade and Development Agency (TDA) held a
conference in Istanbul to underline the US interest in providing effective financing support to the
East-West pipeline projects.190 The US administration opened Ankara-based Caspian Finance
Center to coordinate efforts of these export finance agencies in the region. The World Bank-
sponsored feasibility study in 1998 recommended BTC route, while BP-Amoco (the leading
companies in AIOC) in October 1999 referred to the BTC pipeline as a “strategic project” that
could deliver oil to European markets.191 This was followed in November 1999 by the signing
of Istanbul declaration on the sidelines of the OSCE summit by the presidents of Azerbaijan,
Georgia and Turkey in the presence of the US president Clinton.192 Moreover, BP also
announced that Baku-Erzurum gas pipeline from the Shakh-Deniz gas field will be built along
the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline that would reduce the costs of the latter to $1.3 billion and
                                                
188 According to David Woodward AIOC President, it would take 6 billion barrels of oil committed to the
pipeline to make it a commercial proposition. (Source: Azerbaijan International Winter 1999 (7.4).
189 In March 2000 Azerbaijan agreed to give up its transit fees to Georgia to persuade Georgian government
to accept these tariffs. See Michael Lelyveld, “Georgia/Azerbaijan: More Questions Rose About Baku-
Ceyhan Pipeline”, RFE/RL Newsline, (27 March 2000).
190 Jan H. Kalicki, “US Policy in the Caspian…”, p. 146.
191 See Gareth Winrow, “Turkey and the Caucasus…”, (2000), p. 44.
192 This inter-governmental agreement defines the legal and commercial terms that would apply to the Main
Export Pipeline Company (MEPCO) that would build such a pipeline.
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strengthen the case of building of the BTC pipeline.193 In May 2001 a $ 30 million worth
preliminary engineering study, commissioned by BP-Amoco confirmed the feasibility of the
project and led to an additional $ 120 million in detailed engineering studies. The fact that
Chevron company and Total Final Elf (TFE) group, which previously opposed the project,
declared their willingness to join the consortium that would construct the pipeline, indicate that
the commercial viability of the project is no more questioned.194 The construction phase of the
BTC is expected to start shortly after creation by the states-participants in the BTC project of a
BTC Co company on August 4, 2002, that would be responsible for the construction and
managing of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline.195
                                                
193 Gareth Wintrow, “Turkey and the Caucasus…”, p. 50.
194 Michael Lelyveld, “Azerbaijan: Baku-Ceyhan Pipeline Gets A Boost”, RFE/RL Newsline, (13
February2001).
195 At present the shares of the states shareholders in the BTC project is following: BP 38,21%; SOCAR
25%; Statoil 9, 58%; Unocal 8,90%; TPAO 7,55%; Eni 5%; TotalFina-Elf (TFE) 5%; Itochu 3,40%; Amerada
Hess 2,36%;
121
CHAPTER III
THE PROSPECTS OF A STABILITY PACT
FOR THE SOUTH CAUCASUS
3.1. Obstacles to Stability in the South Caucasus
Since the demise of the Soviet Union the primary preoccupation of Azerbaijan, Georgia
and Armenia was searching for the mechanisms that would maintain their security and stability.
Though all regional countries agreed that security and stability of each state depended to a large
extent on the security in the whole region, they have failed however to create cooperative
regional security framework. The reason for this failure as was mentioned in previous chapters
were numerous security problems in the South Caucasus.
As was previously mentioned instability in the South Caucasus has both internal and
external dimension. Such domestic problems as weak state institutions, lack of political culture,
corruption in the state structures, organized crime, social problems and economic hardships are
potentially threatening the fragile domestic stability in South Caucasian states. The principal
source of instability emanates, however, from the unresolved armed conflicts in Karabakh,
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Apart from the huge humanitarian crisis that these conflicts
created1, these conflicts led to the numerous security problems that beset the long-term stability
in the region.
It should be noted that the regional security problems are intermingled with each other.
Few would doubt for example in Georgia, Azerbaijan and elsewhere that the situation of “no
peace, no war” and continuing threat of separatism in these countries are serious obstacles on
                                                
1 As a result of Armenian aggression against Azerbaijan approximately 1 in 8 Azerbaijanis became refugees.
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the way of domestic stability and inevitably impede socio-economic development and
democratization process in these countries.2 At the same time, internal sources of instability
contributed to the sense of insecurity among ethnic groups and struggle for benefits/resources
that in turn ignited ethnic hatred among different communities and lead to the inter-national
conflicts.3
Numerous regional conflicts led to the emergence of lawless quasi-independent
territories uncontrollable by the central governments. This increased the prospects of the spread
of such unconventional threats to security and stability in the region as organized criminal
networks, drug trafficking, and illegal arms sales. Moreover these secessionist territories
became in effect heaven for terrorist groups.4 Azerbaijani defense minister is reported to say for
example that occupied Azerbaijani territories became “a place where Armenian and Kurdish
terrorists and saboteurs are being trained.”5
Conflicting states and communities have developed different security perceptions. The
lack of regional institutional arrangements favoring associative forms of security led to the
attempts to address the security threats through balance-of-power policies. All regional actors
have tried to revise the existing forms of distribution of power through alliances with regional
and non-regional powers.6 While, Azerbaijan and Georgia fearing regional separatism and
                                                
2 See Stuart Parrott, “Caucasus: Conflicts Threaten Democracy”, RFE/RL Newsline, (14 November 1997).
3 See George Tarkhan-Mouravi, “A ‘Realistic’ Approach to Regional Security in the South Caucasus”, OSI
International Policy Fellowship Program policy paper, (2001),
<http://www.policy.hu~mouravi/IPF%20Policy%20Paper%2002.html>, Accessed: May 29, 2002.
4 See Charles Fairbanks, “Bases of Debate: America in Central Asia, Being There”, The National Interest,
No. 58, (Summer 2002), pp. 45-47.
5 Quoted in Elkhan Nuriyev, “The Ongoing Geopolitical Game in the Caucasus and the Caspian Basin:
Towards War or Peace?”, (1999), <http://cns.miis.edu/cres/nuriyev.htm>, Accessed: December 5, 2000.
6 See Bruno Coppieters, “A Regional Security System for the Caucasus”, Brussels: Free University, (1996),
<http://poli.vub.ac.be/publi/crs/eng/Vol5/coppetiers.htm#1>, Accessed: February 24, 2002.
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Russia’s hegemonic aspirations, were pursuing policy of geopolitical pluralism fostering external
security ties with the Western countries, Armenia, in order to gain and preserve military
superiority over Azerbaijan, needed so desperately to retain control over occupied Azerbaijani
territory, was interested in increasing Russian military presence on its soil. These conflicting
security interests eventually increased the possibility of emerging of informal alliances along
North-South and East-West axis, which resulted in excessive militarization7 and polarization of
the region.
Involvement of the external powers played double role in the regional affairs. On the
one hand, the geopolitical pluralism became an effective counterweight against Russia’s
attempts to consolidate its predominant position in the region. On the other hand, Russian
political circles viewed the growing involvement of NATO countries, and the USA and Turkey
in particular, through the Cold War paradigms and used regional conflicts and domestic
instability in the South Caucasian states as an instrument to prevent unwanted external
penetration. Thus, involvement of external powers directly or indirectly supplemented internal
sources of instability and increased zero-sum character of the regional disputes and rivalries.
This “Great Power” rivalry formed in effect an external dimension of the regional instability.
It is also noteworthy, that the distinction between external and internal security threats is
blurred in today’s strategic thinking in the South Caucasian countries.8 Meddling of some
external powers into the domestic affairs of South Caucasian states by manipulating regional
                                                
7 See Mark Eaton, Ch. 5, “Major Trends in Military Expenditure and Arms Acquisitions by the States of the
Caspian Region” in Gennady Chufrin (ed.) The Security of the Caspian Sea Region, (SIPRI, Oxford
University Press, 2001), pp. 88-97.
8 See David Darchiashvili, Ch.4 “Trends of Strategic Thinking in Georgia: Achievements, Problems and
Prospects” in Gary K. Bertch, Cassady Craft, Scott A. Jones, Michael Beck (eds.) Crossroads and Conflict:
Security and Foreign Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia, (N.Y. – London: Routledge, 2000) p. 68.
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conflicts is seen as the main threat to their national security and internal stability. In other words,
there is a clear linkage between the internal stability of South Caucasian states and their external
security environment.9
Predominance of security issues in regional politics led to the gradual securitization of
economic and political issues,10 complicated the process of resolution of regional disputes and
led to further regional fragmentation.11 The conflicts became deadlocked because leaders of
some regional states and secessionist communities have become in effect hostages of their own
previous policies that were aimed at maximizing power and building their political careers by
exploiting nationalist and secessionist slogans. As Bruno Coppieters argues, ‘it is not so easy to
accept the compromise solution when the basic interests or even survival of the ethnic
community or the state is declared to be at stake.’12 In these circumstances, any unfavorable
change of status quo in the conflicts could undermine positions of the political elites. This was
clearly illustrated by the ouster of Armenian president Levon Ter-Petrossian in February 1998,
when he showed readiness to accept the compromise solution in the Karabakh conflict.13 Some
observers also believed that the killings14 in the Armenian Parliament on October 27, 1999
were connected with the ongoing Karabakh peace talks and were deliberately intended to
                                                
9 See Reiner Weichhardt (ed.) “Economic Developments and Reforms in Cooperation Partner Countries: The
Link between Economy, Security and Stability”, NATO Colloquium transcript, (1999),
<http://www.nato.int/docu/colloq/1999/econ-col99.pdf>, Accessed: June 3, 2002.
10 See Bruno Coppieters, “A Regional Security System…” (1996).
11 See Alexander Rondeli, “The Forces of Fragmentation in the Caucasus”, Insight Turkey, Vol. 2, No. 3,
(July-September 2000).
12 See Bruno Coppieters, “A Regional Security System…” (1996).
13 See Edward W. Walker, “Armenia's 'Constitutional Coup' and the Karabakh Conflict,” <http://ist-
socrates.berkeley.edu/~bsp/caucasus/articles/walker_1998-armenia.pdf>, Accessed: 2 June 2002, Originally
appeared in Analysis of Current Events, Vol. 10, No. 3-4, (March/April 1998).
14 As a result of the terrorist attack by the five gunmen led by Nairi Hunanian Prime Minister Vazgen
Sargsian, parliamentary speaker Karen Demirchian, one government minister and five other deputies were
assassinated.
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destabilize the political situation inside Armenia, and thwart the signing at the 18-19 November
OSCE summit in Istanbul of a formal commitment by the Armenian and Azerbaijani Presidents
to pursue their efforts to reach a Karabakh peace agreement.15
As aptly observed one analyst peace negotiations processes in the South Caucasus
became only means to demonstrate good intentions of the leaderships to solve the conflicts,
while there was no real will to seek compromise.16 This situation is not unique to the Armenian-
Azerbaijani Karabakh conflict. Similar situation is in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict. The most
recent Georgian peace proposal of February 2001 entitled the “Basic Principles for the
Distribution of Competences between Tbilisi and Sukhumi” was again rejected by the Abkhaz
leadership, despite of the UN Security Council endorsement of this document. Most
independent analysts agree, however, that this situation of “frozen instability” cannot endure
indefinitely and that, sooner or later it may lead to another armed confrontation. On many
occasions the president of Azerbaijan Heydar Aliev warned, for example, that the patience of
the Azerbaijani people “has been exhausted,” and that popular sentiment increasingly favors a
military solution of the conflict.
3.2. The “Stability Pact” Model: A long-Sought-After Regional Security
          Framework?
As was mentioned in the first chapter of the present study, the Caucasus is a security
complex in a sense that numerous security problems are interrelated with each other and
security of one state of the region is linked with the security of all other countries. For example
in February 1996 Georgian president Shevardnadze stated that the Caucasus was the zone of
                                                
15 See RFE/RL Caucasus Report, Vol. 2, No. 43, (October 28, 1999).
16 See George Tarkhan-Mouravi, “A ‘Realistic’ Approach to Regional Security…” (2001), p. 7.
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life interests for Georgia and that stabilization of the political situation in the region, creation of
strong, durable guarantees of peace, was of utmost importance for safeguarding national
security and prosperity.17
The leaders of Azerbaijan and Georgia have long ago acknowledged that the regional
approach is essential to meet the challenges of the regional security problems.18 In 1995
President Shevardnadze conceived the “Peaceful Caucasus” initiative co-authored by
President Aliyev. This initiative emphasized the common interest of the three countries of the
Southern Caucasus states in regional cooperation. In February 1996 they issued a joint
declaration “On Peace, Security and Cooperation in the Caucasus Region.” They participated
in the Kislovotsk Summit of May 31, 1997, initiated by Russia, which ended with the adoption
of the statement “On Mutual Understanding, Peace and Inter-Ethnic Accord in the Caucasus.”
These initiatives failed however to present any concrete mechanisms to breakthrough the
deadlock situation in the settlement of the regional conflicts mainly due to the reasons discussed
above and did not go beyond political declarations.
The new impetus to the search for the regional security mechanisms was given by the
“Balkan Stability Pact” of 1999, which was in fact a first attempt by the international community
to replace the previous, reactive crisis intervention policy in South Eastern Europe with a
comprehensive, long-term conflict prevention strategy.19 Since then proposals are in circulation
for a “Stability Pact for the Caucasus” (Hereafter CSP). The first proposal of such a pact came
                                                
17 Quoted in George Tarkhan-Mouravi, “A ‘Realistic’ Approach to Regional Security…” (2001), p. 8.
18 See Address of the President of Georgia Eduard Shevardnadze to the Conference “Georgia and its
Partners: Directions for the New Millennium”, Tbilisi, October 5, 2000,
<http://www.georgiaemb.org/Address%20of%20the%20President.htm>, Accessed: June 8, 2002.
19 For more information on the Pact see official web site of the Pact, <http://www.stabilitypact.org/>.
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from the Turkish president Demirel on the sidelines of the OSCE summit in November 1999 in
Istanbul. Demirel repeated this proposal in January 2000, during his official visit to Georgia. In
February 2000 he forwarded a letter to 12 leaders of world countries, in which he warned that
the problems of the Caucasus could negatively affect the stability and security in the whole
Euro-Atlantic region.20 He is quoted to say that:
Stability and peace in the Caucasus should be under European
guarantees because this is important not only for Georgia and other countries of
this region, but for their neighbors.21
Though at first it may seem that an attempt is being made to simply copy the “Balkan
Stability Pact” model and to apply it in the South Caucasus, the aim is far from this however.
Though, there are indeed some obvious similarities between the Balkans and the Caucasus such
as multi-ethnic “Balkanization”, inter-ethnic conflicts, and territorial disputes, the circumstances
are different.22 However, there is one important common feature that deserves special attention
– external dimension of the regional conflicts. It is for this reason that Zbigniew Brzeziski
includes the Caucasus into what he calls the “Eurasian Balkans”(See Map 6) arguing that:
Eurasian Balkans…are truly reminiscent of the older, more familiar
Balkans of South Eastern Europe: not only are its political entities unstable, but
they tempt and invite the intrusion of more powerful neighbors, each of whom is
determined to oppose the region’s domination by another.23
The leaders of the South Caucasian states welcomed this proposal. From the 1st of
September of 2000, Georgian president Shevardnadze appointed an Ambassador at Large at
                                                
20 See Gareth Winrow, “Turkey and the Caucasus...” (2000), p. 59.
21 See RFE/RL Caucasus Report, Vol. 3, No. 3, (January 21, 2000).
22 See Michael Emerson, “A Stability Pact for the Caucasus”, Insight Turkey, Vol. 2, No. 3, (July-September
2000), p. 23.
23 See Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives,
(N.Y.: Basic Books, 1997), p. 123-124.
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the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, who was responsible for fulfilling the efforts around
“A Stability Pact for the Caucasus.”24 The president of Azerbaijan Aliyev also supported the
offer stating that “the countries of the South Caucasus must enter the 21st century free from all
conflicts and confrontations and accept their own pact for security and peace without taking
into consideration the ambitions of other countries.”25 It should be noted however, that though
Armenian leadership also agreed that a regional security arrangement was necessary and agreed
that the pact should be based on a 3+3+2 formula (i.e. Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia + Russia,
Turkey, Iran + the EU and the US),26 the real content of the Armenian concept is based on a
different vision of a security mechanism. While, Azerbaijan and Georgia see conflict resolution
as a prerequisite for a lasting stability and cooperation, Armenia is unwilling to link the regional
economic cooperation with the resolution of the regional conflicts (the conflict over Karabakh in
particular).27 At the same time Armenia is eager to use CSP proposal as leverage on Turkey
forcing it to open border gates. In response to Demirel’s proposal spokesman of Armenian
MFA Ara Papian told that “without a normalization of the Turkish-Armenian relationships it is
impossible to speak about regional programs.”28
It is noteworthy that Turkey’s proposal for a “Caucasus Stability Pact” coincided with
the ever-growing concern in Europe about the implications of the instability in this remote corner
of Europe on the overall European security. The countries of the European Union (EU) learned
                                                
24 See official web site of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia <http://www.mfa.gov.ge/stability.html >.
25 Quoted in Michael Emerson, “A Stability Pact for the Caucasus”, (2000), p. 24.
26 Ibid.
27 Under the economic cooperation Armenian authorities first of all envisage opening of communication
lines through Azerbaijan and Turkey, whereas Azerbaijan and Turkey made re-opening of transport routes
and economic cooperation conditional to withdrawal of Armenian forces from the occupied Azerbaijani
territories.
28 See RFE/RL Caucasus Report, Vol. 3, No. 3, (January 21, 2000).
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from the experience of the conflicts in the Balkans that the negative consequences of the
conflicts on the European continent, regardless of how remote they are, will not be long in
presenting themselves and will effect security of EU in an immediate way – be it wave of illegal
immigration, drug and weapons trafficking, terrorism, spread of the criminal networks or even
spill over of the conflicts. Back in 1998, during his visit to the South Caucasus, NATO
Secretary-General Javier Solana stressed that “Europe will not be completely secure if the
countries of the Caucasus remain outside of European security.”29 NATO’s new Secretary-
General John Robertson spoke in a similar way during his trip to Azerbaijan in January 2000
noting that “the Security of the South Caucasus is a part of European security.”30
In June 22, 1999 the joint EU-Caucasus summit was held in Luxemburg, whose joint
concluding declaration noted that the “outstanding conflicts are impeding the political and
economic development of the South Caucasian states.”31 The EU’s growing engagement in the
Caucasus should be regarded through the prism of its Common Foreign and Security Policy
(CFSP) concept that formally started in October 1999 in accordance with the Amsterdam
treaty. The EU is increasingly views its role as an international actor in its own right in the vast
area stretching from the Balkans and the Black Sea throughout the Caucasus and Central Asia
to the border with China.32 Like NATO, the EU has been reviewing its foreign policy
“instruments” that would serve its primary goals in this vast area – stabilization and
                                                
29 Cited by Glen E. Howard, “NATO and the Caucasus: The Caspian Axis”, in Stephen Blank (ed.) NATO
after Enlargement: New Challenges, New Missions, New Forces, (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College,
1998), p. 152.
30 Recorded by the present author on location in Baku, during Robertson’s address to the students and
academic staff of Baku State University, (January 2000).
31 Cited in “A Stability Pact for the Caucasus”, CEPS Working Document No. 145, (May 2000).
32 See Alexandr Rahr, “Europe in the New Central Asia”, in Sherman W. Garnett, Alexandr Rahr and Koji
Watanabe (eds.) The New Central Asia: In Search of Stability, Trilateral Commission Report No. 54, N-Y-
Paris-Tokyo, (October 2000), p. 61.
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democratization.33 EU’s growing geo-economic interests in the Caspian region should not be
overlooked either. Over a past decade, the EU has used predominantly economic tools such as
economic assistance, creation of intra-regional cooperation structures (TRACECA34,
INOGATE35 projects are most ambitious) to achieve its regional objectives.36 The essence of
the EU strategy is that through the economic regional cooperation it would be possible to hasten
economic recovery and thus dampen existing inter-ethnic and territorial conflicts.37
The past decade showed however that pure economic initiatives are not enough to
foster economic cooperation among belligerent states. The regional projects are indeed
effective incentive for cooperation, but only among states that are free from ethnic and/or
territorial disputes between them (cooperation between Azerbaijan and Georgia in the energy
transportation projects is a case in point). Besides, these ambitious projects require huge
investments that can only be attracted if there is peaceful, stable environment. Therefore, the
success of any stability plan depends on whether it can solve the existing territorial and ethnic
disputes. Thus, any initiative for economic cooperation should be proposed along with a
comprehensive plan that would envisage political settlement of the regional conflicts.
In the mid-1990’s the EU developed a “Stability Pact” strategy that envisaged parallel
process of economic cooperation and political settlement of disputes on the European
                                                
33 See Alexandr Rahr, “Europe in the New Central Asia”, (2000), p. 63.
34 Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Central Asia, for more on this see official web site
<www.traceca.org>.
35 Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe, see <www.inogate.org>
36 See Alexandr Rahr, “Europe in the New Central Asia”, (2000), p. 64.
37 The attempt is being made to repeat Europe’s post-World War II experience, when The European Coal
and Still Community (ECSC) was founded in 1952 with the aim to integrate key industries needed to
increase military capabilities of states, thus preventing formation of threat perceptions between European
states.
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continent. As argues Michael Emerson,38 “Stability Pact” model is in fact a EU strategy
designed to stabilize the borderlands of Russia and enlarging EU. The first Stability Pact, the so-
called Baladur Stability Pact (1995), was designed for the Central Europe; the second is a
work-in-progress in the Balkans (1999) and the more recent Stability Pact was proposed for
the Caucasus (2000).39
The Center for European Policy Studies (CEPS)40, at the proposal of the OSCE High
Commissioner for National Minorities, Max Van der Stoel, formed a Task Force for the
Caucasus on 28 January 2000. The Task Force developed and put into circulation the
preliminary text of a comprehensive plan for the region.41 “A Stability Pact for the Caucasus” is
the only comprehensive Action Plan considering the mechanisms in establishing regional stability
and cooperation. It is thus important for our study to consider its key ideas and general
approach.
It should be noted from the outright that though the experience and mechanisms of the
Baladur and Balkan Stability pacts applied to the Central and South-Eastern Europe
respectively, are invaluable for the proposed Caucasus Stability Pact, none of these models is
adequate for the Caucasus, which has its own more complicated regional dynamics and
requires more complex solutions and mechanisms. The Baladur Pact (1995) was based on
preventive diplomacy of the EU that made EU membership aspirations of the Central European
countries conditional to the settlement of frontier and minority problems among these countries.
                                                
38 Michael Emerson is Senior Research Fellow at Center for European Policy Studies (CEPS), Brussels.
39 See Michael Emerson, “A Stability Pact for the Caucasus”, (2000), p. 24.
40 It should be noted that the CEPS played an important role in shaping EU’s Balkan Stability Pact of 1999.
41 See “A Stability Pact for the Caucasus”, CEPS Working Document No. 145, (May 2000),
<http://www.ceps.be/Pubs/2000/Caucasus/ndc/Newdeal.htm>, Accessed: June 9, 2002.
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The Balkan Stability Pact (1999) became possible only after the direct NATO intervention and
peace settlements (based on the Dayton accords and the UNSC Resolution 1244) that were in
fact imposed on Bosnia and Kosovo. These scenarios are unlikely to be used in the case of the
Caucasus. Russia had already expressed its “dissatisfaction” with NATO’s unilateral actions in
the Balkans and it is not difficult to imagine what would had been Russia’s response if such
“unilateral” international involvement would have taken place in the region, a part of which is
Russian territory (North Caucasus). Besides, unlike the Balkans, in the Caucasus there is still
technically a state of war even if the conflicts are “frozen” and as indicates decision of the
OSCE Budapest summit (1994) on the peacekeeping operation in Karabakh, any broad
international involvement is made conditional on reaching political solution to the conflict(s).42
However, given, that the three South Caucasian states aspire to integration into
European institutions with eventual (although remote) EU membership, the EU intends to use its
“virtual membership” tool as a strong incentive mechanism to settle Caucasian conflicts. These
states are already members of the OSCE and Council of Europe (CoE). The proposed special
status for these states on their way to integration to EU would presumably be weaker than
formal candidacy but require certain adjustment beyond OSCE and CoE standards.43  A
specific “Stability Pact” package for the Caucasus proposed by the CEPS is drawn, however,
on the experience from the previous pacts in Europe. The model envisages three general
actions:
                                                
42 See Budapest Summit document: “Towards a Genuine Partnership in a New Era” (1994)
<http://www.osce.org/docs/english/1990-1999/summits/buda94e.htm#Anchor_REGIONA_34546>,
Accessed: March 19, 2002.
43 See George Tarkhan-Mouravi, “A ‘Realistic’ Approach to Regional Security…” (2001), p. 2.
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a) Conflict resolution for Karabakh, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia;
b) Establishment of regional security order under the OSCE;
c) Initiation of the South Caucasus Community (SCC);
The proposed pact presupposes also three actions of wider regional cooperation:
a) Russia/EU/US Southern Dimension44 cooperation;
b) Broader Black Sea-Caucasus-Caspian cooperation;
c) Oil and gas investment and related infrastructure;
Though the priority is given to the resolution of regional conflicts, special emphasis is put
on regional integration and cooperation. The package proposes to play down notions of
absolute independence, sovereignty and federation, while instead focusing on “a schema of how
competences may be shared by levels of government” that is based on “modern European
models of shared sovereignty, interdependence and multi-tier governing structures.”45 This is a
general approach to the conflict resolution that could serve a basis for individual cases.
Once there are clear signs of progress towards resolving the most serious regional
conflicts, especially the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Karabakh, there is
proposal to initiate so-called “South Caucasus Community” (SCC) – a regional integration
mechanism. The joint EU-Caucasus summit (June 1999) declaration allows to assume that the
EU might regard such intra-regional integration mechanism as a first stage on the way towards
the region’s European vocation, thus further strengthening incentives for integration.
                                                
44 In analogy to “Northern Dimension” in the Baltic and Barents Sea area within the framework of EU-Russia
partnership and Cooperation Agreement.
45 Excerpts are taken from the text “A Stability Pact for the Caucasus”, (CEPS Working Document No. 145,
May 2000).
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Without dwelling too much on the details of the document, it should be noted that
throughout the document a number of interesting scenarios for conflict resolution and regional
cooperation are discussed and proposed. They indeed seem plausible provided they are
feasible. However, the document does not seem to have settled the question of prioritization
between economic, political and security objectives that is very crucial. The first priority is given
to the resolution of conflicts. At the same time the document states that “the international
community should not be waiting for the conflicts to be settled before opening up such
perspectives of a wider cooperative strategy for the whole region. On the contrary, elements of
a new regional order would be built into political settlements of the conflicts.” This reflects in
fact a long standing “chicken-and-egg” debate on what should proceed first. As was previously
mentioned Azerbaijan and Georgia made comprehensive regional economic cooperation
conditional to the resolution of the conflicts and restoration of their territorial integrity.46
Whereas, as it is seen from the available information from the negotiation processes, attempt is
being made to discuss first practical matters of transportation (especially re-opening of the
communication lines between Azerbaijan, Turkey and Armenia in two-way directions)47 and
economic revival. Azerbaijan warned the international community (states that participate in the
Minsk Group of the OSCE on Karabakh in particular) that turning blind eye on attempts of
Armenia to alter one of the pillars of international security i.e. inviolability of internationally-
                                                
46 This principle was confirmed by Azerbaijani President H. Aliyev during the anniversary summit of the
BSEC in Istanbul, held in June 24-25, 2002 in Istanbul. (See RFE/RL Newsline, June 26, 2002).
47 Since the outbreak of war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, both Turkey and Azerbaijan closed their
borders with Armenia using this as a tool to contain Armenian irredentism.
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recognized borders, may in fact mean legitimizing the use-of-force as a means of solving
international disputes.48
It should be noted that certain key elements of the proposals made in the CSP model
have been circulating in various forums and reportedly during the peace negotiations.49 The
question is however, why it was not possible so far to break the deadlock and make progress
in the conflict resolution. As argues Michael Emerson, in order to overcome the region’s
instability a paradigm shift (emphasis added) from one reminiscent of the 19th century (i.e.
rivalries, realpolitik, violent nationalism and conflict) to one of cooperation is required. The text
of the proposed pact reads as follows:
There are many conflicts and tense oppositions in the region, from the clan
to the geopolitical. The pivotal case, both in terms of local geography and
geopolitics, is that of Nagorno-Karabakh. Behind the trenches and land-mines of no
man’s land lies a wide set of virtual alliances, notwithstanding the efforts of the
Minsk Group of the OSCE (Co-chairs: France, Russia, US). The virtual alliances on
the Armenian side see support from Russia with arms and military bases. Iran
cooperates closely with Armenia. On the Azerbaijan side there is political support
from Turkey, which blockades Armenia. The US supports a line of virtual alliance
from Turkey through Georgia to Azerbaijan, as seen in the oil pipeline diplomacy.
The US sanctions Iran. Armenia blockades the Azeri province of Nakhichevan.
Russia argues that Georgia has not been helping stop infiltration of terrorists in and
out of Chechnya...Both Azerbaijan and Georgia feel insecure in relation to Russia,
and so discuss developing a stronger relationship with NATO, which further
aggravates the atmosphere between Russia and the US.”50
“The cost of the present confusion of systems (i.e. virtual alliances) is that parties to the
conflicts of the region are themselves not receiving clear incentives and pressures to settle. Each
                                                
48 See Svante E. Cornell, “Undeclared War: the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Reconsidered”, Journal of
South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. XX, No. 4, (Summer 1997), pp. 1-23.
49 On proposed conflict resolution mechanisms see RFE/RL Caucasus Report, Vol. 1, No. 17, (June 23,
1998).
50 See “A Stability Pact for the Caucasus”, (CEPS Working Document No. 145, May 2000)
136
has more or less its big protector.”51 Thus, the shift in paradigm is essential not only in the South
Caucasian states, but also, in neighboring and extra-regional powers, as “nothing can happen
without the engagement of the big powers.”52
Thus, when we are talking about the feasibility of the “Stability Pact” model, our
concern is not only about applicability of this model to the Caucasus. The question is rather
whether regional and non-regional powers can develop a constructive strategic cooperation
framework for the whole region as it was done in the Balkans. As argues Sergiu Celac,53 the
greatest challenge for a “Stability Pact for the Caucasus” will not be that getting the three South
Caucasian countries to agree on a regional set of principles and practical steps regulating their
mutual relationships. It will be to get the global and the neighboring regional powers to achieve
a balanced accommodation of their respective interests in the South Caucasus (emphasis
added).54 In other words, a balance-of-power concept should be substituted by a balance-of-
interests. As regional and non-regional powers are claiming to have political, economic and
strategic interests in the region, the proposed CSP brings into focus the very substance of the
future relationships between the Russian Federation, the EU and the USA.55 Taking into
consideration the geopolitical consequences the resolution of the conflicts in the South Caucasus
may have for the external actors, the following paradigm seems to emerge: the lasting solution to
these conflicts depends to a large extent on the interests and policies pursued by powerful
regional and extra-regional states.
                                                
51 See “A Stability Pact for the Caucasus”, (CEPS Working Document No. 145, May 2000).
52 See Michael Emerson, “A Stability Pact for the Caucasus”, (2000), p. 27.
53 Sergiu Celac, Romanian ambassador, co-chair of the CEPS Task Force for the Caucasus.
54 See Sergiu Celac, “Prospects for a Stability Pact for the Caucasus: Some Preliminary Speculations”, CEPS
Brainstorming Session, Brussels, (27-28 January 2000).
55 See Michael Emerson, “A Stability Pact for the Caucasus”, (2000), p. 27.
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In this regard, for Turkey, which modeled this pact from the Balkan Stability Pact, and
for Azerbaijan and Georgia perhaps the most attractive element of the proposed pact is
multilateral diplomatic initiative by the international community. The impression should not
be however, that Azerbaijan and Georgia want just to relegate conflict resolution to the
international community. Azerbaijan and Georgia, being aware that the deadlocked character of
the regional conflicts can be broken through by the external pressure on secessionist
communities and/or states supporting them, advocate for broader involvement of the
international community. Such international organizations as the UN and the OSCE do
participate in the mediation process. However, as John Maresca aptly argues, ‘the OSCE is
merely a vehicle for international community involvement. And one of the main reasons why the
OSCE was not effective is that the OSCE has been unsuccessful thus far in connecting the
problems of the Caucasus with the high levels of outside Western governments, needed to push
the conflicting sides to agreement.’56 The US, Russia and France - states co-chairs of the
Minsk Group of the OSCE on the Karabakh conflict - had their own hidden agendas on
Armenia.57 The Abkhaz conflict was also stalemated mainly due to the fact that Russia was
anxious about Georgia’s NATO-oriented policy. Thus, political cooperation among major
powers involved in the region is viewed by Azerbaijan and Georgia as imperative in settlements
of regional conflicts and fostering regional peace, security and stability.
In this regard, a Trilateral response (i.e. concerted efforts of major actors such as EU,
Russia and the USA) based on a rational balance of trade-offs and pay-offs between these
actors, proposed by the CEPS document, should be of special interest to the South Caucasian
                                                
56 See John Maresca, “Why an OSCE Role in the Caucasus”, Security Dialogue, Vol. 27, No. 1, (1996), p. 88.
57 See Alexandr Rahr, “Europe in the New Central Asia”, (2000), p. 63.
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states. Common interest of major powers indeed could provide viable answers to the complex
issues of the region. As argues M. Emerson “the Caucasus might be the next big test for
transatlantic cooperation and solidarity.“ The key mechanism for this Trilateral response is the
so-called Southern Dimension concept, which is modeled in analogy of Northern Dimension
cooperation framework on major economic projects in the Baltic and Barents Sea basins.58 The
Southern Dimension is suggested building on existing Black Sea Economic Cooperation
(BSEC) organization by creating wider Black Sea-Caucasus-Caspian cooperation scheme.
Additional players such as OSCE/UN for conflict resolution and regional security arrangements
and international financial institutions such as IMF, IBRD, EBRD would be involved on an ad
hoc basis. The primary goal for such cooperation is to create transparency in the regional
initiatives of these actors (such as CIS, NATO-sponsored PfP, EAPC), thus “reducing threat
perceptions that have resulted from differing assessments of these initiatives.”
The linkage between geopolitical environment in the region (formed to a large extent by
the policies and strategies pursued by the major powers) and the dynamics of the conflicts in the
South Caucasus is clearly identifiable. The common ground between major powers found over
the need to combat international terrorism and extremism in the aftermath of September 11 fall-
out that led to the activisation of peace negotiations on the regional conflicts, and the Karabakh
conflict in particular is most recent example. Subsequent change of strategies from reactive
crisis management to the pro-active preventive strategies put on the agenda once again the need
                                                
58 The Northern Dimension (comprises northern EU countries, Baltic states and Russia) was first recognized
EU-wide at the Luxembourg European Council in December 1997. In the following years, it was developed
into a more concrete concept. The Vienna European Council in December 1998 adopted a Commission
Communication on a ‘Northern Dimension for the policies of the Union’. For more on this see
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/north_dim/#4>, Accessed: June 12, 2002.
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to seek comprehensive solutions to the “frozen” conflicts in the pivotal regions (which
sometimes are referred to as Eurasian “Arc of Instability”).
The need to make coordinated efforts in fighting international terrorism ended up with
the shift of Russia’s foreign policy in general and in the South Caucasus in particular. Russia’s
sudden accord to the basing of the US troops in Central Asia and arrival of the US military
instructors in Georgia prompted some observers to conclude that “Russia is not against sharing
its geopolitical influence in the South Caucasus with the West in the same manner as it is already
doing in Central Asia.”59 Whatever are the real calculations of President Putin, it seems that he
realizes the need to find some sort of accommodation with the US, NATO and the EU” in
order to achieve his goal of reviving Russia’s international status.60 In the new geopolitical
configuration of the world that emerged after the notorious September 11 terrorist attacks,
Russia’s new leadership is seeking to avoid vicious circle of geopolitical confrontation that only
reveals Russia’s limited capabilities. Thus, by supporting anti-terrorist coalition President Putin
seeks to secure a role for Russia in shaping security order across Eurasian continent, that will
most probably raise its international status, strengthening its position vis-à-vis NATO (as
indicates new agreement between Russia and NATO within the framework of the “20”61) and
making the US and EU more sensitive to Russia's security interests.62
                                                
59 Quoted in “A New Security Arrangement takes Shape in the South Caucasus”, Eurasia Insight, January
24, 2002, <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav012402.shtml>, Accessed: March 21,
2002.
60 For a more recent analysis see Zbigniew Brzezinski, “The Geostrategic Triad: Living with China, Europe,
and Russia”, (Washington D.C.: CSIS, January 2001).
61 New NATO-Russia Council was established at the NATO-Russia Summit on 28 May 2002 in Rome, which
brings together the 19 Allies and Russia to identify and pursue opportunities for joint action at 20. For more
on this see <http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/nato-rus.htm>, Accessed: June 26, 2002.
62 See Nina Bachkatov, “Russia: Winning without Fighting”, Le Monde Diplomatique, November 2001(in
English).
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This change of attitude was reflected in the declarations adopted at the recent Russian-
American summit in Moscow in May 2002. The joint declaration by President George W. Bush
and President Vladimir V. Putin on “the New Strategic Relationship Between the United States
of America and the Russian Federation” unequivocally stressed that:
In Central Asia and the South Caucasus, we recognize our common interest in
promoting the stability, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of all the nations of this
region. The United States and Russia reject the failed model of “Great Power”
rivalry that can only increase the potential for conflict in those regions
(Emphasis added). We will support economic and political development and
respect for human rights while we broaden our humanitarian cooperation and
cooperation on counterterrorism and counternarcotics.63
However, though these developments undoubtedly are plausible and have potential to
positively effect security in the South Caucasus, simple encouragement (albeit strong) by Russia
and the US of the presidents of South Caucasian states (and of Azerbaijan and Armenia in
particular) “to exhibit flexibility and a constructive approach to resolving the conflict concerning
Karabakh”64 is clearly not enough. As argues M. Emerson, “the overarching shift of paradigm
has to be engineered and set into motion by the powerful impulse.”65 Though just like in case of
the Balkan Stability Pact, the proposed CSP would be deprived of powers and would not
probably have the role of making hard policy proposals at the initial stage some elements of
imposition might be necessary to break the deadlock.
It should be noted that the external states involved in the conflict resolution process in
the South Caucasus should be more careful in their approaches to the regional problems. For
                                                
63 From the text of the “Joint Declaration by President George W. Bush and President Vladimir V. Putin on
the New Strategic Relationship Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation”,
(Moscow, May 24, 2002), Source: <www.interfax.ru>, (Official translation) May 25, 2002.
64 See the text of the “Joint Declaration…”
65  See Michael Emerson, “A Stability Pact…” (2000) p. 29.
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example, the recognition of the so-called “Armenian genocide” in the French parliament in
January 2001, and lobbying of Armenian Diaspora in the Western states to recognize the
“genocide” undoubtedly negatively affects present tense relationships between Armenia and
Azerbaijan and Turkey and inevitably complicates the conflict resolution. Gerard Libaridian66
claims that ‘the Karabakh conflict and the “genocide” have their own points of intersection.
Armenians refer to Azerbaijanis as “Turks”, with all the evil and anxiety that the word evokes
from history.’67 Thus any such moves do not contribute to the confidence-building measures
aimed at dampening existing inter-ethnic and territorial conflicts and only add fuel to the regional
animosities between these peoples.
The CSP would in fact mean creation of credible Caucasus regional security system
that would preserve regional stability. As reads the CSP document “a common security order
for the South Caucasus should become the dominant feature of further joint action.” A specific
security agreement or treaty (or set of treaties), endorsed and supported by the UN, OSCE
and major powers, would define regional security aspects including questions of territories,
security guarantees. The question of borders should be given special consideration. Though all
regional conflicts are ethnicity-based and have secessionist elements, nevertheless
overgeneralization of the patterns of these conflicts to the minority versus “titular nation”68
standoff may hide other no less serious impediments to the regional stability. Attempts of
Abkhaz to control the territory of the autonomy where they used to be a minority before the
                                                
66 Gerard Libaridian – former adviser (1991-1997) to the ex-president Levon Ter Petrossian (1990-1998).
67 See Gerard Libaridian, “Re-imagining the Past, Rethinking the Present: The Future of Turkish-Armenian
relations”, Insight Turkey, Vol. 2, No. 4, (October-December 2000), p. 141.
68 Most of the Post-Soviet and, more broadly post-communist states are officially based on strict adherence
to the ethno-nationalistic idea of the nation state as a state primarily belonging to the dominant, most
numerous, ‘historic’, or ‘titular’ nation.
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war, for example, cannot be compared to Armenia, which is, in fact, trying to realize its policy
of “miatsum” – forceful annexation of Karabakh region of Azerbaijan. Thus, Armenian
irredentist territorial claims on neighboring countries (Armenia still has not renounced its
territorial claims on Turkey’s eastern provinces) are no less acute problem to the regional
security. Therefore any future regional security framework will have to contain something more
than a mutual obligation of three South Caucasian states to recognize and respect each others’
territorial integrity. Any stability pact will have to provide some sort of internationally sanctioned
commitment about the territorial integrity and inviolability of internationally recognized borders.
At the time when this thesis is being written it is difficult to predict whether such a
comprehensive pact is possible for the region in the foreseeable future. There are still too many
problems in relationships between the regional states. It will take time to get all parties agree on
the pact that would include all aspects of regional security issues. This is why analysts prefer to
talk about stabilization “process” instead of a “pact.”69
                                                
69 See Robert Culter, “The Key West Conference on Nagorno-Karabakh: Preparing Peace in the South
Caucasus”,<http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/commentary/0104karabakh_body.html>, Accessed: 2
June, 2002.
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CONCLUSION
The security environment in the South Caucasus after the demise of the Soviet Union
was characterized by the numerous ethnic conflicts and territorial disputes that turned into the
full-fledged wars. The weakening and eventual retreat of central Moscow authority from the
post-Soviet republics provided opportunity for various political groups to consolidate their
power by using nationalistic and secessionist slogans. The weak state institutions, lack of
political culture, centrifugal movements as well as social problems and economic hardships in
the newly independent states that resulted from the transformation of the central state economy
into the market-based economic system formed the internal sources of instability in the South
Caucasian states.
The internal sources of the instability in the South Caucasus affected the overall regional
security environment, by providing an opportunity for the meddling of the external powers to
advance their interests in the region. The security environment in the region was shaped to a
large extent by the policy of Russia – a sole country, which still had decisive leverage on the
newly independent states. The Russian political elite, in response to the Russia’s weakening
position in a number of key important international affairs, shifted its foreign policy orientation
towards the “Near Abroad.” It instrumentalised instability in the South Caucasus in order to
retain Russia’s preponderant position there and seal off the region from the external
penetrations. The Russian military, that was influential in Russian policy making towards the
FSU between 1992-1996, supported secessionist leaders and used them as leverage in order
to subdue the central governments in the NIS and weaken the growing influence of the Western
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countries. Internal security threats in Azerbaijan and Georgia were viewed as externally
instigated, to a large degree by Russia. As a result, the ethnic conflicts in the region quickly
internationalized and turned from “purely” ethnicity-based conflicts into the hidden struggle for
the geopolitical “sphere of influence,” and formed an external dimension of the regional
instability. The linkage between geopolitical environment in the region and the dynamics of the
conflicts in the South Caucasus became clearly identifiable.
The primary determinant of the foreign policy options of South Caucasian states was
thus location of these states in the geopolitical zone of “Great Power” competition. Azerbaijan
and Georgia in order to counterweigh Russia’s hegemonic aspirations developed close political
and security ties with other extra-regional countries. Turkey, that is the only regional power with
the long traditions of relations with the Western institutions was of particular importance to these
states. Although Turkey avoided policies that could bring to the head-on confrontation with
other regional powers, primarily with Russia, the “Turkish factor” was indispensable in fostering
geopolitical pluralism in the region. Apart from the role of “facilitator” in membership of these
states in the Western institutions such as the OSCE, NACC, IMF, World Bank, Turkey played
an important role in the diversification of the security ties of Azerbaijan and Georgia, that
eventually provided these states with greater space for political maneuverability in the region.
Turkey’s strategic partnership with Georgia and Azerbaijan moved quickly into the
military sphere. Given Turkey’s proximity to the region and historical ties with the regional
states, Turkey with the US backing took a leading role in promoting “Partnership for Peace”
(PfP) program in the region - a blueprint for NATO’s engagement in the South Caucasus.
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Turkey institutionalized defense links with these states by opening NATO-sponsored PfP
training center in Ankara.
Turkey just like Azerbaijan and Georgia sees the primary reason for the stalemate in the
conflict resolution in the region in the different security perceptions of regional and extra-
regional actors and acknowledged that the balancing of interests of all states involved is
essential to meet the challenges of the regional security problems. Turkey put forward a number
of regional initiatives that were believed to contribute to the creation of the regional cooperative
security framework. Turkey initiated such new regional cooperation schemes as the BSEC and
the “Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group” (BLACKSEAFOR) in 2001 and held a
trilateral summit of Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia in Trabzon in April 2002, which resulted in
signing of an agreement on “struggling against terrorism, organized crime and other heavy
crimes.” However, the most important initiative of Turkey was the “Caucasus Stability Pact”
proposed by the Turkish 9th president Süleyman Demirel in 2000. More than on one occasion,
Turkish ex-president Demirel noted that any regional stability scheme have to include concerted
cooperative efforts of the international community – a feature that was present in the Balkan
Stability Pact (1999), from which the Caucasus Stability Pact was in fact modeled. The fact that
the Task Force of the Brussels-based Center for European Policy Studies developed the
preliminary text of a comprehensive plan for the region indicates the growing interest by the
international community in the developing of a constructive strategic cooperation framework for
the whole region. Endorsement of a pact by the US and Russia – a key actors in the region, and
subsequent recognition by the leaders of these states of their “…common interest in promoting
the stability, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of all the nations of this region…” and pledges
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of the transparency and cooperation in their relations with the regional states is another
indication of the shift from a balance-of-power approach to that of the balance-of-interests.1
The Action Plan between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Turkey on co-operation
in Eurasia that was signed in November 2001 is one recent example of the fundamental change
in Russia’s approach to the involvement of other major regional actors in the “Near Abroad” –
a zone, which until recently had been considered a sphere of exclusive Russia’s interests.
Russia’s new president Putin is inclined to accommodate interests and concerns of other
regional states, and Turkey in particular, with which Russia has common zones of intersections.
These recent developments greatly diminish at least one of the main obstacles to the regional
stability, i.e. geopolitical rivalry of the major states and increase the prospects of a stabilization
of the South Caucasus.
                                                
1 From the text of the “Joint Declaration by President George W. Bush and President Vladimir V. Putin on
the New Strategic Relationship Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation”,
(Moscow, May 24, 2002), Source: <www.interfax.ru>, (Official translation) May 25, 2002.
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MAP 5: EXISTENT AND PROPOSED OIL AND GAS PIPELINES IN THE CASPIAN SEA BASIN
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     TABLE 1: DECLARED RUSSIAN MILITARY MANPOWER IN THE CAUCASUS
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1999 2000 2001
TCGF 100,000 30,000 25,000 20,000 12,945 13,100 10,700 8,800 6,900
Azerbaijan* 60,000 - - - - - - - -
Georgia
20,000
(+5.000)
20,000
(+6,000)
20,000
(+8,750)
15,000
(+7,000)
8,500
(+1,700)
8,500
(+2,100)
5,000
(+3,200)
5,000
(+2,000)
4,000
(+2,150)
Armenia 20,000 10,000 5,000 5,000 4,300 4,300 3,100 3,100 2,900
NCMD 20,000 30,000 55,000 50,000 65,000 70,500 79,500 82,500 76,000
Total
(without PKF)
120,000 60,000 80,000 70,000 77,945 83,600 90.200 91.300 82,900
      Notes:
      TCGF – The Trans-Caucasus Group of Forces.
      NCMD – The North Caucasus Military District.
      * Former Soviet 4th Army was withdrawn from Azerbaijan by May 15, 1993
      Figures in brackets are total Russian/CIS PKF (Peacekeeping Forces) deployed in South and North Ossetia, and Abkhazia.
      Source: The Military Balance: 1992-1993,1994-1995, 1996-1997, 1998-1999, 2000-2001, 2001-2002, IISS, London.
172
      TABLE 2:  ESTIMATED RUSSIAN POPULATION
 IN THE FORMER SOVIET REPUBLICS
COUNTRY ESTIMATED RUSSIAN
POPULATION
PERCENTAGE TO TOTAL
POPULATION, %
Ukraine 11,200,000 21.8
Crimea (Ukraine) 1,550,000 65
Kazakhstan 4,500,000 30.0
Belarus 2,100,000 20.4
Uzbekistan 1,300,000 5.8
Latvia 741,000 29,6
Moldova 500,000 11.5
Estonia 416,000 28.5
Lithuania 304,000 8.7
Kirgizia 290,000 6.5
Georgia 260,000 4.9
Azerbaijan 180,000 2.4
Tajikistan 140,000 2.4
Turkmenistan 50,000 1.2
Armenia 10,000 0.3
         Source: CIS Institute (Moscow), reprinted in www.echo-az.com (on-line Azerbaijani daily newspaper), April 2001.

